prsity  of  California 
them  Regional 
brary  Facility 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 

GIFT  OF 

HUGH  MILLER 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

EMERITUS 


DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,   AND   GOD 


MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND, 
AND  GOD 

FIVE    LECTURES    ON    CONTEMPORARY 
TENDENCIES    OF   THOUGHT 


BY 

R.  F.  ALFRED  HOERNLE 

M.A.,  B.Sc.  (Oxon.) 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY,  ARMSTRONG  COLLEGE 
(NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE)  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  DURHAM 


DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


NEW  YORK 

HARCOURT,  BRACE  AND  COMPANY 


PRINTED    IN    GREAT    BRITAIN 


IN    MEMOEIAM 

JOANNIS   THEODORI    MERZ 


1782217 


PREFACE 

MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD  may 
well  seem  too  big  a  title  for  so  small  a 
book.  And,  truly,  if  it  were  taken  to 
imply  a  claim  to  exhaustive  treatment  of  the  topics 
it  names,  it  would  bespeak  inexcusable  presump- 
tion on  the  author's  part.  No,  it  is  meant  as 
nothing  more  than  a  handy  abbreviation  for  some 
such  phrase  as  this  :  "  A  discussion  of  what  some 
of  the  leading  thinkers  of  our  day  are  saying  about 
'  Matter,  Life,  Mind,  and  God.'  "  This,  and  no 
more,  is  all  this  little  volume  of  lectures  attempts. 

The  original  lectures  were  inspired  by  the  thought 
that  a  University  placed,  like  Armstrong  College, 
in  a  centre  of  business  and  industry,  owes  a  duty 
not  only  to  its  enrolled  students,  but  to  the  whole 
community  of  which  it  forms  a  part :  that  it  should 
strive,  in  fact,  to  be  the  focus  of  the  intellectual  life 
of  its  neighbourhood.  For,  the  days  when  educa- 
tion was  treated  as  the  special  prerogative  of  the 
well-to-do  have  passed  away.  In  principle,  no  one 
now  disputes  that  all  should  have  access  to  education 


viii      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

in  the  measure  of  their  interest  and  capacity.  More- 
over, the  many  vigorous  movements  for  Adult 
Education  which  have  sprung  up  of  recent  years 
bear  eloquent  witness  to  the  truth  that  the  desire 
for  knowledge  lasts  as  long  as  life  itself.  This  new 
spirit  is  altering  profoundly  the  outlook  of  the 
academic  teacher.  He  is  learning  that  he  owes  it 
to  his  subject,  to  his  University,  to  his  city  and  dis- 
trict, to  help  all  who  desire  to  keep  in  touch,  not  only 
with  new  discoveries  and  theories  in  every  field  of 
research,  but  especially  with  those  larger  move- 
ments of  thought,  in  science,  in  philosophy,  in 
religion,  which  lie  behind  the  visible  scene  and 
make  or  unmake  our  civilization. 

The  lectures,  then,  which  compose  this  small 
volume  are  offered  as  a  contribution  to  the 
realization  of  this  ideal.  They  are  not  intended 
for  professors  and  experts.  The  audiences  which 
listened  to  them  were  composed  mainly  of  men 
and  women  without  any  special  training  in 
philosophy.  But  they  brought  to  the  hearing, 
together  with  a  common  background  of  general 
education,  a  keen  desire  to  understand  whither 
the  reflections  of  leading  thinkers  of  the  day 
are  tending  on  such  persistent  problems  as  Matter 
and  Life,  Mind  and  God.  To  meet  this  demand,  so 
far  as  lay  in  my  power,  was  my  aim.  By  this  aim 
I  would  ask  that  the  lectures  be  judged,  now  that, 


PREFACE  ix 

through  the  medium  of  print,  they  are  laid  before 
a  wider  public. 

The  lectures  were  originally  spoken  freely  from  a 
few  notes  and  written  out  later,  after  an  interval 
occasioned  by  other  claims  upon  my  time.  In 
consequence,  the  written  lectures  differ,  both  by 
omission  and  by  addition,  from  the  spoken  ones. 
Moreover,  freed  in  writing  from  the  time-limits 
imposed  on  a  speaker,  I  have  re-arranged  into  five 
printed  lectures  what  occupied  six  lectures  in 
delivery.  But  the  substance  and  the  general  plan 
have  remained  the  same. 

The  plan,  or  pervading  interest,  which  runs 
through  the  lectures  is  to  review  some  of  the  chief 
movements  hi  contemporary  thought,  in  order  to 
see  whether,  in  spite  of  their  manifest  diversity  and 
even  their  conflict,  they  do  not  exhibit  traces,  at 
least,  of  a  coherent  pattern ;  whether  they  do  not 
hold  out  the  promise  and  possibility  of  unity  in  our 
spiritual  life — a  unity  no  less  of  thought  than  of 
feeling.  The  precise  nature  of  this  synoptic  problem 
is  set  forth  in  the  first  lecture,  which  describes  the 
profound  and  many-sided  influence  of  Science  on 
modern  Thought,  and  then  goes  on  to  exhibit  the 
limitations  of  the  scientific  concept  of  "  Nature  " 
as  compared  with  the  whole  "  Universe  "  of  human 
experience.  The  second  lecture  gives  an  account  of 
the  revolt  against  "  materialism  "  in  the  Philosophy 


x        MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

of  Nature,  of  which  A.  N.  Whitehead  is  the 
brilliant  leader — a  revolt,  however,  the  success  of 
which  has  been  prepared  by  many  forerunners, 
both  among  philosophers  and  physicists.  The  main 
point  is  that  physical  theories  are  being  brought  to 
the  essentially  philosophical  test  of  a  fresh  analysis 
of  the  actual  data  of  our  experience.  This  is  shown, 
in  the  third  lecture,  to  react  on  the  antithesis  of 
mechanism  and  vitalism,  facilitating  the  recognition 
of  life  as  a  distinctive  type  of  phenomenon,  open  to 
empirical  study  without  needing  to  be  explained 
away  into  physics  and  chemistry,  or  else  referred  to  a 
hypothetical  vital  force  or  energy.  Simultaneously, 
recent  philosophical  analysis  has  undermined  the 
idolatry  of  "  mechanism."  The  fourth  lecture, 
after  an  historical  survey  of  theories  of  mind,  and 
a  discussion  of  the  causes  of  the  present  chaos  in 
psychology,  attempts  to  support  the  suggestion  that 
the  concept  of  "  behaviour,"  freed  from  the  exag- 
gerations and  prejudices  of  friend  and  foe  which 
now  beset  it,  may  offer  a  basis  for  the  reconciliation 
of  the  divergent  tendencies  which  now  divide  psycho- 
logists. The  fifth  lecture  is  devoted  to  reviewing 
the  attitude  of  philosophy  to  religion  and  theology, 
and  the  main  tendencies  in  the  Philosophy  of 
Religion,  more  especially  the  revival  of  Theism. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  I  have  tried  to  do  little 
more   than   play  an   intelligent   showman's   part. 


PREFACE  xi 

though  in  selection,  emphasis,  and  criticism,  as  well 
as  in  the  general  synoptic  aim,  I  naturally  betray 
the  direction  in  which  my  own  thinking  runs.  Still, 
my  chief  aim  has  been  to  interpret  to  my  audiences 
the  thoughts  of  some  of  the  best  thinkers  of  our  own 
generation.  To  those  whom  I  have  thus  ventured 
to  expound  I  would  now  acknowledge,  with  sincere 
gratitude,  my  obligations  for  the  use  I  have  made  of 
their  writings  in  these  lectures.  There  is  no  need 
to  assure  them  how  acutely  I  am  aware  of  the 
inevitable  shortcomings  of  my  treatment.  No  sum- 
mary presentation  of  tendencies  of  thought,  eked 
out  here  and  there  by  specific  quotation  or  allusion, 
can  possibly  do  justice  to  the  many  excellent  books 
enumerated  in  the  bibliographies  appended  to  each 
chapter.  But  I  hope  my  lectures  nowhere  fail  to 
make  clear  that  they  are  intended,  not  as  substitutes 
for,  but  as  guides  and  stimuli  to,  first-hand  study. 
I  have  reason  to  think  that  they  have  had  this  effect 
on  many  of  those  who  heard  them  delivered.  If 
in  their  printed  form  they  gain  additional  students 
for  some  of  the  masterpieces  of  contemporary  philo- 
sophy, they  will  not  have  been  written  in  vain. 

R.  F.  ALFRED  HOERNLE" 

ARMSTRONG  COLLEGE 

NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE 

December,  1922 


CONTENTS 

LECTURE  PAGE 

I.      SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY      -  I 

II.      THE      PRESENT-DAY      REVOLT     AGAINST 

"  MATTER "                              -           -          -  44 

III.  THE     ORDER    OF   NATURE  :     MECHANISM, 

VITALISM,   TELEOLOGY    -                      -  87 

IV.  THE  NATURE  AND   FUNCTION   OF  MIND     -  127 
V.      RELIGION  AND  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "  l66 


MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND 
GOD 

LECTURE    I 

SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND   PHILOSOPHY 


T 


i.   f   |    A  HERE   is   a   famous  saying  in  Plato's 
Republic :     "  He     who     sees     things 
together  is  the  true  dialectician,"  or, 
as  we  should  say,  "  the  true  philosopher." 

What  is  meant  by  this  "  seeing  things  together," 
this  synoptic  vision  of  the  philosopher  ?  What  need 
is  there  for  it  ?  What  occasion  ?  What  demand  ? 
Does  not  science  give  us  all  we  want  ?  Or,  else, 
religion  ? 

Consideration  of  these  questions  will  help  to  start 
us  on  our  way.  We  are  about  to  review  some  of 
the  chief  tendencies  in  contemporary  speculation 
concerning  the  nature  of  the  world  we  live  in.  Such 
an  enquiry  is  inspired  by  no  idle  curiosity  ;  for  our 
beliefs  concerning  the  nature  of  our  world  react 
profoundly  upon  our  feelings,  upon  our  conduct, 
upon  our  whole  attitude.  The  whole  spirit  of  our 
living,  the  way  we  bear  ourselves,  the  things  we 


2         MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

reckon  of  highest  worth,  are  apt  to  depend  on  what 
we  believe  to  be  our  place,  our  duty,  our  destiny  in  a 
world  such  as  ours.  But  what  sort  of  a  world  is  it  ? 
With  this  problem  we  are  still  wrestling,  as  our 
forefathers  have  wrestled  with  it  back  to  the  dawn 
of  human  thought.  We  are  conscious,  indeed,  that 
our  knowledge  has  made  great  strides  and  that  new 
discoveries  are  constantly  extending  its  boundaries. 
Modern  science,  especially  in  the  last  two  centuries, 
has  achieved  triumphs  far  beyond  anything  of  which 
our  forefathers  dared  to  dream.  It  has  given  us  in 
many  ways  a  different  world  and,  correspondingly, 
a  different  attitude  towards  the  world. 

But  when  we  survey  the  results  attained,  are  there 
not  grounds  also  for  misgiving  ?  We  spoke  just 
now  of  "  knowledge."  To  say  that  we  have  "  know- 
ledge "  is  to  say  that  the  world  is  really  what  we 
think  it  to  be.  In  other  words,  it  implies  a  claim  that 
what  we  think,  believe,  affirm,  is  true  and  can  be 
trusted ;  that  criticism  can  find  no  flaw  in  it,  no 
ground  for  doubt. 

If  we  ask,  Why  should  the  conclusions  of  science 
be  trusted  ?  or,  Why  should  its  theories  rank  as 
"  knowledge  "  ?  we  are  referred  to  scientific  method 
for  our  answer.  Ever  since  Bacon  and  Descartes 
the  problem  of  the  right  method  for  thinking,  or 
framing  judgments,  about  the  world  has  stood 
in  the  centre  of  philosophical  speculation.  Now, 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    3 

whatever  in  detail  the  method  of  science  may  be — 
and  this  is  a  question  to  some  aspects  of  which  we 
have  to  return — it  conies  to  us  with  the  prestige  of 
undeniable  success.  It  works.  Science  enables 
us  to  predict  natural  events  ;  more,  it  enables  us  to 
control  them  and  produce  them  at  will.  All  modern 
industry  is  built  up  by  the  application  of  science. 
Here,  then,  is  knowledge  which  is  power. 

But  these  reflections  do  not  suffice  to  put  us  beyond 
the  reach  of  doubt  altogether.  For  "  science  "  is 
a  blanket-term  which  covers  a  variety  of  distinct 
"  sciences,"  and  as  soon  as  we  look  closer  and  compare 
these  sciences  with  each  other,  we  notice  that  they 
are,  at  least  for  the  present,  far  from  forming  a  single, 
unified,  coherently  articulated  structure.  There  are 
sciences  dealing  with  purely  physical,  or  material, 
objects.  There  are  sciences  dealing  with  living 
beings  and  their  behaviour.  There  are  sciences 
dealing  with  minds.  But  how  matter,  life,  mind 
are  related  to  each  other — this  is  a  question  to 
which  we  get  ambiguous  answers,  or  none  at  all. 
In  fact,  as  we  shall  see,  about  the  very  meaning  of 
these  terms  there  is  much  dispute,  not  only  among 
philosophers  whom  it  is  customary  to  accuse  of 
logic-chopping  and  quibbling  about  terms,  but 
among  scientists  themselves.  Thus,  we  are  con- 
fronted by  the  paradoxical  result  that  a  super- 
structure which  is  secure  enough  to  "  work "  in 


4         MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

practice,  rests  nonetheless  on  insecure  foundations. 
Each  science,  so  we  might  say,  deals  with  a  fragment 
of  the  world,  but  the  fragments  fit  ill  together — 
nay,  they  may  appear  even  to  conflict. 

Nor  is  this  all.  There  are  many  feelings  and 
thoughts  which  the  world  evokes  in  us  and  which 
we  express  in  appropriate  speech  and  conduct, 
but  for  which  the  world,  as  scientific  thought 
defines  its  nature,  offers  no  basis  or  justification. 
The  beauty  which  the  artist  perceives  in  the  world 
and  renders  in  works  of  art,  the  moral  values  which 
we  embody  in  the  organized  institutions  of  a  social 
order,  the  perfection  which  a  religious  mind  discerns 
and  worships — what  place  have  these  in  the  scientific 
scheme  of  things,  as  that  is  usually  presented  ? 
They  have  no  place  in  it  at  all.  They  have  not  been 
considered  in  the  framing  of  it.  They  may  be 
not  only  ignored  by  it,  but  denied  as  having  no 
foundation  in  the  nature  of  things.  Merely  to 
mention  science  and  religion  in  one  breath  is  to  stir 
up  memories  of  past  and  present  conflicts. 

It  is  these  conflicts,  both  within  the  realm  of 
science  itself  in  respect  of  its  fundamental  concepts, 
and  also  between  it  and  other  sides  of  the  world  of 
our  experience,  which,  on  the  one  hand,  throw  doubt 
on  the  sufficiency  of  science  itself,  and,  on  the  other, 
are  a  standing  demand  or  call  for  a  synoptic  effort. 
Seeing  things  together  and  thinking  them  together 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    5 

are  necessary  if  we  are  to  escape  from  these  discords 
in  what  we  feel,  think,  and  express  in  act.  In 
proportion  as  we  become  acutely  conscious  of  these 
discords,  we  experience  also  the  desire  to  overcome 
them.  We  seek  to  transcend  the  fragmentariness 
and  instability  of  partial  views  and  attitudes. 
Is  this  merely  a  sentimental  demand  which  the 
world  is  not  bound  to  satisfy  ?  Is  it,  in  other 
words,  unreasonable  ?  Or  is  it  not,  rather,  the 
very  clue  which  reason  bids  us  follow  if  we  would 
learn  to  think  the  world  as  it  really  is  ?  The  goal 
of  the  synoptic  endeavour  is,  precisely,  to  think 
together  all  the  data  which  experience  offers  us. 
The  actual  success  of  our  efforts  may  fall  far  short 
of  the  attainment  of  this  goal,  and  therefore 
persistence  in  the  effort  requires  much  of  the  faith 
which  anticipates  what  it  cannot  bodily  possess. 
Still,  it  is  no  small  gain  for  the  reasonable  conduct 
of  life  to  feel  assured  that  our  demand  for  unity 
and  stability  in  thought  and  feeling  and  action  is 
not  likely  to  be,  in  principle,  denied  by  the  world. 
But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  the 
synoptic  effort  of  philosophy  requires  for  its  satis- 
faction the  construction  of  a  "  system,"  snug, 
tidy,  all-inclusive,  and,  above  all,  fixed.  The 
stability  of  an  attitude  towards  the  world  must  not 
be  confused  with  the  rigidity  of  a  system.  What 
we  value  even  in  the  apparently  most  rigid  systems 


6        MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

of  the  older  thinkers,  e.g.,  in  Spinoza's  Ethics, 
where  he  tries  to  demonstrate  by  the  "  geometric 
method "  that  man's  happiness  consists  in  the 
"intellectual  love  of  God" — is  the  attitude,  the 
living  spirit.  The  stability  of  an  attitude  must  rest 
on  principles  and  thus  be  ever  true  to  itself,  but  it 
must  be  also  infinitely  flexible  and  adaptable  so 
as  to  meet  with  appropriate  response  the  ever- 
changing  demands  of  life.  For,  it  is  true,  in  a 
sense,  that  life  is  too  varied  and  changeful  to  be 
imprisoned,  once  and  for  all,  in  a  formula.  The 
world  moves  on,  and  no  "  system  "  can  capture  it 
and  hold  it  fast.  We  are  never  without  fresh 
discoveries  and  theories  in  science,  new  movements 
in  art  or  religion,  new  experiments  in  economic 
or  political  organization.  Old  social  customs  are 
always  being  abandoned  and  new  fashions  set  up 
in  their  place.  Great  crises,  like  war  or  revolution, 
periodically  threaten  to  engulf  the  landmarks  by 
which  we  have  been  wont  to  steer  life's  course. 
Novelty,  in  this  sense,  is  an  ever-present  feature  of 
our  world,  and  thus  the  problem  of  adjusting  our- 
selves to  facts  and  situations  which  we  have  never 
met  with  before  is  always  with  us — no  less  so  in 
family  life,  in  business,  in  politics  than  in  the 
laboratory  of  the  scientific  researcher.  This  is  the 
reason  why  the  philosophical  problem  of  "  seeing 
things  together  "  persists,  why  it  is  ever  new,  why 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    7 

it  has  to  be  solved  again  by  each  generation  in  terms 
of  the  fresh  data  of  its  experience. 

Thus,  we  are  not  setting  out  in  these  lectures  to 
construct  yet  another  system  of  philosophy.  We 
shall  not  even  attempt  to  bring  the  whole  field  of 
modern  life  and  thought  within  the  scope  of  our 
synoptic  survey.  Human  learning  has  become 
too  vast,  human  civilization  too  many-sided  and 
complex,  for  any  single  human  mind  to  encompass 
them,  as  Aristotle  may,  perhaps,  be  said  to  have 
encompassed  them  in  antiquity,  or  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas  at  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages,  or  Leibniz 
in  the  seventeenth  century,  before  the  modern  mind 
had  fairly  got  into  its  stride.  Our  task  is  to  be  a 
much  humbler  one.  We  are  to  pass  in  review  some 
of  the  most  recent  movements  of  thought  on  the 
problems  of  Matter,  Life,  Mind,  and  God — or,  in 
other  words,  movements  of  thought  in  physics, 
biology,  psychology,  and  theology.  On  the  other 
hand,  with  all  those  currents  of  contemporary 
thought  and  feeling  which  are,  before  our  eyes, 
remoulding  the  relations  of  classes  and  nations  we 
shall  not  be  concerned.  So,  too,  we  shall  leave 
aside  all  movements  in  the  realm  of  private  morals, 
or,  again,  in  the  realm  of  art.  A  truly  compre- 
hensive programme  of  synopsis  would  demand  the 
inclusion  of  all  these,  as  also  of  history,  and  of  many 
sciences  not  mentioned  above.  But  we  must  be 


8        MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

content  to  limit  ourselves  and  to  select,  from  the 
realm  of  theories,  scientific  and  theological,  a  few 
problems  which  must  needs  stand  in  the  centre  of 
discussion  whenever  men  debate  what  sort  of  a 
world  it  is  in  which  their  lives  are  cast. 

We  are  to  make  the  experiment  of  looking  for 
evidence  that  contemporary  movements  of  thought 
on  these  problems  are  not  mutually  incompatible, 
but  hold  out  the  promise  of  forming  parts  of  a  cohe- 
rent pattern  or  order.  In  this  sense,  and  to  this 
extent,  we  shall  try  to  practise  the  philosophical 
art  of  "  seeing  things  together  "  on  the  science  and 
theology  of  our  day. 

2.  In  the  realms  of  theory  which  we  are  about 
to  enter,  we  must  be  prepared  for  a  good  deal  of 
discussion  which  is  technical  and,  in  the  common 
phrase, "  abstract."  All  the  more  important  is  it  that 
we  should  keep  vividly  with  us,  throughout,  a  sense 
of  the  many-sided  context  of  human  life  and  work, 
of  the  whole  pageant  of  human  history  and  civiliza- 
tion, out  of  which  even  the  most  abstract  theories 
have  sprung  and  within  which  they  never  cease  to 
have  their  roots.  Only  imagination  can  help  us 
here.  Let  us,  therefore,  evoke  a  picture  which  may, 
as  a  sample,  stand  for  countless  other  pictures  taken 
from  the  story  of  our  race  upon  this  earth.  Let  us 
suppose  ourselves  to  be  standing  on  the  Northum- 
brian uplands,  above  the  valley  of  the  Tyne,  where 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY      9 

the  crumbling  remains  of  the  great  Roman  Wall 
run  along  the  crests  of  the  hills  from  east  to  west 
as  far  as  the  eye  can  reach.  It  is  a  scene  sufficiently 
desolate — with  the  ruins  at  our  feet  witnessing  to  the 
fall  of  an  ancient  empire,  with  sparse  sheep  browsing 
on  the  fell-side,  and  here  and  there  a  lonely  farm- 
house tucked  into  the  folds  of  the  hills.  Yet,  even 
so,  there  is  scarce  a  spot  on  which  the  eye  can  rest 
but  bears  the  impress  of  human  hands.  And  behind 
the  hands  there  are  the  minds,  using  the  natural 
resources  which  they  find,  in  the  measure  of  their 
knowledge  of  them,  for  the  appeasing,  first,  of  the 
urgent  needs  of  bodily  life,  and,  next,  for  the 
gradual  upbuilding  of  a  civilization  the  essence  of 
which  is  to  make  physical  things  and  physical  forces 
instrumental  to,  and  expressive  of,  spiritual  values. 
It  is  easy  to  say  that  man  has  touched  but  the  sur- 
face of  nature,  here  or  anywhere :  that  sky  and 
mountain,  river  and  sea,  are  what  they  always  were 
and  would  have  been  had  man  never  appeared  upon 
the  scene.  Granted  :  man  cannot  alter  the  move- 
ments of  the  stars  or  the  vagaries  of  the  weather 
or  the  tides  of  the  sea.  He  may  level  hills  to  build 
his  cities,  but  he  does  not  turn  mountain-ranges 
into  plains.  He  may  canalize  rivers  for  navigation 
or  dam  them  to  irrigate  his  fields  and  supply  power 
to  his  turbines,  but  he  cannot  make  rivers  to 
run  if  Nature  has  not  provided  them  for  him. 


10      MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

He  may  drain  marshes  and  fill  up  a  Zuyder 
Zee,  but  he  cannot  make  dry  land  where 
there  are  oceans.  But,  granting  all  this,  it 
still  remains  true  that  the  actual  environment  in 
which  civilized  man  lives  is  one  which  he  has  made 
what  it  now  is,  to  suit  his  needs,  to  realize  his 
aspirations,  to  express  some  belief  concerning  the 
meaning  and  purpose  of  his  life.  Wherever  civiliza- 
tion has  established  itself,  there  the  virgin  soil  and 
the  untrod  forest  are  no  longer  found.  The  farmer's 
fields  and  meadows  have  been  worked  and  tended 
by  generations,  the  trees  have  been  planted,  the 
crops  sown,  the  animals  bred  by  human  hands. 
Wherever  man  has  taken  control,  he  has  step,  by 
step,  as  he  progressed  in  knowledge  and  the  power 
which  is  knowledge,  elicited  effects  from  Nature 
which  Nature,  left  to  herself,  would  scarce  have 
produced.  Consider,  for  example,  the  many  species 
of  domesticated  animals  and  plants  which  man  has 
bred  out  of  their  "  wild  "  progenitors  as  he  first 
found  them.  The  creative  intelligence  of  man  has 
been  in  historical  times  one  of  the  chief  agencies  of 
organic  variation. 

But  let  us  continue  our  experiment.  Let  us  turn 
from  the  lonely  uplands  down  to  the  populous  valley, 
where  villages  and  townships  cluster  round  mines 
and  factories  on  the  river  bank,  where  road  and 
railway  and  telegraph  run  to  the  distant  city.  Let 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    11 

us  turn  to  the  city  itself  where  the  streets  are 
crowded  with  traffic,  where  buildings  climb  high 
into  the  sky,  where  in  shop  and  office,  church  and 
college,  men  gather  on  their  various  businesses 
bent.  Once  more  what  a  transformation  of  Nature  ! 
The  once  bare  hillside  is  covered  with  structures  of 
brick  and  stone  and  cement.  The  original  forest 
survives  as  scarce  a  name.  What  was  once  a 
babbling  brook  runs  in  a  covered  conduit  and  serves 
as  a  sewer.  The  river  banks  are  lined  with  mighty 
works,  and  ocean-going  steamers  float  where  once 
a  ford  crossed  the  river. 

Yet  this  is  but  the  surface,  the  visible  scene.  The 
meaning  and  purpose  of  it  all  appear  only  when,  in 
terms  of  the  human  mind,  we  interpret  this  transfor- 
mation of  the  pathless  jungle  and  the  untilled  glebe 
into  farm  and  factory,  road  and  city.  If  we  would 
understand  it  all  we  must  take  it  as  what  it  really  is, 
and  talk  of  it  in  terms  of  agriculture  and  handicraft, 
of  industry  and  commerce,  of  trade  and  politics,  of 
war  and  peace.  And  last,  but  not  least,  we  shall 
have  to  speak  of  things  of  beauty  created  for  the 
sheer  joy  thereof,  of  knowledge  sought  for  its  own 
sake,  of  the  struggle  of  good  and  evil,  of  the  worship 
of  God.  Everywhere  the  visible  scene  is  the  symbol 
of  spiritual  fact.  A  dwelling-house  is,  at  its  lowest, 
a  shelter  against  storm  and  wind,  heat  and  cold, 
but  at  its  normal  best  it  is  a  home  and  the  setting 


12      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

of  family-life.  Farm  and  factory  are  unintelligible 
except  as  creations  of  intelligence  applied  to  the 
satisfaction  of  wants.  Schools  and  colleges  serve 
the  realization  of  educational  ideals.  Only  a  know- 
ledge of  religion  will  explain  the  edifice  of  a  church 
— its  existence,  its  design,  the  use  of  its  various 
parts,  the  symbolism  of  its  total  structure  and  its 
detailed  ornament. 

What  has  not  Man  made  of  Nature  !  How  closely 
interwoven  are  what  Nature  gives  and  Man  has  made 
of  the  given.  Materials  are  given — "  raw,"  until 
human  hands  and  intelligences  impose  upon  them 
form  and  shape,  eliciting  use  and  beauty  from  their 
varied  natural  qualities.  Forces,  too,  are  given, 
the  "  laws  "  of  which  we  cannot  alter,  but  we  can 
obey  these  laws  and  thus  bend  the  forces  to  our 
purposes.  In  proportion  to  the  growth  of  civiliza- 
tion does  the  actual  environment  of  our  daily  living 
become  an  environment  of  things  made,  shaped, 
arranged  by  ourselves  to  satisfy  our  ever-increasing 
needs — an  environment  of  tools  and  instruments 
which  secure,  not  merely  the  necessities  of  bare 
existence,  but  comforts  and  luxuries,  and  which 
make  it  possible  to  set  free  from  the  incessant 
struggle  for  survival  energies  for  the  cultivation  of 
beauty  and  knowledge  for  their  own  sakes.  When 
we  reflect  on  all  the  achievements  of  our  modern 
civilization  we  may  well  repeat,  with  deeper 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    13 

meaning,  the  Greek  poet's  paean  of  the  triumph  of 
Man  : 


There  are  marvellous  wonders  many 

Where'er  this  world  we  scan, 
Yet  among  them  nowhere  any 

So  great  a  marvel  as  Man. 
To  the  white  sea's  uttermost  verges 

Afloat  this  miracle  goes, 
Forging  through  thundering  surges 

When  the  wintry  southwind  blows  : — 
And  the  Earth,  Heaven's  Mother,  divinest  born, 
The  eternal,  deathless,  unoutworn. 
Still  plied  with  an  endless  to-and-fro 
As  the  yearly  ploughshares  furrowing  go, 

By  Man  is  fretted  and  torn. 


The  blithe  swift  careless  races 

On  light  wing  flying  in  air 
With  speed  of  his  wit  he  chases 

And  takes  in  a  woven  snare  : 
All  deer  in  the  wild  wood  running, 

The  deep  sea's  diverse  kind, 
Are  snared  in  toils  by  the  cunning 

Of  Man's  outrivalling  mind. 
Strength  of  the  lion,  lord  of  the  hill, 
Yields  to  Man's  overmastering  skill ; 
With  his  proud  mane  bowing  under  the  yoke 
The  rebellious  horse  is  tamed  and  broke, 

And  the  mountain  bull  to  his  will. 


He  hath  found  out  Speech,  and  the  giving 

Of  wings  to  his  high,  proud  Thought ; 
And  the  ordered  spirit  of  living 

In  Towns  his  mind  hath  taught ; 
Shelter  from  arrowy  shafts 

Of  the  bleak  air's  frost  and  sleet ; 
There  is  nought  in  store  but  his  crafts 

Shall  have  armed  him  ready  to  meet ; 


14      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

He  fronts  with  fresh  devices 

The  future's  every  shape  : 
Only,  despite  his  cunning, 
The  Grave  still  mocks  all  shunning  ; 
Disease  may  root  her  vices, 

But  Art  hath  learned  escape.1 

3.  If  Sophocles  could  write  thus  of  the  power 
and  cunning  of  man  in  the  fifth  century  B.C.,  how 
would  he  have  written  in  our  age  of  inventions  and 
machines !  Of  beauty  he  might  now  find  less,  of 
power  vastly  more.  Whithersoever  he  turned,  he 
would  find  knowledge  applied  to  the  task  of  subduing 
Nature  to  human  purposes.  It  is  a  bare  common- 
place to  say  that  our  age  of  machines  is  an  age  of 
applied  science,  an  age  which  has  taken  for  its  motto 
Bacon's  maxim  that  "  knowledge  is  power  " — 
power  to  be  used  for  improving  man's  estate.  The 
vast  and  rapid  expansion  of  science,  especially 
during  the  last  hundred  and  fifty  years,  is  profoundly 
altering  the  attitude  of  modern  man  towards  the 
world.  This  development  of  science  has  come  on 
the  top  of  the  revival  of  classical  learning  which  we 
call  the  Renaissance,  of  the  religious  emancipation 
which  we  owe  to  the  Reformation,  of  the  voyages  of 
discovery  and  colonial  expansion  which  carried  the 
civilization  of  Western  Europe  to  all  corners  of  the 
earth.  It  has  accompanied  the  rise  of  nation-states, 

1  From    Sophocles,    Antigone,    second    chorus    (Headlam's 
translation). 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    15 

each  with  its  distinctive  culture,  language,  and 
national  feeling.  It  has  gone  hand  in  hand  with  the 
development  and  spread  of  democracy.  It  has  made 
possible  the  modern  industrial  system,  with  its  huge 
aggregations  of  workers  in  factory-towns  and  its 
far-reaching  changes  in  the  economic  and  social 
relations  of  men.  With  all  these  successive  trans- 
formations and  expansions  of  his  outlook,  a  subtle 
change  has  come  over  the  spirit  of  modern  man — 
a  change  born  of  the  new  sense  of  power  with  which 
science  has  endowed  him.  A  new  quality  of  hope- 
fulness, of  confidence  in  the  future  and  in  the  destiny 
of  the  human  race  on  earth,  marks  now  his  attitude. 
"  Progress "  has  become  his  watchword.  Belief 
in  progress  has  replaced  the  legends  of  a  golden  age 
in  the  past,  of  a  paradise  lost.  Our  paradise  lies 
in  the  future  and  is  to  be  built  by  our  own  strength 
and  knowledge.  In  this  form,  the  belief,  as  Pro- 
fessor J.  B.  Bury  has  recently  shown  in  his  History 
of  the  Idea  of  Progress,  is  a  peculiarly  modern 
phenomenon.  Moreover,  this  new  hopefulness  and 
confidence  draw  their  main  inspiration,  not  from 
trust  in  the  loving  care  of  a  personal  God,  but  from 
the  conviction  that  through  knowledge  the  human 
race  will  increasingly  become  master  of  its  own  fate. 
Mankind  is  learning,  and  will  continue  to  learn, 
ever  more  completely  how  to  control  the  conditions 
of  its  existence  on  earth,  including  the  working  of 


16      MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

men's  own  bodies  and  minds.     Health  and  happiness 
for  as  many  human  beings  as  possible — such  is  the 
gospel  of  this  new  "  religion  of  humanity."     For 
a  religion  it  is — a  religion  of  devotion  to  the  service 
of  man,  a  religion  in  which  morality  joins  hands  with 
science,  the  latter  supplying  the  means  for  the  vic- 
tory over  poverty,  disease,  and  vice  which  the  former 
proposes  as  the  end.     The  achievement  of  happiness 
by  the  use  of  all  the  resources  of  knowledge  for 
the  elimination  of  evil — thus  one  might  formulate 
the  programme  of  the  new  spirit.     Here  is  a  typical 
utterance  :    "  That  the  control  of  nature  through 
the  advancement  of  knowledge  is  the  instrument  of 
progress  and  the  chief  ground  of  hope,  is  the  axiom 
of  modern  civilization.  .  .  .     The  good  is  to  be  won 
by  the  race  and  for  the  race  ;  it  lies  in  the  future, 
and  can  result  only  from  prolonged  and  collective 
endeavour  ;   and  the  power  to  achieve  it  lies  in  the 
progressive  knowledge  and  control  of   Nature."  1 
Here  is  another  :    "  Of  all  the  modern  steps  towards 
international  unity,  the  most  indisputable,  the  most 
firmly  based  and  farthest  reaching,  is  science,  and 
the  various  applications  of  science,  both  in  promot- 
ing intercourse  between  different  parts  of  the  world 
and  in  alleviating  suffering  and  strengthening  and 
illuminating  human  life.      The  more  prominence, 
therefore,  that  we  can  secure  for  the    growth  of 

1  R.  B.  Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  pp.  4,  5. 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    17 

science  in  the  teaching  of  history,  the  larger  place 
humanity,  or  the  united  mind  of  mankind,  will  take 
in  the  moving  picture  of  the  world."  l  On  all  sides 
science  is  praised,  and  rightly  praised,  as  being 
progressive,  co-operative,  international,  beneficent, 
or,  at  least,  beneficent  when  combined  with  the  will 
to  use  only  for  good  ends  the  immense  powers  which 
it  confers.  But  this  goodwill  is  universally  assumed 
by  the  apostles  of  the  religion  of  humanity,  for  they 
are  commonly  themselves  burning  with  hatred  of 
injustice  and  evil,  and  many  of  them  have  been 
zealous  champions  and  devoted  workers  in  the  cause 
of  reform. 

Nonetheless,  it  is  a  large  assumption  to  make. 
It  is  one  thing  to  hope  much  from  the  power  for  good 
which  science  brings.  But  a  power  for  good  is  also 
a  power  for  evil.  Hence,  it  is  another  thing  to  hope 
much  from  men's  will  to  seek  the  good  and  nothing 
but  the  good.  Moreover,  are  we  even  agreed,  do  we 
know  beyond  the  shadow  of  doubt,  what  the  good 
is  ?  If  we  press  these  questions,  we  soon  find  that 
the  optimism  of  the  new  spirit  is  dogged  by  pessi- 
mism, that  its  hopefulness  is  easily  by  disappoint- 
ment turned  to  despair.  We  would  all  like  to 
believe,  with  Mr.  Bertrand  Russell,  that  if  men  would 
only  take  thought  and  show  goodwill,  they  could 
rid  themselves  in  a  few  years  of  all  the  major  ills 

1  F.  S.  Marviu,  The  Unity  of  Civilization,  p.  32. 


18      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

which  now  afflict  them.  But  why  do  we  take 
thought  so  little,  or  so  often  think  badly  when  we 
do  ?  Why  do  we  show  so  little  goodwill  ?  Why 
do  we  profess  high  ideals  and  so  constantly  fail  to 
carry  them  out  ?  If  the  War  has  taught  us  nothing 
on  this  point,  what  of  the  Peace  ?  The  Peace 
Conference  at  Paris  has  shown  to  all  of  us  that  the 
world  with  which  our  statesmen  have  to  deal,  is 
rapidly  becoming  too  vast  and  complicated  for  the 
knowledge  of  any  group  of  men  to  be  equal  to  the 
wise  ordering  of  it.  But,  what  is  far  more  ominous 
still,  human  character,  i.e.,  the  quality  of  the 
purposes  of  nations,  as  expressed  in  the  decisions 
and  actions  of  their  representatives,  looks  like  being 
even  more  unequal  to  the  demands  made  upon  it. 
Our  passions  constantly  becloud  our  vision  of  the 
common  good.  The  "  Great  Society  "  of  mankind, 
as  Mr.  Graham  Wallas  calls  it,  is  a  fact  which  is 
daily  becoming  more  firmly  established,  especially 
in  the  interlacing  of  the  economic  interests  of  all 
peoples.  But  Mr.  Wallas  seems  right  in  arguing 
that  so  far  we  have  failed  to  develop  the  type  of 
mind  required  of  citizens  of  the  Great  Society. 
Neither  our  power  of  understanding  one  another  nor 
our  power  of  organized  co-operation  have,  so  far, 
proved  adequate  to  the  need.  Slowly,  all  too  slowly, 
we  are  learning  to  think  and  act  internationally. 
Moreover,  our  failure  to  organize  the  relations  of 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    19 

nations  on  a  basis  of  peaceful  co-operation  is 
repeated  in  our  failure  to  organize  the  relations  of 
peoples  and  the  relations  of  races.  A  cynic  might 
find  ample  opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  bitter 
humour  in  the  contrast  between  mankind's  trium- 
phant control  of  non-human  Nature  and  its  con- 
spicuous failure  to  manage  itself.  It  is  as  if  human 
minds  were  too  small  to  solve  man-made  problems — 
in  knowledge  too  ill-equipped,  in  purpose  too  impure. 
For  nineteen  hundred  years  the  white  race  has  been 
schooled  by  Christian  discipline  :  the  present  state 
of  Europe  shows  how  little  it  has  profited  by  the 
lesson. 

Thus,  the  gospel  of  man's  place  and  destiny  in  the 
world  which  the  religion  of  humanity  offers  is  sub- 
ject to  grave  deductions  on  account  of  the  defects 
in  human  nature  itself.  But  it  is  undeniable  that 
it  has  proved  capable  of  expressing  the  best  feelings 
and  aspirations  of  some  of  the  ablest  and  most  public- 
spirited  men,  especially  of  the  Victorian  Age.  After 
Comte  had  formulated  it  in  France,  John  Stuart 
Mill  transferred  it  to  England,  where  it  has  become, 
so  we  may  fairly  say,  the  working-creed  of  all 
scientists  who  have  shaped  their  world-view  under 
the  vivid  impression  of  all  that  science  has  done, 
and  promises  still  to  do,  for  the  alleviation  of  the 
human  lot.  Darwin's  theory  of  evolution  did  much 
to  dispose  men's  minds  in  favour  of  such  an  attitude. 


20      MATTER,   LIFE,  MIND,   AND  GOD 

We  know  that  Francis  Galton,  Darwin's  cousin, 
was  profoundly  struck  by  the  theory  of  evolution 
as  implying  the  ascent  of  man.  The  thought  of 
the  human  race  evolving  under  the  influence  of 
factors  discoverable  by  scientific  methods  inspired 
in  him  the  vision  of  the  intelligent  control  of  the 
evolutionary  process,  of  the  application  of  know- 
ledge to  the  guidance  and  acceleration  of  that 
process.  He  wrote  of  this  inspiration  as  "  a  virile 
creed,  full  of  hopefulness,  and  appealing  to  many  of 
the  noblest  feelings  of  our  nature."  It  made  him 
the  founder  of  the  science  of  Eugenics.  Another 
scientific  worker  of  that  age,  Metchnikoff,  known 
for  his  researches  into  the  possibility  of  postponing 
old  age  and  death,  was  similarly  inspired  by  the 
thought  of  the  dependence  of  human  progress  on 
science — a  thought  which  came  to  him  through 
Buckle's  History  of  Civilization.  In  Tyndall,  in 
Huxley,  we  find  the  same  attitude.  In  our  own  day, 
it  is  eloquently  voiced  by  Soddy  and  by  many  others. 
Its  influence  has  penetrated  into  all  departments 
of  modern  life,  wherever  scientific  ways  of  thinking 
have  found  entrance.  Through  the  development  of 
psychology,  it  has  taught  us  that  there  is  a  technique 
in  the  control  and  moulding  of  minds.  Our  educa- 
tional practice  is  being  transformed  by  new  experi- 
ments in  methods  of  teaching  and  training.  The 
arts  of  advertisement  and  political  propaganda 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    21 

play  upon  our  feelings  and  beliefs,  for  better  or 
worse.  Social  psychology  sets  itself  to  study  the 
behaviour  of  men  in  society,  and  the  motives  from 
which  it  springs,  in  order  to  supply  a  psychological 
technique  for  statesmanship.1  Psycho-analysis  is 
perfecting  a  method  for  discovering,  and  curing,  the 
causes  of  many  morbid  derangements.  It  is  begin- 
ning to  formulate  valuable  hints  for  moral  training. 
Even  in  the  suggestion  that  crime  is  disease  and 
demands  to  be  healed  by  the  psychiatrist  rather  than 
to  be  punished  by  the  judge,  no  less  than  in  the 
Taylor  system  for  securing  increased  output  and 
efficiency  from  industrial  workers,  we  can  trace  the 
influence  of  the  ideal  of  managing  men  to  better 
effect  by  "  taking  thought,"  i.e.,  by  the  application 
of  science. 

It  was  only  to  be  expected  that  this  new  move- 
ment should  find  expression  also  in  contemporary 
philosophy,  for  in  philosophy  the  human  spirit  reflects 
upon  itself  and  gives  an  account  to  itself  of  what  it 
is  and  what  it  wants.  The  Pragmatism  of  William 
James,  the  Humanism  of  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  the 
Instrumentalism  of  John  Dewey,  all  emphasize 
different  aspects  of  the  new  attitude.  Schiller 

1  Cf.  Graham  Wallas,  The  Great  Society,  ch.  ii,  p.  20  :  "  The 
science  of  social  psychology  aims  at  discovering  and  arranging 
the  knowledge  which  will  enable  us  to  forecast,  and  therefore 
to  influence,  the  conduct  of  large  numbers  of  human  beings 
organized  in  societies." 


22      MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

stresses  the  way  in  which  all  thinking  is  controlled 
by  purposes,  by  problems  to  be  solved,  by  things 
to  be  done.  James  dwells  most  on  the  part  which 
thinking  plays  in  the  guidance  of  behaviour,  and  on 
the  way  in  which  the  consequences  of  acting  out  our 
ideas  teach  us  to  discriminate  between  good  (true) 
and  bad  (false)  thinking.  He,  too,  preaches  the 
gospel  of  Meliorism,  i.e.,  the  urgency  and  hopeful- 
ness of  the  moral  endeavour  for  the  elimination  of 
evil,  for  the  perfecting  of  man  and  of  his  world. 
Dewey  sums  up  in  the  concept  of  "  creative  intelli- 
gence "  the  call  to  us  to  take  thought  about  human 
aff airs,  and  to  apply  scientific  methods  to  the  prob- 
lems of  educational  and  social  reform.  The  term 
"  creative "  expresses  better  than  any  other 
the  quality  which  contemporary  thinkers  acclaim 
in  the  characteristic  spirit  of  our  age.  It  meets  us 
again  in  Bergson's  Creative  Evolution,  in  the  pages 
of  which  we  find  that  bold,  imaginative  picture  of 
humanity,  as  the  chief  bearer  of  the  cosmic  elan 
vital,  galloping  forward  into  the  future  like  an  army 
of  horsemen  destined  to  put  even  death  to  flight.1 
In  profounder  metaphysical  speculations,  as  in  the 
Gifford  Lectures  on  Space,  Time,  and  Deity  of  the 

1  Cf.  L'  Evolution  Cvkatrice,  end  of  ch.  iii,  p.  295  :  "  L'humanit6 
entiere,  dans  1'espace  et  dans  le  temps  est  une  immense  armee 
qui  galope  a  cote  de  chacun  de  nous,  en  avant  et  en  arriere  de 
nous,  dans  une  charge  entrainante  capable  de  culbuter  toutes 
les  resistances  et  de  franchir  bien  des  obstacles,  meme  peut-etre 
la  mort." 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    23 

realist,  Professor  S.  Alexander,  the  modern  spirit 
appears  in  the  emphasis  on  evolution  as  the  move- 
ment of  the  world  towards  perfection,  whereas  in 
the  writings  of  the  Italian  neo-idealists,  Croce, 
Gentile,  and  others,  it  appears  in  the  emphasis  on 
mind  as  "  pure  act."  And  in  both  theories  the 
ultimate  reality  of  time  is  affirmed  as  the  condition 
of  progress  and  creative  advance. 

We  have  already  noted,  above,  that  this  modern 
attitude  appears  in  many  of  its  representatives  as 
a  religion,  or,  at  least,  that  Comte's  "  religion  of 
humanity  "  is  one  of  its  most  characteristic  forms. 
As  such,  it  challenges  comparison  with  the  tradi- 
tional forms  of  religion,  or,  rather,  it  is  a  phenomenon 
of  revolt  against  certain  features  of  the  traditional 
theology.  The  lines  of  affiliation  and  contrast, 
here,  are  many  and  tangled.  But  two  among  them 
are  clearly  marked.  One  is  the  line  of  moral  revolt 
which  J.  S.  Mill,  for  example,  voiced  in  his  posthum- 
ous Essays  on  Religion  and  which  bases  itself  on  the 
difficulty  of  reconciling  the  existence  of  evil  with  the 
belief  in  a  God  who,  as  all-good  and  all-wise,  cannot 
have  wuled  evil,  and  who,  as  all-powerful,  could 
have  prevented  it.  The  other  is  the  scientific  revolt 
against  "  physico-theology,"  i.e.,  against  the  theo- 
logizing form  of  science  which  set  itself  piously  to 
explore  the  world  for  evidences  of  the  goodness, 
wisdom,  and  power  of  the  Creator. 


24      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND   GOD 

But  this  emancipation  of  science  from  theology, 
and  the  abandonment  of  design  in  favour  of  cause  as 
the  explanatory  principle  of  science,  brings  us  to 
another  aspect  of  our  topic. 

4.  So  far,  we  have  been  considering  the  distinc- 
tive cast  which  science,  as  power,  has,  in  alliance  with 
morality,  given  to  the  feelings,  thoughts,  and  actions 
of  many  modern  men. 

But  this  is  only  one  side  of  the  story.  Science  has 
helped  to  shape  the  modern  mind  and  its  way  of 
conceiving  the  world,  not  only  as  power,  but  also 
as  theory.  As  theory,  science  is  a  body  of  proposi- 
tions, or  judgments,  in  which  a  certain  constitu- 
tion and  character  are  affirmed  of  the  world.  As 
scientists,  we  claim  to  know  that  the  world  has  the 
character  which  these  propositions  ascribe  to  it. 
Or,  recalling  the  language  which  we  used  at  the 
beginning  of  this  lecture,  we  may  say  that,  when 
we  equate  science  with  "  knowledge,"  we  affirm 
that  the  world  really  is  what  we,  as  scientists,  think 
it  to  be. 

Now,  a  theory  about  the  character  of  the  world 
we  live  in  is,  as  we  also  reminded  ourselves,  bound 
to  have  consequences  for  the  way  we  feel  and  the 
way  we  behave.  Particularly  important,  in  this 
respect,  has  been  the  emancipation,  just  mentioned, 
of  science  from  theology.  For  it  implies  that,  in 
scientific  thinking,  we  ascribe  to  the  world  a  char- 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    25 

acter  which  may  contradict,  and  which  certainly 
is  different  from,  and  lends  no  direct  support 
to,  the  character  affirmed  of  it  by  religion  and 
theology. 

What  is  this  character  which  scientific  theory 
ascribes  to  the  world  ? 

The  most  general  and  inclusive  term  for  the  world, 
so  far  as  science  deals  with  it,  is  Nature.  Hence,  too, 
when  science  is  contrasted  with  theology,  what  is 
meant  is  "  natural  science,"  and  the  contrast  is 
between  thinking  of  the  world  as  "  Nature  "  and 
thinking  of  it  as  "  God."  But  what  does 
"  Nature,"  here,  include  or  exclude  ?  Let  us  take 
the  answer  which  the  most  recent  interpreter  of 
science,  Professor  A.  N.  Whitehead,  gives  in  his 
Concept  of  Nature.1  Nature,  he  tells  us,  is  "  that 
which  we  observe  in  perception  through  the  senses." 
What  is  thus  disclosed  to  our  perception  is  assumed 
by  us  to  exist  in  its  own  right,  apart  from  the  fact 
that  we  perceive  it  or  think  it.  Relatively  to  our 
acts  of  perception  we  regard  it  as  self-contained  and 
independent.  We  assume  that  its  existence  and 
character  would  be  just  what  they  are  if  we  did  not 
perceive  it  at  this  moment  at  all.  In  Whitehead's 
vivid  phrase,  Nature  is  "  closed  to  mind."  This 
means  that,  in  studying  Nature,  we  can  ignore  its 
relation  to  our  minds,  to  us  as  percipients  and 

1  See  especially  pp.  2-5. 


26      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

thinkers.  So,  likewise,  Nature  is,  for  science, 
closed  to  "  moral  and  aesthetic  values  whose  appre- 
hension is  vivid  in  proportion  to  self-conscious 
activity." 

Let  us  pause  for  a  moment  to  consider  what  this 
last  statement  implies.  It  implies,  we  must  declare 
at  once,  a  very  considerable  selection,  or  abstraction, 
from  what  Nature  means  to  us  in  the  concrete  con- 
text of  everyday  life.  For,  it  is  there  tinged  for  us 
by  every  kind  of  experience  through  which  it  is 
interwoven  with  our  lives.  It  certainly  is  the  realm 
of  "  that  which  we  observe  in  perception  through  our 
senses."  But  it  is,  also,  much  more  than  this.  It 
is  the  scene  of  our  bodily  activities.  From  some  of 
the  objects  within  it  we  have  to  win  the  satisfaction 
of  our  needs  :  others  we  may  have  to  fight  for  our 
very  existence.  Some  may  thrill  us  by  their  beauty, 
others  make  a  claim  on  our  sympathy  and  care. 
For,  let  us  bear  in  mind  that  the  phrase,  "  that  which 
we  observe  in  perception  through  the  senses," 
covers  all  that  we  ordinarily  distinguish  as  human 
beings,  animals,  plants,  and  inanimate  objects. 
Towards  these  diverse  objects  we  have  diverse 
relations.  We  feel  and  behave  differently  towards 
them.  Yet,  Whitehead's  formula  is  designedly 
chosen  in  order  to  level  away,  as  irrelevant  to  pure 
science,  these  differences  between  the  non-living 
and  the  living,  or,  again,  between  living  beings 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    27 

which  have  minds  and  those  which  have  none.1 
Similarly,  it  eliminates  all  differences  in  our  attitudes 
and  responses  to  these  different  kinds  of  things, 
and  thereby  all  "  aesthetic  and  moral  values." 
Yet,  when  we  ordinarily  speak  of  "  Nature,"  the 
term  echoes  for  us  something  of  the  beauty  which 
thrills  us,  of  the  power  which  strikes  us  with  fear, 
of  the  order  in  her  system  which  fills  us  with  intel- 
lectual satisfaction,  of  the  religious  sentiment  of 
awe  which  may  be  evoked  when  beauty  and  power 
and  order  are  joined  with  mystery  and  immensity. 
Thus,  clearly,  the  scientific  meaning  of  "  Nature," 
i.e.,  the  character  which  science  ascribes  to  Nature, 
is  something  much  more  narrow  and  artificial  than 
the  character  which  Nature  discloses  when  all  the 
resources  of  our  experience  are  allowed  to  count. 
This  is  what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  science 
selects  or  abstracts.  To  acknowledge  this  is  not  to 
find  fault  with  science  for  its  method.  To  this 
selective,  or  abstracting,  method  science  owes  its 

1  At  the  end  of  his  Principles  of  Natural  Knowledge,  Whitehead 
touches  in  some  tantalizingly  brief  sentences  on  the  appearance 
of  life  in  "  Nature,"  identifying  it  with  rhythm  in  the  events 
which  we  "  observe  in  perception  by  our  senses."  But,  valuable 
as  this  suggestion  is,  it  does  not  carry  us  far  towards  under- 
standing the  functioning  of  a  living  organism.  Still  less  does  it 
help  us  to  understand  mind  as  expressed  in  Nature,  i.e.,  as 
expressed  through  the  perceptible  behaviour  of  certain  kinds  of 
organisms.  This  shows  very  clearly  that  Whitehead,  whose 
own  special  science  is  applied  mathematics,  has  constructed  his 
concept  of  Nature  to  fit  the  requirements  of  theoretical  physics, 
rather  then  the  requirements  of  biology  or  psychology. 


28      MATTER,   LIFE,  MIND,   AND  GOD 

precision  and  its  successes,  in  theory  and  practice. 
Science,  as  a  method,  consists  in  this  abstract  way 
of  looking  at  the  world.  It  selects  and  uses  out  of 
the  general  context  of  human  experience  certain 
data  as  evidence,  and  rejects  all  the  rest.  It  uses 
certain  concepts  in  framing  its  theories  and  avoids 
all  others.  That  is  the  privilege  of  its  character- 
istic technique.  But,  we  must  note  and  emphasize 
the  contrast  between  the  character  of  "  Nature  " 
for  science  and  its  character  for  concrete  experience, 
precisely  because  this  contrast  presents  one  of  the 
chief  problems  for  philosophical  synopsis.  For,  the 
individual  scientist,  as  a  man,  may  be  also  a  poet 
and  a  believer  in  God,  but,  as  a  scientist,  he  will 
keep  poetical  or  religious  modes  of  thinking  and  feel- 
ing out  of  his  science,  at  least  if  he  plays  the  game 
of  science  according  to  the  usual  rules.  The  descrip- 
tion of  a  natural  event  in  the  language  of  religious 
emotion  will  not  for  him  count  as  relevant  evidence. 
The  beauty  or  sublimity  of  natural  objects,  for  all 
that  they  are  intensely  real  to  the  artist's  perception 
and  enjoyment,  he  will  ignore.  That  human  needs 
and  interests  should  depend,  for  better  or  worse, 
on  natural  processes  and  laws  is  an  accident  to 
the  investigator's  dispassionate  gaze.  He  looks  at 
Nature  with  the  eyes  of  pure  and,  as  it  were,  dis- 
embodied perception  and  intelligence.  Nature,  for 
him,  lies  wholly  in  the  plane  of  observation  and  logic. 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    29 

This  is  not  to  deny,  of  course,  that  within  these  limits 
the  concept  of  Nature  also  undergoes  a  vast  develop- 
ment at  the  hands  of  science.  For,  not  only  do 
scientific  observation  and  experiment  bring  to  light 
regions  of  fact  wholly  beyond  the  reach  of  everyday 
perception,  but,  above  all,  science  emphasizes  the 
character  of  order  and  law  throughout  Nature,  where 
common  experience  finds  much  chaos  and  caprice. 
Still,  the  broad  fact  remains  undeniable :  the 
characteristic  method  of  science  consists  in  practis- 
ing such  a  selection  from  the  context  of  human 
experience  that  the  resulting  object  has  to  be  de- 
scribed in  terms  from  which  the  language  of  human 
desire  or  feeling,  of  aesthetic  enjoyment,  of  moral 
endeavour,  of  religious  love,  is  in  principle  excluded. 
This  being  so,  it  is  the  more  significant  to  find 
Whitehead  admitting,  at  the  end,  that "  the  values 
of  Nature  are  perhaps  the  key  to  the  metaphysical 
synthesis  of  existence,"  i.e.,  to  what  we  have 
described  as  the  philosophical  problem  of  "  seeing 
things  together." 

But  there  are  many  other  ways,  still,  in  which 
science  has  revolutionized  our  ways  of  thinking  of 
Nature  and  of  our  place,  as  human  beings,  in  its 
scheme.  Older  ways  of  thinking,  which  have  left 
an  abiding  mark  on  our  language  and  our  literature, 
interpreted  natural  processes  "  anthropomorphic- 
ally,"  i.e.,  on  the  analogy  of  human  behaviour,  and 


30      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,   AND  GOD 

construed  the  whole  scheme  of  things  "  anthropo- 
centrically,"  i.e.,  as  centring  round  the  welfare  and 
destiny  of  the  human  race.  It  is  characteristic  of 
modern  science  that  it  has  challenged  all  these 
anthropomorphic  and  anthropocentric  types  of 
belief  and  driven  them  from  the  field,  at  least  in 
their  crudest  forms.  Mediaeval  thought,  accepting 
the  cosmology  of  the  Book  of  Genesis,  found  the 
meaning  of  the  universe  in  the  drama  of  man's  fall 
and  redemption  enacted  upon  the  earth  as  the  centre 
of  the  universe.  But  when  astronomy  changed  from 
a  geo-centric  to  a  helio-centric  theory,  not  only  was 
the  earth  displaced  from  the  centre  of  the  solar 
system,  but  man  was,  so  to  speak,  dethroned  with 
it.  One  may  still  meet  with  scientists  who,  having 
been  brought  up,  as  children,  on  the  older  beliefs, 
now  find  a  grim  emotional  satisfaction  in  contrast- 
ing the  immensity  in  time  and  space  of  the  stellar 
universe  with  the  insignificance  of  the  earth  and  of 
man  upon  the  earth.  The  theory  of  evolution  in 
the  nineteenth  century  has  helped  to  intensify  this 
attitude,  both  by  exhibiting  the  evolutionary  deriva- 
tion of  man  from  lower  forms  of  life,  and  by  pre- 
dicting, on  astronomical  grounds,  the  ultimate 
extinction  of  all  life  on  the  earth.  Thus,  astronomy 
and  biology  have  combined  to  revolutionize  the 
traditional  cosmology.  Human  history  and  civiliza- 
tion shrink  to  the  dimensions  of  a  mere  episode  on 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    31 

"  one  of  the  meanest  of  the  planets,"  and  man 
appears  verily  as  the  helpless  plaything  of  the  blind 
forces  of  Nature.  How  should  the  hopes  and  fears 
and  imaginings  of  a  creature  so  puny  supply  the 
clue  to  a  theory  of  the  universe  ?  Let  man's  desires 
and  feelings  be  what  they  may,  the  majesty  of  objec- 
tive fact  remains  untouched  by  them  and  reveals 
itself  only  to  the  disinterested  eye  of  science.  Those 
who  follow  this  line  of  thought  to  its  bitter  end  are 
apt  to  deal  less  gently  with  "  values  "  than  just  now 
we  found  Whitehead  doing.  In  art,  morality, 
religion  they  see  nothing  but  the  mirage  of  feelings 
and  desires  seeking  a  make-believe  satisfaction. 
Anything  so  incurably  "  subjective  "  and  "  human  " 
they  would  rigorously  eliminate  from  the  objective 
contemplation  of  facts  as  they  are. 

If  we  may  not  be  anthropocentric,  neither  may 
we  be  anthropomorphic.  The  use  of  human 
analogies  in  explaining  natural  processes  and  events 
is  not  permissible  in  science.  The  most  familiar 
expression  of  this  attitude  is  the  so-called  "  mechan- 
ical theory  of  Nature."  This  is  a  sustained  protest 
against  the  theory  of  agency  to  which  common 
thought  is  committed,  without  knowing  it,  by  the 
active  and  passive  tenses  of  the  verbs  of  current 
speech.  The  sun  melts  the  ice,  the  flowers  are  killed 
by  the  frost — thus,  with  unconscious  personifica- 
tion, we  talk  of  things  as  doing  and  suffering  where 


32      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND   GOD 

strict  science  bids  us  talk  only  of  the  "  correlation 
of  events  according  to  law."     Causality,  for  science, 
no  longer  connotes  activity ;    and  with  activity 
have  gone  the  allied  notions  of  will,  purpose,  design, 
intelligence.     In  one  way  this  change  has  been  all 
to  the  good.     The  substitution  of  the  question, 
How  ?     for    the    question,    Why  ?    has    supplied 
science    with    an    inexhaustible    programme    for 
research  into  the  laws  according  to  which  pheno- 
mena are  connected.     The  concept  of  law  has  eman- 
cipated science  from  the  "  animism  "  of  primitive 
thought  which  looked  for  the  explanation  of  natural 
events  to  the  capricious  will  of  some  spirit  or  demon. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mechanical  theory  has 
raised  grave  difficulties  of  its  own.     Its  most  trium- 
phant successes  have  been  in  those  sciences  in  which, 
as  in  astronomy,  physics,  and  chemistry,  no  question 
of  life  or  mind  arises.     But,  when  we  pass  to  the 
study  of  living  beings  and,  even  more,  of  conscious 
and   intelligent   beings,    the   mechanical   concepts 
work  more  and  more  awkwardly.     It  is  not  that  we, 
here,  pass  necessarily  beyond  the  sphere  of  "  law." 
The  difficulty  is  rather  that  life  and  mind  seem  each 
to  be  something  distinctive  and  unique,  and  that 
the  terms  in  which  we  analyse  those  physical  objects 
which  are  non-living  and  inanimate,  hardly  suffice 
for  a  complete  account  of  beings  which,  though  their 
bodies  are  "  material "  and  "  perceptible  by  the 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    33 

senses,"  yet  exhibit  the  characters  of  life  and,  it 
may  be,  of  intelligence  and  will.  Thus,  we  are 
brought  from  another  angle  to  the  same  difficulty 
which  we  noted,  a  short  while  ago,  in  Whitehead's 
concept  of  Nature.  The  sharp  distinction  between 
body  and  soul,  matter  and  mind  or  consciousness, 
which  is  so  common  and  marked  a  feature  of  current 
scientific  views,  is  largely  the  result  of  the  desire 
to  escape  from  these  difficulties  by  eliminating  from 
"  Nature,"  as  the  subject-matter  of  science,  all 
facts  which,  like  consciousness,  do  not  fit  into  the 
mechanistic  pattern  and  cannot  be  dealt  with  by 
theoretical  physics. 

And,  lastly,  if  the  mechanical  theory  of  Nature 
excludes  explanation  in  terms  of  human,  or  animal, 
purpose  and  mind,  it  excludes,  a  fortiori,  all  explana- 
tions which  refer  to  the  will,  or  design,  of  God. 
Modern  scientists  do  not  employ  the  "  hypothesis 
of  God."  The  famous  Bridgewater  Treatises  were 
the  last  considerable  attempt  to  theologize  in  science. 
Since  then  it  has  become  the  established  practice  of 
science  to  avoid  theological  language.  The  break 
is  complete.  Science  no  longer  bids  us  admire, 
God's  wisdom,  power,  or  goodness  as  displayed  in 
creation.  It  no  longer  explains  the  arrangements  it 
finds  by  saying  that  God  made  them  just  so,  and 
that,  therefore,  they  are  for  the  best.  It  does  not 
mention  God  at  all.  Whether  this  "  break  "  with 
3 


84      MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

theology  necessarily  implies  an  irreconcilable  conflict 
remains  to  be  seen.  It  may  turn  out  to  be  more 
of  the  nature  of  a  division  of  labour — a  legitimate 
result  of  the  methodical  abstraction  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  science  practises,  but  which  need  not  be 
held  to  invalidate  the  aesthetic,  moral,  and  religious 
modes  of  experience. 

But  it  is  just  because  science  abstracts  that  it 
cannot  be  "  synoptic,"  or  take  the  place  of  philo- 
sophy, which  seeks  to  transcend  abstract  points  of 
view  in  order  to  see  things  together  and  to  compre- 
hend the  world  as  a  whole. 

5.  So  far  we  have  been  tracing,  in  its  main 
ramifications,  the  profound  influence  which  science, 
both  as  power  and  as  theory,  has  had  upon  the  ways 
in  which  modern  man  conceives  the  world  and, 
therefore,  also  upon  the  ways  in  which  he  responds 
to  the  world  in  feeling  and  act.  Especially  have  we 
noted  how,  both  as  power  and  as  theory,  science 
tends  to  lead  men  to  doubt,  and  often  to  abandon, 
not  only  the  theological  creeds  which  are  our 
historical  heritage,  but  also  the  religious  attitude 
itself,  the  religious  way  of  taking  and  valuing  the 
world,  of  which  the  creeds  offer  a  reflective  formula- 
tion. Yet,  this  picture  of  the  modern  man  and  the 
modern  spirit  which  we  have  drawn  is,  strictly, 
no  more  than  the  picture  of  an  increasingly  power- 
ful tendency  in  contemporary  civilization.  It  is 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    35 

not  a  faithful  portrait  either  of  that  civilization  as 
a  whole  or  of  the  mind  of  the  average  educated 
individual.  True,  both  civilization  as  a  whole 
and  the  average  individual  are  profoundly 
influenced  by  the  scientific  thinking  which 
reaches  us  all  through  contact  with  the 
scientists  in  our  midst  and  with  their  lectures 
and  books.  But,  they  are  also  shaped  and  moulded 
by  a  large  variety  of  other  interests  and  experiences 
and  by  a  wealth  of  tradition  kept  alive,  partly 
through  literature  and  education,  and  partly  through 
the  modes  of  feeling,  thinking,  acting  which  are 
fostered  and  standardized  in  the  organizations  of 
Church  and  State.  So  far  as  physics  influences  us, 
we  talk  of  the  world  in  terms  of  matter  and  motion. 
When  we  think  biologically,  we  talk  of  life  and 
behaviour.  As  psychologists,  we  use  the  language 
of  consciousness  and  mind.  But  we  are  interested, 
too,  in  industry  and  commerce,  in  art,  in  morals, 
in  politics,  in  religion,  and  accordingly  we  talk 
and  think  and  act  also  in  terms  of  wealth,  of  beauty, 
of  goodness,  of  citizenship  and  government,  of  God. 
In  the  vocabulary  which  any  moderately  educated 
man — any  newspaper-reader,  shall  we  say  ? — daily 
uses,  fragments  of  all  these  technical  languages  play 
their  part.  And  with  each  language  the  individual 
adjusts  his  attitude  and  response,  more  or  less,  to 
the  characteristic  point  of  view  which  it  expresses. 


36      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

Yet  what  a  babel  of  languages  it  is  !  What  a 
chaos  of  attitudes  and  points  of  view  !  We  are 
saved  in  ordinary  life  from  bewilderment  and  con- 
fusion, because  we  acquire,  in  greater  or  less  measure, 
the  useful  habit  of  switching  over  from  one  point  of 
view  and  language  to  another,  without  experiencing 
the  transition  as  a  discord  and,  therefore,  also  with- 
out feeling  the  need  for  a  reconciliation,  a  synopsis. 
Yet,  when  we  once,  in  explicit  reflexion,  bring  all 
these  diverse  aspects  of  our  civilization  into  a 
single  focus,  what  a  thing  of  fragments,  of  shreds 
and  patches,  even  of  conflicts,  it  then  appears ! 
The  demand  for  unity  in  outlook  and  attitude  then 
becomes  wellnigh  irresistible.  Yet,  the  wider  a 
man's  interests  and  contacts,  the  more  difficult 
is  he  apt  to  find  the  achievement  of  such  unity.  For, 
it  requires  a  comprehensive  theory  of  the  Universe 
in  which  all  sides  of  his  life  have  their  place — the 
sort  of  theory,  in  short,  which  it  is  the  traditional 
aspiration  of  philosophy  to  supply.  Paradoxically 
enough,  in  modern  education,  and  especially  in 
modern  "  higher  "  education,  we  do  not  attempt  or 
profess  to  provide  such  a  theory.  We  cannot 
provide  it  because  we  have  not  got  it.  Our  civiliza- 
tion has  not  yet  achieved  reflective  expression  in 
any  single  philosophical  form.  We  have  plenty  of 
philosophies,  but  no  philosophy ;  plenty  of  "  ten- 
dencies "  and  "  movements "  and  experiments, 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    37 

but  few  common  premises  and  still  fewer  common 
conclusions.  Religion  which  once  supplied  focus 
and  unity  to  civilization  has  lost  this  central  position, 
and  the  consequent  secularization  of  education  has 
intensified  the  disintegration  of  our  intellectual 
world.  The  subjects  taught  at  our  universities  and 
colleges  offer  a  fairly  representative  cross-section  of 
that  world,  yet  it  would  be  difficult  to  gather  from 
a  survey  of  them  any  unified  and  coherent  system 
of  what,  in  the  name  of  "  knowledge,"  we  believe 
the  Universe  to  be.  The  very  increase  of  know- 
ledge compels  teachers  to  specialize  to  a  point  where 
the  power  of  synopsis  is  inevitably  lost,  and  students 
to  sample  the  intellectual  world  in  so  many  discon- 
nected places  that  it  does  not  seem  to  be  a  world  at 
all  but  only  a  collection  of  atomic  subjects.  And, 
thus,  as  subjects  are  subdivided  and  information 
grows  in  volume,  the  problem  of  eliciting  from  all 
these  separate  bits  of  theory  a  unified  interpretation 
of  the  world  becomes  increasingly  unmanageable. 
Let  alone  that  our  educational  systems  leave  it 
mainly  to  our  private  initiative  to  determine  and 
cultivate  our  attitudes  to  art  and  politics  and 
religion.  No  wonder  that  for  all  our  "  education  " 
few  of  us  have  a  unified  outlook  upon  life  or  that 
fine  stability  of  character  which  is  almost  unattain- 
able without  such  an  outlook. 
It  is,  perhaps,  fortunate  for  our  peace  of  mind 


38      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

that  most  of  us  hardly  feel  the  problem.  We  are 
so  busy  living  that  we  have  no  time  to  take  stock 
of  our  beliefs,  no  time  to  realize  how  incoherent  they 
usually  are,  no  tune  to  ask  whether  they  are  true, 
or  how  far,  in  our  manner  of  living,  we  are  true  to 
them.  Such  stability  as  we  possess  rests  largely 
on  the  comforting  sense  that  each  shred  of  belief 
is  shared  by  many  of  our  fellows  and  perhaps  backed 
by  special  authority  as  well.  For  the  rest,  absorp- 
tion in  our  work  is  our  salvation.  For  the  work  of 
each  of  us  is,  at  once,  his  readiest  channel  of  self- 
expression,  reflecting  in  its  successes  and  failures 
his  good  and  bad  qualities  of  intelligence  and 
character,  and  it  is,  also,  his  contribution  to  that 
total  achievement  of  the  human  spirit  which  we  call 
our  civilization.  Without  reflecting  on  it,  we  all 
draw  some  strength  and  inspiration  from  the  fact 
that  in  this  total  achievement  we  co-operate  alike 
with  those  who  have  gone  before  us  and  with  those 
who  will  come  after  us.  Even  if  utter  extinction 
be,  as  some  hold,  the  ultimate  destiny  of  the  human 
race  and  all  its  works,  yet  here  and  now  this  partici- 
pation in  the  creative  effort  of  the  human  spirit 
saves  our  individual  lives  from  being  merely 
ephemeral  and  ineffective. 

But,  if  once  reflection  awakens  us  to  the  need  for 
a  synoptic  effort,  it  is  hard  to  draw  back.  And  here 
we  may  well  draw  courage  from  the  support  of  a 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    39 

distinguished  scientist  who,  in  the  midst  of  his 
scientific  researches,  has  always  kept  his  mind  open 
to  the  larger  outlook.  From  him  we  can  learn  that 
science,  though  by  its  abstract  method  it  does  so 
much  to  stimulate,  and  so  little  to  satisfy,  the 
demand  for  a  synoptic  attitude,  is  yet  not  hostile 
to  our  endeavour.  Professor  J.  A.  Thomson, 
surveying  in  his  System  of  Animate  Nature  the  whole 
field  of  biology,  defines  his  goal  as  a  "  Philosophy  of 
Animate  Nature,"  i.e.,  "  a  consistent  thinking 
together  of  what  we  know  and  feel  about  Animate 
Nature  along  with  what  we  know  and  feel  about 
other  orders  of  facts."  A  striking  phrase  is  this — 
"  what  we  know  and  feel."  It  finds  its  fuller 
explanation  in  such  utterances  as  these  :  "  We  get 
closer  to  some  things  through  feeling  than  we  do 
through  science  "  ;  or,  "  the  tendency  of  feeling 
is  always  to  see  things  whole — synoptically."  And, 
above  all,  "  we  cannot,  for  our  life's  sake,  and  for 
the  sake  of  our  philosophical  reconstruction,  afford 
to  lose  in  scientific  analysis  what  the  poets  and  artists 
and  lovers  of  Nature  all  see.  It  is  intuitively  felt, 
rather  than  intellectually  perceived,  the  vision  of 
things  as  totalities,  root  and  all,  all  in  all ;  neither 
fancifully,  nor  mystically,  but  sympathetically  in 
their  wholeness." 

"  Intellect  "  and  "  feeling  "  are,  indeed,  empty 
terms  until  we  translate  them  concretely  into  the 


40      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

scientist's  theory  and  the  poet's  vision  of  the  same 
object.     They  are  different,  but  are  they  incompat- 
ible ?     Is  not  each  by  itself  impoverished  for  lack 
of  the  characteristic  excellence  and  truth  of  the 
other  ?     The  poet's  vision  uninformed  by  science 
degenerates   into   sentimentalism.     The   scientist's 
analysis  tends  to  destroy  the  sense  of  the  whole, 
whilst  his  suspicion  of "  anthropomorphic  "  extrava- 
gance often  leads  him  to  put  into  words  something 
less  than  the  total  impression  he  receives.     Can  it 
be,   one  wonders,   that   laboratory  research,   just 
because  of  its  inevitably  artificial  conditions  and 
manipulations,  lends  itself  to  the  use  of  the  language 
of  physico-chemical  mechanism,  whereas  most  field- 
naturalists,  studying  living  creatures  in  their  natural 
haunts  and  enjoying  Nature  as  an  unbroken  whole, 
talk    unhesitatingly    anthropomorphic    language  ? 
However  this  may  be,  Thomson  is  clearly  a  lover  of 
Nature  as  well  as  a  scientist,  and  in  this  lies,  we 
may   boldly   say,    his    superior   objectivity.     The 
result  is  not  bad  science,  but  better  philosophy.     For 
the  fuller  use  of   experience  provides  additional 
"  pathways  to  reality,"  i.e.,  pathways  to  a  total 
view  of  Nature.     Such  a  total  view  will  not  exclude 
the  effects,  on  our  own  minds,  of  the  contact  with 
Nature  in  contemplation  and  enjoyment,  for  such 
contact  with  Nature  has,  as  Thomson  justly  says, 
a  "  tonic  virtue."     Unrest  and  petty  cares  and 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY    41 

mean  thoughts  drop  away  as  we  learn  to  perceive 
and  appreciate  the  power,  order,  beauty,  intricacy 
of  the  web  of  life.  Without  this  contact  we  are 
impoverished,  with  it  we  are  made  strong  in  hope 
and  faith. 

Of  course,  Thomson  is  dealing  with  "  Animate 
Nature,"  i.e.,  with  the  subject-matter  of  biology, 
not  simply  with  "  Nature,"  which  latter  term,  as 
we  have  seen,  orients  us  rather  towards  mathe- 
matical physics.  It  is  no  mere  accident  that  a 
biologist  should  show  himself  more  keenly  alive  to 
the  need  for  a  synoptic  philosophy  than  a  physicist. 
Without  doubt,  the  abstractions  of  scientific  method 
are  easier  to  practise  in  proportion  as  we  face  away 
from  all  facts  which  suggest  the  presence  and  efficacy 
of  mind  in  the  world.  But  though  we  may  take  up 
and  maintain  such  an  attitude  by  a  kind  of 
methodical  make-believe,  a  moment's  reflection  on 
the  full  world  of  concrete  experience  should  convince 
us  that  such  a  position  cannot  be  final.  Biology 
shakes  its  foundations.  Psychology  ignores  it. 
Its  inadequacy  becomes  patent  when  we  turn  to  the 
concrete  achievements  of  mind  in  history,  in  social 
and  economic  life,  in  government,  and  in  art.  And 
any  sane  theory  of  religion  transcends  it  altogether. 


42      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  following  books,  which  obviously  are  but  a  selection  from 
the  available  literature,  may  be  recommended  to  those  who 
wish  to  follow  up  the  argument  of  Lecture  I  with  further 
reading : — 


1.  Alexander,  S. 

2.  Bosanquet,  B. 

3.  Bosanquet,  B. 

4.  Laird,  J. 

5.  Marvin,  F.  S. 

(editor) 

6.  Marvin,  F.  S. 

(editor) 

7.  Merz,  J.  T. 

8.  Pringle- 
Pattison,  A.  S. 

9.  Russell,  B. 

10.  Russell,  B. 

11.  Soddy,  F. 

12.  Sorley,  W.  R. 

13.  Thomson,  J.  A 

14.  Whitehead, 
A.  N. 

15.  Whitehead, 

A.  N. 


Space,  Time  and  Deity,  2  vols.     (Macmillan 

&  Co.,  1920.) 
The  Principle  of  Individuality  and    Value. 

(Macmillan  &  Co.,  1912.) 
The    Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual. 

(Macmillan  &  Co.,  1913.) 
A  Study  in  Realism.     (Camb.  Univ.  Press, 

1920.) 
The  Unity  of  Western  Civilization.     (Oxford 

Univ.  Press,  1915.) 
Recent  Developments  in  European  Thought. 

(Oxford  Univ.  Press,  1920.) 
A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,  4  vols.     (Blackwood,  1896- 

1914.) 
The    Idea    of   God    in    Recent    Philosophy. 

(Oxford  Univ.  Press,  1917.) 
Philosophical  Essays.   (Longmans,  Green  & 

Co.,  1910.) 
Mysticism  and  Logic.     (Longmans,  Green  & 

Co.,  1918.) 

Science  and  Life.     (John  Murray,  1920.) 
Moral  Values  and  the  Idea  of  God,  2nd  Ed. 

(Camb.  Univ.  Press,  1921.) 
The  System  of  Animate  Nature.     (Williams 

&  Norgate,  1920.) 
The  Concept  of  Nature.      (Camb.  Univ.  Press, 

1920.) 
The  Principles  of  Natural  Knowledge.  (Camb. 

Univ.  Press,  1919.) 


The  claims  advanced  on  behalf  of  science  and  scientific  method 
may  be  studied  in  No.  n,  in  several  essays  in  Nos.  9,  10,  and 
in  Mr.  Marvin's  contributions  to  Nos.  5,  6.  Nos.  14,  15  illus- 
trate impressively  how  one  of  the  most  original  among  living 
physicists  looks  at  Nature.  The  sharp  distinction  between 
Nature  and  the  human  beholder,  between  the  object  known  and 


SCIENCE,  RELIGION,  AND  PHILOSOPHY   43 

the  knowing  mind,  which  science  postulates,  has  been  elevated 
to  the  dignity  of  a  fundamental  philosophical  principle  by  the 
movement  known  as  "  realism  "  or  "  neo-realism  "  (illustrated 
by  Nos.  i,  4,  9,  10).  With  Nos.  2,  3,  8,  13,  14,  the  point  of  view 
and  the  argument  of  the  preceding  lecture  have  most  affinity. 
No.  7  is  invaluable  as  a  mine  of  information  about  the  develop- 
ment of  thought,  both  scientific  and  philosophical,  in  the  nine- 
teenth century.  It  is  from  Dr.  Merz  that  I  have  adopted  the 
term  "  synoptic." 


LECTURE   II 

THE  PRESENT-DAY  REVOLT  AGAINST 
"  MATTER  " 


I 


i.  "Y"  N  the  first  lecture  our  aim  had  been  to  bring 
home  to  ourselves  the  need  for  a  synoptic 
effort — a  need  resulting  from  the  bewilder- 
ing number  and  diversity  of  the  currents  and  systems 
of  thought  which  our  civilization,  as  a  whole,  has 
produced  and  which  impinge  upon  all  educated  men 
and  women  in  proportion  to  the  range  of  their 
interests,  practical  and  theoretical.  This  need 
becomes  doubly  great  when  systems  of  thought 
which  appeal  to  us  with  equal  strength,  though 
perhaps  on  different  grounds,  appear  to  conflict 
and  to  compel  us  to  make  a  choice  between  them. 
Here,  so  we  held,  is  the  great  opportunity  for  philo- 
sophy, the  function  of  which  is  to  stand  for  the  ideal 
of  "  thinking  together  "  the  whole  of  human  experi- 
ence, taken  as  revealing  in  all  its  modes  and  forms 
— through  what  we  feel  and  will  no  less  than  through 
what  we  perceive  and  think — something  of  the 
nature  of  the  world  we  live  in. 

44 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    45 

The  undeniable  vastness  of  such  a  synoptic  pro- 
gramme is  no  excuse  for  not  attempting  it  at  all. 
If  we  could  satisfy  ourselves  that  some  measure  of 
order  and  harmony  obtains  where,  at  first  sight,  all 
is  confusion  and  conflict,  it  would  be  no  small  gain. 
If  we  could  convince  ourselves  that  some  of  the 
most  important  tendencies  of  contemporary  thought, 
so  far  from  being  as  isolated  from,  and  repellent 
to,  each  other  as  on  the  surface  they  may  seem  to  be, 
hold  out  a  promise  of  fitting  together  into  a  unified 
world-view,  we  should  be  amply  rewarded  for  our 
effort.  At  any  rate,  for  better  or  for  worse,  the 
effort  to  "  see  things  together  "  is  worth  making. 

Our  programme  calls,  in  to-day's  lecture,  for  a 
review  of  current  tendencies  of  thought  in  the 
"  philosophy  of  Nature."  By  this  term  we  mean 
the  philosophical  criticism — be  it  by  philosophers, 
be  it  by  philosophically-minded  scientists — of  what 
the  natural  sciences,  and  more  particularly  physics, 
have  to  tell  us  about  "  Nature,"  not  in  its  details, 
but  in  its  general  character.  And  "  criticism," 
here,  does  not  mean  fault-finding  but  interpreta- 
tion— nay  more,  appreciation.  Its  purpose  is 
neither  to  correct  the  sciences  nor  to  do  their  work 
for  them.  For  Ersatz-science  there  is  no  room. 
But  there  is  room,  and  need,  for  a  reflective  estimate 
and  appreciation  of  what  the  sciences,  severally  and 
together,  have  achieved  in  the  way  of  making  known 


46      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

to  us  the  fundamental  character  of  the  world  we 
live  in.  To  know  a  thing,  as  we  said  in  the  first 
lecture,  is  to  believe  that  it  is  really  and  truly  what 
we  think  it  to  be.  Each  of  the  sciences  teaches  us 
to  think  of  the  world,  or,  at  least,  of  that  portion 
of  the  world  which  is  its  chosen  subject-matter,  as 
having  a  certain  definite  character  and  structure. 
The  philosophy  of  Nature  is  interested  in  these 
characters  and  structures,  in  the  evidence  on  which 
they  are  affirmed,  in  their  coherence  and  compati- 
bility with  each  other,  and  ultimately,  too,  in  their 
coherence  with  the  evidence  of  those  modes  of  experi- 
ence of  which,  as  of  the  aesthetic,  the  moral,  the 
religious  experience,  the  natural  sciences  take  no 
account.  Such  criticism  and  interpretation  of 
scientific  concepts  and  theories  is,  clearly,  synoptic 
in  tendency  and  effect.  It  does  not  claim  to  assist 
the  scientist  in  his  investigations.  It  does  not 
make  him  a  better  observer  or  experimenter.  He 
can,  if  he  pleases,  ignore  it  all  as  irrelevant  for  his 
purposes  and  limit  his  attention  strictly  to  the 
detailed  problems  of  his  special  field.  But  he  can- 
not help  becoming  a  philosopher  himself  the  moment 
he  chooses  to  consider  the  relation  of  his  field  of 
work  to,  and  the  bearing  of  his  results  on,  the  fields 
and  results  of  other  scientists,  or,  again,  the  fields 
and  theories  of  students  of  art  or  morality  or 
religion. 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    47 

In  this  lecture,  however,  we  shall  confine  ourselves 
to  one  natural  science,  viz.,  physics,  which,  by 
teaching  us  to  think  of  Nature  as  "  material,"  has 
profoundly  affected  all  our  other  ways  of  thinking 
of  Nature.  Ever  since  modern  physics  began  with 
the  work  of  Galileo  and  Descartes,  its  influence  on 
other  sciences,  as  well  as  on  philosophy,  has  been 
immense.  Hence  it  is  of  the  utmost  interest  and 
importance  for  our  synoptic  programme  that 
philosophically-minded  physicists  are,  once  again, 
becoming  keenly  critical  of  the  concept  of  "  matter," 
and  are  thereby  led,  once  again,  to  speculate  about 
the  foundations  of  their  science  in  the  facts  of 
experience.  When  physicists  themselves  turn 
philosophers  and,  like  Whitehead,  confess  the 
"  incoherence "  of  their  traditional  theories  of 
Nature,  philosophers  may  well  expect  some  grist 
for  their  own  mill.  Especially  Whitehead's  two 
recent  books,  The  Principles  of  Natural  Knowledge 
and  The  Concept  of  Nature,  have  with  good  reason 
been  hailed  as  the  most  illuminating  contributions 
of  our  day  to  the  philosophy  of  Nature.  Whitehead's 
criticisms  of  "  matter  "  and  his  fresh  interpretation 
of  "  Nature  "  are  full  of  value  for  our  synoptic 
programme,  just  because  Whitehead  approaches 
his  problems  throughout  by  way  of  the  relation  of 
physical  concepts  to  the  ultimate  data  of  experience. 

2.     It  has  been  wittily  said  that  "  we  know  too 


48      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

much  about  matter  to  be  any  longer  materialists." 
This  saying  may  serve  as  a  text  for  the  present 
lecture.  Let  us  consider  in  what  sense,  if  any,  it 
is  true. 

Our  best  way  to  begin  is  to  make  clear  to  our- 
selves that  the  term  "  matter "  is  exceedingly 
ambiguous.  Like  every  other  term  which  has  for 
centuries  been  a  centre  of  discussion  and  controversy 
it  has  gathered  round  itself  a  variety  of  meanings 
which  are,  commonly,  not  clearly  distinguished. 
We  shall  best  prepare  ourselves  for  an  appreciation 
of  Whitehead's  attack  on  "  matter  "  by  making  a 
preliminary  survey  of  the  chief  senses  in  which  the 
term  "  matter  "  has  come  to  be  used.  In  each 
of  these  senses  there  is  a  vague  echo  of  some  philo- 
sophical or  scientific  theory.  Thus,  for  example, 
most  of  us  have  probably  heard  it  said  that 
"  idealists,"  like  Berkeley,  "  deny  the  existence  of 
matter,"  and  have  wondered  how  anybody  can  be 
such  a  fool.  It  is  a  pleasant  fashion  among  many 
scientists,  in  their  anxiety  to  clear  their  "  science  " 
from  any  taint  of  "  philosophy,"  to  hold  Berkeley 
up  to  scorn  as  the  type  of  a  "  metaphysician," 
which  term,  to  them,  means  a  person  who  flies  in 
the  face  of  commonsense  and  denies  the  reality  of 
what  to  everybody  else  is  obviously  most  real  of 
all.  For,  the  "  matter,"  the  existence  of  which 
Berkeley  is  supposed  to  deny,  is  by  his  critics  taken 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    49 

to  mean  tables  and  chairs,  trees  and  animals,  the 
air  we  breathe  and  the  ground  we  walk  on — in 
short,  the  physical  objects  of  everyday  life,  including 
our  own  bodies.     No  wonder  that  the  denial  of 
their   existence   seems   nothing   but   a   gratuitous 
paradox.     On  the  other  hand,  we  have  all  heard, 
too,  of  "  materialists  "  who  declare  that  matter  is 
the   only   reality   and   the   ultimate   principle    of 
explanation  for  everything,  or  who,  in  other  words, 
deny  that  anything  is  real  except  matter.     But, 
what  becomes  of   this  theory  of  mind  and  God  ? 
The  implied  denial  of  the  existence  of  mind  seems 
as    much    an    offence    against     commonsense     as 
Berkeley's  denial  of  matter,  and  the  implied  denial 
of  the  existence  of  God  is  uneasily  felt  to  be  an 
attack  on  religion.     The  suspicion  that  science  is 
committed  to  "  materialism  "  arouses  misgivings, 
if  not  hostility,  in  many  quarters  and  tends  to 
bring  undeserved  discredit  upon  science.     But  in 
this  whole  situation  there  is  much  confusion  of 
thought,  resulting  from  the  failure  to  distinguish 
the  different  senses  of  "  matter."     We  are  all  far 
too  apt  to  take  it  for  granted  that  we  know  what 
the  term  "  matter  "  means.     We  argue  and  take 
sides  without  asking  first  in  what  sense,  precisely, 
Berkeley  denies,  or  physicists  affirm,  the  existence 
of  matter,  and  whether  in  either  case  the  paradoxical 
consequences  really  follow  from  the  sense  intended. 

4 


50      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND   GOD 

Thus,  a  discrimination,  however  rough,  of  the 
different  meanings  of  "  matter,"  and  of  the  contexts 
to  which  each  meaning  belongs,  is  indispensable 
both  for  clearness  of  thought  and  for  a  just  apprecia- 
tion of  the  position  of  physical  science  in  our 
own  day. 

The  following  enumeration,  though  by  no  means 
exhaustive,  will  suffice  for  our  purpose  : — 
i — There  is  the  meaning  of  matter  as  opposed 

to  mind  or  spirit. 

2 — Matter,  or  the  material  world,  may  be  used  as 
a  blanket-term  for  all  objects    of    normal, 
waking  perception  as  opposed  to  the  objects 
of  hallucination  and  dream. 
3 — Matter  may  mean  the  atoms,  electrons,  and 
similar  imperceptible  entities,  which  scientific 
theory    postulates    for    the    explanation    of 
perceptible  phenomena. 
4 — Matter  may  mean  the  imperceptible  cause  of 

our  sensations. 

These  four  senses  of  "  matter  "  are  all  different 
from  each  other,  but  they  are  not  easy  to  distinguish 
— in  fact,  they  are  frequently  confused — because 
there  is  a  single,  central  situation  in  the  different 
analyses  of  which  each  of  the  different  senses  takes 
its  rise. 

It  will  assist  our  argument  if  we  state  this  single, 
central  situation  at  once,  and  then  show  how  each 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    51 

of  the   different   senses   of  matter   arises  from   a 
different  analysis  of  it. 

Physics  is  an  empirical  science.  That  is  to  say, 
its  ultimate  data — the  facts  from  which  it  starts 
and  which  it  seeks  to  explain — are  data,  or  facts, 
of  "  experience."  Experience,  here,  means  sense- 
experience,  sense-perception.  With  facts  of  sense- 
perception,  or  sensible  "  phenomena,"  the  physicist 
begins  ;  they  provide  his  problems.  With  facts  of 
sense-perception,  too,  he  ends  ;  to  them  he  appeals 
for  the  verification  of  his  theories.  Whatever  the 
terms  may  be  in  which  he  formulates  his  laws, 
these  laws  must  apply,  in  the  end,  to  phenomena 
open  to  his  observation  and,  preferably,  capable  of 
being  checked  and  confirmed  by  the  observation 
of  others.  This  explains  the  central  position  of 
observation,  with  or  without  experiment,  in  the 
physicist's  procedure.  He  may  frame  hypotheses 
concerning  imperceptible  entities  and  processes, 
but  his  justification  for  doing  so  will  be  that  in  no 
other  way  can  he  explain,  or  predict  the  occurrence 
of,  the  phenomena  which  he  perceives. 

The  central  situation,  then,  is  that  physics,  as 
an  empirical  science,  finds  it  subject-matter  within 
the  field  of  what  we  perceive  by  our  senses.  This 
is,  as  we  saw  in  the  last  lecture,  what  Whitehead, 
too,  means  when  he  defines  the  subject-matter  of 
science  as  "  Nature,"  and  identifies  Nature  wiHi 


52      MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

"  what  we  perceive  by  the  senses."  The  philoso- 
phical criticism  of  physical  theory  thus  becomes 
inevitably,  hi  Whitehead's  phrase,  a  "  philosophy 
of  the  thing  perceived,"  i.e.,  a  study  of  the  problems 
raised  by  different  analyses  of  the  processes  and 
objects  of  perception. 

It  is  in  this  context  that  we  can  most  conveniently 
locate,  and  distinguish,  the  four  different  meanings 
of  "  matter." 

(i)  Matter  and  mind,  or  spirit,  have  often  been 
distinguished  in  the  past  by  saying  that  matter  is 
passive,  mind  is  active,  or  that  matter  is  "  extended," 
i.e.,  occupies  space,  whereas  mind  does  not.  But, 
in  this  form  the  distinction  has  ceased  to  interest 
contemporary  thought.  Nowadays,  we  use  the 
distinction  between  mind  and  matter  most  often 
in  the  attempt  to  differentiate  between  the  subject- 
matter  of  physics  and  that  of  psychology,  between 
the  "  outer  "  world  of  "  Nature  "  and  the  "  inner  " 
world  of  "  consciousness."  But  both  these  worlds 
— seeing  that  each  is  being  dealt  with  by  an 
"  empirical  "  science — must  ia&  within  "  experience" 
in  the  widest  sense  of  that  term.  Thus,  the  distinc- 
tion between  them  is  best  interpreted  as  one  of 
the  most  emphatic  ways  of  acknowledging  the  fact, 
already  recognized  by  us  in  the  last  lecture,  that 
physics  selects  and  abstracts.  As  Mr.  Norman 
Campbell  puts  it,  "  the  whole  field  of  our  experience 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    53 

is  not  the  domain  of  science,  but  only  a  very  limited 
portion  of  it." 1  Whitehead's  principle  that  "  Nature 
is  closed  to  mind  "  is  another  way  of  putting  the 
same  distinction.  To  say,  as  Campbell  and  many 
others  do,  that  physics  has  for  its  subject-matter 
the  "  material  "  world  means  that  it  studies  "  what 
we  perceive  by  the  senses  "  without  reference  to, 
or  in  abstraction  from,  the  processes  of  perceiving, 
thinking,  reasoning,  etc.,  which  are  involved  in  the 
studying  ;  in  abstraction,  too,  from  the  student's 
feelings,  desires,  and  other  "  mental "  processes. 
All  these  are  part  of  our  "  experience "  in  the 
widest  sense,  but  when  we  restrict  physics  to 
"  matter  "  as  distinct  from  "  mind,"  we  exclude 
these  ranges  of  experience  from  its  scope.  By  the 
same  act,  as  we  have  seen,  our  aesthetic,  moral, 
religious  reactions  to  the  world  which  we  perceive 
by  our  senses  are  ruled  out  from  the  realm  of 
physics. 

This,  then,  is  the  first  sense  in  which  "  matter  " 
may  be  interpreted.  It  is  a  sense  strictly  relevant 
to  this  context,  and  to  this  context  only.  "  Matter," 
or  the  material  world,  here  means  the  world  of  "  what 
we  perceive  by  our  senses,"  abstracted,  in  the 
manner  characteristic  of  physics,  from  "  mind," 
i.e.,  from  the  rest  of  our  experience.  "  Matter  " 

1  Cf .  Physics  :  The  Elements,  p.  238.  (Camb.  Univ.  Press, 
1920.) 


54      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

(with     its    synonyms,   "  Nature,"    the    "  external 
world,"    the    "  physical    world ")    signalizes     this 
methodically  maintained   attitude   of  abstraction. 
(2)  But,  the  description  of  the  subject-matter  of 
physics  as  what  we  perceive  by   the  senses  is, 
according  to  some  authorities,  still  too  wide.     And, 
correspondingly,   the  meaning  of   "  matter,"   and 
"  material  world,"  has  to  be  further  restricted  to 
those  objects  of  perception  which  we  commonly 
call    "  real,"    as   distinct   from   those   which   are 
"  unreal."     The  golfer  who  has  partaken  of  whisky 
not  wisely  but  too  well,  may  see  two  balls,  but  his 
testimony  is  not  accepted  by  any  physicist  as  good 
evidence.     Hallucinations  are  commonly  as  vivid 
as,  and  often  much  more  impressive  than,  ordinary 
percepts,  but  they  do  not  count  as  "  facts  "  for 
physical  theory  to  explain.     The  objects  and  events 
which  we  witness  in  dreams  may  in  themselves  be 
indistinguishable  from  similar  objects  and  events 
perceived  in  waking,  yet,  once  again,  they  are  not 
included    among    the    data    of    physics.      These 
examples  may  serve  to  remind  us  that,  although 
these  several  kinds  of  experiences  must  be  classed 
as  perceptions,  what  we  perceive  on  these  occasions 
is  not  accounted  as  "  real "  and  forms  no  part  of 
what  the  science  of  physics  deals  with.     In  other 
words,  the  physicist,  if  his  observations  are  to  be 
good  evidence  for  the  purposes  of  his  science,  must 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    55 

make  his  observations  when  he  is  neither  drunk, 
nor  subject  to  the  influence  of  drugs,  nor  the  victim 
of  hallucinations,  nor  asleep  and  dreaming.  No 
phenomena  perceived  under  such  conditions  will  be 
recorded  as  physical  facts  or  furnish  occasion  to 
physicists  for  further  research.  They  may  be 
investigated  by  physician  or  psychologist,  but  the 
physicist  will  simply  rule  them  out  of  his  domain. 
There  are,  indeed,  border-line  cases,  e.g.,  so-called 
after-images,  on  which  the  decision,  one  way  or  the 
other,  seems  arbitrary,  but,  broadly  speaking,  the 
physicist's  "  material  world "  covers  all  those 
phenomena  which  are  "  real "  in  the  sense  that 
they  can  be  perceived  by  more  than  one  observer, 
so  that  one  man's  perception  of  them  can  be  checked 
and  confirmed,  either  simultaneously  or  subse- 
quently, by  that  of  others.  To  talk,  with  Norman 
Campbell,  of  "  universal  assent  "  as  the  test  of 
what  is  for  the  physicist  "  material,"  in  the  sense 
of  "  real,"  is,  perhaps,  to  use  too  large  a  word. 
But  getting  one's  perceptions  confirmed  and  corro- 
borated, or,  if  necessary,  corrected,  by  others  is  a 
recognized  procedure,  both  in  ordinary  life  and  in 
science,  for  guarding  oneself  against  illusions  of 
one's  own  senses.  It  is,  for  example,  by  this  test 
that  most  physicists  reject  the  evidence  offered  for 
the  existence  of  ghosts,  and  for  the  occurrence 
of  other  "  supernatural,"  or,  at  least,  abnormal, 


56      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

phenomena,  such  as  are  investigated  by  the  Society 
for  Psychical  Research.  Though  the  evidence  is 
voluminous,  and  though  there  are  even  cases  in 
which  several  observers  have  perceived  the  same 
ghost,  ghosts  have  not  yet  made  good  their  status 
as  "  real  "  at  the  bar  of  physical  science. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  observed  that  in  all  the 
experiences  which  the  physicist  rejects,  something, 
whatever  it  may  be,  is  really  perceived.     An  after- 
image may  not  count  as  "  real "  for  the  physicist, 
but  it  is  none  the  less  a  genuine  phenomenon 
after  its  own  kind  ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  illusions 
of  the  senses,  hallucinations,  dreams.     The  delusions 
of  drunkards  and  drug-fiends  exhibit  a  considerable 
degree  of  "  assent."     Moreover,  all  these  experiences 
obey  laws  which  we  can  ascertain.     They  occur 
regularly  under  appropriate  conditions,  such  as  the 
action  of  alcohol  or  drugs  on  the  nervous  system. 
Whitehead,  thoroughgoing  in  his  application  of  the 
principle  that  Nature  consists  of  what  we  perceive 
by  the  senses,  includes  them  in  "  Nature."     But 
physics,  as  practised  by  most  physicists  of  our  day, 
excludes  these  "  unreal "   objects  from  its  scope 
and,    assigning   them   to   other   sciences,   such   as 
psychology   or   psychiatry,    labels   them    "  purely 
mental."     They  are  said  to  exist  "  merely  in  the 
mind."   But,  then,  physicists  are  apt  to  use  "  mind  " 
as  a  picturesque  appellation  for  the  rubbish-heap  of 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    57 

all  those  facts  of  experience  for  which  they  have 
no  use. 

Thus,  our  examination  of  the  second  sense  of 
"  matter  "  and  "  material  world  "  has  led  us  into 
a  fresh  context,  involving  not  merely,  as  before,  a 
reduction  of  the  world  of  experience  to  what  we 
perceive  by  the  senses,  but  a  further  severe  selection 
by  the  physicist  even  among  the  objects  of  percep- 
tion. He  not  only  samples  Nature  most  commonly 
under  highly  artificial  laboratory  conditions,  but 
he  admits  phenomena  as  "  real "  only  subject  to 
the  test  of  "  assent  "  by  several  percipients.  This 
second  sense  of  "  matter,"  therefore,  embodies  the 
commonsense  distinction  of  "  real  "  and  "  unreal  " 
objects  of  perception,  the  former  being  "  material," 
the  latter  "  merely  mental." 

(3)  The  third  sense  of  "  matter  "  introduces  us  to 
yet  a  further  manipulation  of  the  notion  of  "  what 
we  perceive  by  the  senses."  In  fact,  it  takes  us 
beyond  the  realm  of  sense-data  altogether  and 
introduces  us  to  a  world  of  entities  which  are 
frankly  acknowledged  to  be  inaccessible  in  them- 
selves to  our  senses,  though  indispensable  for  the 
occurrence  of  the  phenomena  which  we  can,  and 
do,  observe.  Of  this  order  are  the  atoms  and  the 
ether  of  the  older  physical  theories,  and  the  "  electro- 
magnetic theory  of  matter "  of  our  own  day. 
Current  discussions  about  the  "  constitution  of 


58      MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

matter  "  move  wholly  in  this  sphere  and  are  con- 
ducted in  terms  of  corpuscles,  ions,  electric  charges, 
etc. — all  of  these  being  entities  which,  though 
affirmed  to  be  "  real,"  are  in  their  very  nature 
imperceptible  by  our  senses  even  when  aided  by 
our  most  powerful  instruments  of  observation. 
More  familiar  instances  of  material  processes  of  this 
sort  are  the  air-waves  which  are  correlated  with 
the  sounds  we  hear,  or  the  light-waves  ("  oscillations 
in  the  luminiferous  ether  ")  which  are  correlated 
with  the  colours  we  see.  This  third  sense  of 
"  matter,"  thus,  takes  us  into  yet  another  context. 
We  are  now  no  longer  concerned,  as  we  were  in 
the  first  two  senses  of  "  matter,"  with  determining 
what  belongs,  and  what  does  not  belong,  to  the 
data,  or  subject-matter,  of  physics.  We  are 
concerned  now  with  the  explanatory  theory  of 
physics — with  "  scientific  objects,"  as  Whitehead 
calls  them  to  distinguish  them  from  the  "  perceptual 
objects  "  and  "  sense-data  "  which  have  occupied 
us  until  now. 

At  this  point  we  may  observe  a  curious  shift 
of  emphasis  and  interest  in  the  attitude  of  many 
physicists.  Without  explicitly  challenging  or  deny- 
ing the  principle  that  Nature  is  what  we  perceive 
by  our  senses,  and  without  ceasing  to  use  their 
senses  for  observation,  they  yet  tend  to  look  upon 
the  world  of  sense-experience  as  if  it  were  a  sort 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    59 

of  veil  which  stood  between  us  and  the  imperceptible 
objects  of  scientific  theory,  and  as  if  our  having  to 
use  our  senses  were  a  handicap  and  a  limitation 
rather  than   an   opportunity   and   an  advantage. 
The  spectrum,  for  example,  exhausts  the  colours 
which  we  can  actually  see,  but  the  scale  of  "  light- 
rays  "  extends  beyond  both  ends  of  the  visible 
spectrum,  so  that  we  speak,  e.g.,  of  ultra-violet 
rays   to   which   no   colour   corresponds   that   any 
human  eye  has  ever  seen.     Similarly,  sound-waves 
extend  beyond  both  ends  of  the  scale  of  tones 
audible  to  our  ears.     The  physicist  is  interested 
in  the  light-rays  or  sound-waves  as  such,  and  in 
their  properties  and  laws.     Whether  visible  colours 
or  audible  tones  are,  or  are  not,  correlated  with 
them,  is  irrelevant  to  him,  though  it  was  the  percep- 
tion of  colours  and  sounds  that  first  gave  him  a 
clue  to  these  light-rays  and  sound-waves.    Again, 
different  observers  may  vary  widely  in  their  colour- 
or  sound- judgments,  whereas  the  entities  of  physical 
theory  possess  a  stability  very  satisfying  to  the 
intellect.     For   these   and   similar  reasons,   many 
physicists  tend  to  deprecate  the  world  of  sense- 
perception  by  comparison  with  the  world  of  physical 
theory.    Norman  Campbell  gives  typical  expression 
to  this  view  when  he  writes,  "  Colour  and  pitch 
are  not  in  any  way  fundamental  in  physics ;    it 
would  be  perfectly  possible  to  leave  out  of  our 


60      MATTER,   MIND,   LIFE,   AND  GOD 

treatises  any  mention  of  them  and  out  of  our 
experiments  any  use  of  them,  and  yet  to  leave  the 
science  of  physics  essentially  unchanged.  So  far  as 
I  can  see,  persons  totally  blind  and  totally  deaf 
from  birth  could  appreciate  as  well  as  anyone  else 
the  significance  of  all  the  propositions  of  physics." 

On  the  other  hand,  thinkers  like  Whitehead,  who 
on  this  point  continues  the  attitude  of  physicists 
like  Ernst  Mach  and  Karl  Pearson,  do  not 
countenance  this  depreciation  of  the  world  of 
sense-perception,  and  maintain,  rather,  that  the 
significance  of  scientific  theories  lies  in  their  power 
to  explain  and  order  the  data  of  perception.  The 
purpose  of  all  our  efforts  to  develop  our  physical 
theories  to  the  utmost  extent  is  to  make  Nature, 
as  perceived  by  the  senses,  more  intelligible. 

At  this  point,  therefore,  we  come  upon  a  profound 
divergence  hi  the  interpretation  of  physics.  But 
we  shall  be  better  able  to  appreciate  the  issue  after 
we  have  paid  some  attention  to  the  fourth  sense 
of  the  term  "  matter." 

(4)  This  fourth  sense  is  for  our  argument  the 
most  important  of  all,  as  it  is  also  the  most  familiar 
to  students  of  philosophy.  It  is  reached  from  the 
third  sense,  which  we  have  just  been  discussing,  by 
regarding  colours,  sounds,  smells,  etc.,  as  "  sensa- 
tions "  or  "  mental  impressions,"  and  explaining 
them  as  effects  which  are  caused  by  the  action  of 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    61 

"  matter,"  or  "  material  objects,"  on  the  percipient's 
mind.  This  theory  is  a  very  plausible  one  for 
two  reasons.  One  reason  is  that  it  falls  in  with 
our  ordinary  habit  of  speaking  of  colours,  sounds, 
etc.,  as  "  impressions  received  from  the  world 
outside,  or  around,  us."  The  other  is  that  it  looks 
very  much  like  a  somewhat  crude  version  of  the 
physiological  theory  of  perception  in  terms  of 
"  stimulus "  and  "  response."  Moreover,  it  is 
fatally  easy  to  confuse  it  with  the  third  sense  of 
"  matter,"  for  it  seems  plausible  to  identify  the 
material  objects  which  are  supposed  to  cause  our 
sensations  with  the  atoms,  corpuscles,  rays,  etc., 
of  the  physicist's  theory.  But  just  because  the 
confusion  is  easy  (and,  therefore,  also  very  common), 
it  must  at  all  costs  be  avoided.  Hence  it  is  most 
important  to  make  clear  to  oneself  what  the  differ- 
ence is.  The  difference  is  this.  On  the  third 
view,  colours,  sounds  and  other  sense-data  are 
bona  fide  natural  phenomena,  parts  of  "  Nature  " 
as  "  what  we  perceive  by  the  senses."  On  the 
fourth  view,  they  have  become  "  sensations  "  and 
are  classed  as  "  mental."  As  such,  they  cease  to 
be  parts  of  Nature,  with  the  result  that  Nature  no 
longer  includes  the  colours  we  see,  the  sounds  we 
hear,  or  any  of  the  other  sense-data,  but  is  restricted 
to  the  imperceptible  entities  and  processes  which 
are  supposed  to  cause  sensations  of  colour,  etc., 


62      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

in  our  minds.     Thus,  the  two  views  differ  in  that 
the  third  view  counts  sense-data  as  part  of  Nature 
(part  of  what  we  perceive),  whereas  the  fourth  view 
counts  them  as  part  of  Mind  (part  of  the  percipient's 
inner  consciousness).     The  two  views  draw  the  line 
between  Nature  and  Mind  in  different  places,  and 
whilst  the  third,  for  all  that  it  credits  Nature  with 
much  that  is  not  perceptible,  does  not  break  with 
the  definition  of  Nature  as  "  what  we  perceive  by 
the  senses,"  the  fourth  view  breaks  so  sharply  with 
that  definition  as,  in  effect,  to  abandon  it  altogether. 
At  the  same  time,  it  is  characteristic  of  the  fourth 
view  to  hold  that  all  we  directly  know  of  Nature 
consists  of  these  sensations  produced  in  our  minds. 
But,  if  so,  how  do  we  know  what  has  caused  them, 
or  how  can  we  verify  our  guesses  on  this  point  ? 
A  long  line  of  philosophical  critics — and  of  scientists, 
too — has  laboured  to  point  out  the  difficulties  and 
improbabilities  hi  this  account,  and  to  re-establish 
the  principle  that  colours,  sounds  and  other  sense- 
data  are  natural  phenomena,  and  parts  of  Nature 
as  "  what  we  perceive  by  the  senses."     Berkeley 
was  the  first  of  these  critics,  and  it  is  in  this  fourth 
sense,  and  only  in  this  fourth  sense,  that  he  denies 
"  the  existence  of  matter."     He  was  the  first  to 
re-affirm,  in  opposition  to  Locke  and  others,  that 
the  colours  we  see  and  the  sounds  we  hear  are 
genuine  phenomena,  i.e.,  objects  which  we  perceive, 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"     63 

and  not  merely  states,  or  modes,  of  the  percipient's 
own  mind.  On  this  ground  he  claimed,  fairly 
enough,  to  be  the  champion  of  commonsense. 
He  defended  our  right  to  trust  our  senses  against 
the  "  scepticism  "  lurking  in  the  view  that  what 
our  senses  perceive  are  effects  caused  by  an 
"  unknowable  somewhat."1  Again,  "  materialism  " 
is  built  on  this  fourth  sense  of  "  matter."  It  is  to 
this  sense  of  "  matter,"  and  to  no  other,  that  the 
saying  applies,  "  We  know  too  much  about 
matter  to  be  any  longer  materialists." 

To  sum  up  and  recapitulate  :  The  four  different 
senses  of  "  matter  "  which  we  have  distinguished 
are  best  understood  as  arising  in  the  course  of 
different  interpretations  of  the  principle  that 
physics,  as  an  empirical  science,  has  for  its  subject- 
matter  "  Nature,"  or  "  what  we  perceive  by  the 
senses."  The  first  sense  of  "  matter "  serves  to 
exclude  from  the  field  of  physics  all  reference  to 
mental  activities  and  to  the  values  connected  with 
feeling  and  will.  The  second  further  excludes  the 
objects  of  certain  perceptions  as  unreal  or  abnormal. 
The  third  correlates  what  we  perceive  with  a  world 
of  imperceptible  entities  and  processes,  inferred  by 
scientific  theory.  The  fourth  treats  the  objects  of 

1  The  above,  of  course,  is  far  from  being  a  complete  account 
of  Berkeley's  whole  position,  but  it  does  put  right  a  common 
misinterpretation  of  that  position  as  necessarily  incompatible 
with,  and  hostile  to,  physics  as  an  empirical  science. 


64      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

perception  as  mental  sensations  caused  by  non- 
mental  objects. 

Each  of  these  four  senses  of  "  matter,"  with  the 
context  to  which  it  belongs,  raises  problems  of 
great  philosophical  interest.  But  the  fourth  is  for 
us  the  most  interesting  of  all,  because  once  again 
we  are  witnessing  at  the  present  day  a  revolt 
among  philosophically-minded  scientists  against 
the  mutilation  of  Nature  which  it  involves.  This 
revolt  bids  fair  to  inaugurate  a  new  chapter  in  the 
history  of  the  philosophy  of  Nature,  and  we  must 
now  turn  to  a  closer  consideration  of  it.  But, 
before  doing  so,  let  us  emphasize  once  more  that 
this  revolt  against  "  matter  "  and  "  materialism  " 
is  not  a  denial  of  the  existence  of  anything  which 
physics  rightly  affirms  to  exist.  It  is  not  a  denial 
of  the  existence  of  atoms  or  corpuscles  or  light-rays 
or  sound-waves.  It  is  not  a  denial  of  the  "  electro- 
magnetic theory  of  matter,"  or  of  any  other  specific 
and  established  physical  theory.  The  denial  of 
"  matter  "  with  which  we  are  concerned  is  neither 
more  nor  less  than  the  denial  of  the  theory — which 
is  quite  different  from  all  these — that  what  we 
perceive  is  mental  sensations,  and  that  Nature  is 
the  material  Something  which  causes  these  sensa- 
tions to  occur  in  our  minds.  Nothing  else  is  at 
issue  but  this  theory  of  what  Nature  is  and  of  how 
it  is  related  to  our  minds.  If,  for  example,  anyone 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    65 

were  to  deny  the  existence  of  matter  in  any  sense 
which  implied  that  Sir  Ernest  Rutherford's  epoch- 
making  experiments  on  the  disintegration  of  the 
atoms  of  certain  chemical  elements  under  bombard- 
ment by  a-particles  expelled  from  radium  were  a 
mere  fairy-tale,  he  would  justly  deserve  the  scorn 
which  some  scientists  like  to  pour  on  "  idealists  " 
and  "  metaphysicians."  All  that  is  in  question 
when  we  speak  of  a  revolt  against  "  matter " 
is  the  truth  of  a  certain  theory  concerning  the  nature 
of  what  we  perceive  and  the  causes  of  our  perceiving. 
This  is  the  special  context  which  we  have  to  bear 
in  mind  throughout  all  that  follows. 

3.  Let  us,  now,  state  fully  and  explicitly  the 
theory  to  be  examined. 

By  "  Nature  "  we  have  agreed  to  mean  the  whole 
scene,  including  our  bodies,  which  our  senses 
present  or  disclose  to  us — the  world  of  things  we 
perceive.  Strictly,  what  each  of  us  perceives  at 
any  one  moment  is  only  a  fragment,  a  more  or  less 
limited  section  of  this  world.  Beyond  the  range 
of  what  we  actually  perceive  there  lies  all  that  is 
perceptible,  though  it  may  never  actually  be 
perceived  by  anyone.  Nature,  then,  is  the  world 
of  actual  or  possible  sense-perception.  Further, 
we  commonly  assume  that  the  fragments  of  Nature 
which  each  of  us  perceives  may  overlap,  or,  to  put 
it  more  simply,  that  different  percipients  can 
5 


66      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

perceive  the  same  objects  and  events.  In  short,  we 
regard  the  world  of  Nature  as,  in  principle,  common 
to  all  percipients. 

But,  what  is  it  that  we  actually  perceive  ?  Our 
first  impulse  will  be  to  answer  this  question  by 
enumerating  some  of  the  things  which  we  here  and 
now  perceive,  or  which  at  once  occur  to  us  as 
perceptible — the  walls  and  desks  of  this  room,  the 
persons  in  it,  the  trams  and  motor-cars  the  noise 
of  which  comes  to  us  from  the  street ;  in  short, 
the  whole  assemblage  of  things  which  constitute 
the  familiar  environment  of  our  lives — earth  and 
sky  and  sea,  mountains  and  rivers,  trees  and 
animals,  human  beings  and  all  the  works  of  their 
hands. 

But,  further,  of  these  objects  what  precisely  do 
we  perceive  ?  The  answer  will  surely  be :  their 
qualities — their  colours  and  shapes,  their  tastes, 
smells,  temperatures,  the  sounds  they  make,  their 
feel  to  the  touch.  It  will  not  occur  to  us  to  give 
any  other  answer,  for  our  very  language,  with  its 
substantives  and  adjectives,  imposes  this  type  of 
answer  on  us.  Perhaps  you  have  remarked  that 
the  benches  in  this  lecture-room  are  uncomfortably 
hard.  Well,  if  so,  you  have  translated  your  painful 
experience  of  sitting  on  them  into  language  which 
names  a  "  thing  "  (the  bench)  and  attributes  to  it 
a  "  quality "  (hardness).  The  grammar  of  our 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    67 

language  thus  expresses  our  habit  of  thinking  in 
terms  of  things  and  their  qualities. 

A  "  habit  of  thinking,"  did  we  say  ?  The  phrase 
may  well  give  us  pause.  We  ought  not  to  let  it 
pass  unchallenged.  Is  it  merely  a  trick  of  ours 
thus  to  think  ?  Is  it  an  arbitrary  pattern  which 
our  minds  impose  upon  Nature,  because  they  are 
built  that  way  ?  Is  not  Nature  "  really  "  composed 
of  things  and  their  qualities  ? 

These  questions  are  not  asked  with  the  intention 
of  throwing  doubts  on  our  habits  of  thinking.  We 
have  no  desire  to  infer  that  Nature  is  really  quite 
different  from  what  we  think  her  to  be.  We  take 
our  stand,  now  as  before,  on  the  principle  that 
Nature  is  what  we  think  her  to  be,  subject  only 
to  the  proviso  that  bad  thinking  can  be  corrected 
by  better.  To  abandon  this  principle  is  to  deny 
the  very  possibility  of  knowledge. 

But,  the  purpose  of  our  questions  is  to  force  us 
to  realize  that,  in  thinking  in  terms  of  things  and 
qualities,  we  do  put  an  interpretation  on  the  evidence 
of  our  senses.  We  do  adopt  a  theory  of  what  it  is 
that  we  perceive.  By  all  means  let  us  say  that  the 
theory  is  true,  and  even  that  the  very  facts  which  we 
perceive  compel  us  so  to  interpret  them.  But,  grant- 
ing all  this,  our  immediate  task  is  still  to  distinguish 
between  the  interpretation,  the  theory,  and  the  ulti- 
mate data  of  perception  which  are  thus  interpreted. 


68      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

What  are  these  ultimate  data  of  perception  ? 
The  best  language  to  use  about  them,  when  we  thus 
try  to  attend  to  them  apart  from  all  interpretation, 
is  to  say  that  we  perceive  a  "  tissue,"  or  "  together," 
or  "  mass,"  of  colours,  sounds,  temperatures, 
touches,  etc.  ;  and  that  we  perceive  them,  not  as 
atomic  items,  but  as  a  continuous  and  continuously 
changing  flow  or  stream.  At  the  basis,  thus,  of 
the  articulated  world  of  things  lies,  as  the  ultimate 
fact  of  perception,  this  constantly  changing  tissue 
of  what — choosing  the  most  neutral  and  non- 
committal words  we  can  find — we  will  call  "  sense- 
data,"  or,  with  Whitehead,  "  sense-objects."  The 
knowledge  of  Nature,  the  discovery  of  what  Nature 
is,  begins  for  all  of  us  at  this  point.  We  begin  as 
children  at  this  level.  We  advance  rapidly  to  the 
next  level  which,  adopting  again  Whitehead's 
terminology,  we  may  call  the  level  of  "  perceptual 
objects,"  i.e.,  the  things  with  their  qualities  of 
common  parlance.  But,  only  if  we  are  scientists 
do  we  advance  to  the  third  level,  the  level  of 
"  scientific  objects,"  i.e.,  the  entities  and  processes 
affirmed  by  the  theories  of  physics  and  chemistry. 
These  are  the  three  stages  in  the  development  of 
our  knowledge  of  Nature.  Obviously  the  earlier 
stages  are  the  foundation  of  the  later  and  persist 
as  integral  factors  within  it.  The  scientist,  in  his 
observations,  constantly  draws  upon  his  perception 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    69 

of  sense-objects,  and  by  this  means  he  discriminates 
the  "  things  "  he  handles  in  his  laboratory  or  in 
field-work  just  as  ordinary  mortals  do,  though  with 
more  precision.  And  the  whole  process  is  an 
advance  in  knowledge,  i.e.,  an  advance  in  the 
interpretation,  by  thinking,  of  the  evidence  of  our 
senses — an  advance  towards  a  complete  revelation 
of  what  Nature  really  is.  This  follows  from  our 
principle  that  to  "  know "  Nature  is  to  believe 
that  Nature  is  really  what  the  progress  of  thought, 
and  especially  of  scientific  thought,  reveals  her  to 
be.  The  interest  of  the  "  philosophy  of  Nature  " 
lies  in  analyzing,  on  the  basis  of  this  principle,  the 
logic  of  the  progress  of  thought  from  stage  to  stage. 

Now,  the  theory  of  "  matter  " — the  "  material- 
ism "  of  common  parlance — which  we  have  to 
discuss  and  which  we  shall  find  reason  to  reject  as 
untenable,  is  a  particular  theory  of  the  nature  of 
sense-objects  and  of  their  relation,  on  the  one  side, 
to  the  percipient's  mind,  and,  on  the  other,  to 
"  scientific  objects." 

The  essence  of  this  theory  is  to  be  found  in  the 
following  propositions : — 

(1)  Sense-objects    (colours,    sounds,    etc.)    are 
"  sensations "   and,  as  such,   states  of  the 
perceiver's  mind.     They  are  "  subjective." 

(2)  By   this   classification   of   sense-objects   as 
"  mental  states,"  or  "  mental  impressions," 


70      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

they  are,  at  once,  excluded  from  Nature  as 
"  physical  "  ("  material,"  "  objective  "). 

(3)  Hence,  they  cannot  be  in  any  proper  sense 
qualities    of    physical    things    (theory    of 
"  secondary  qualities  "  :   strictly,  we  should 
not  say,  "  the  sky  is  blue,"  but,  "  it  produces 
a  blue  sensation  in  our  minds  "). 

(4)  As  mental  states  they  are  effects  produced 
in  us. 

(5)  The   cause   of   these   effects  is  matter,   or 
material  things,  acting  through  our  sense- 
organs,  nerves,  and  brain  on  our  minds. 

(6)  The  manner  of  this  causation  is  mechanical, 
i.e.,    by   contact,    or   impact ;     hence    the 
physical  cause  must  possess  the  "  primary 
qualities  "  of  shape,  size,  solidity,  resistance. 

Two  points,  especially,  stand  out  in  this  material- 
istic theory.  The  first  is  that  the  world  of  Nature 
is  stripped  of  all  sense-objects,  of  all  colour,  sound, 
smell,  temperature,  etc.,  which  are  all  denied  to 
Nature  by  being  classed  under  the  heading  of 
"  mind,"  with  the  twofold  result  that  (a)  our 
ordinary  way  of  speaking  of  perceptual  objects  and 
their  qualities  involves  a  complete  illusion,  and 
(b)  that  what  remains  of  Nature  must  be  conceived 
as  consisting  only  of  imperceptible  entities,  possess- 
ing only  the  primary  qualities.  The  second  point 
is  a  causal  theory  of  perception  :  the  sense-objects 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    71 

which  we  perceive  are  the  effects  produced  in  our 
minds  by  the  action  of  the  imperceptible  entities 
on  our  sense-organs.  In  short,  it  is  a  theory,  not 
merely  of  what  Nature  is,  or  is  known  to  be,  but 
also  of  what  Nature  does  to  the  mind  of  the 
percipient. 

The  net  result  is  that  Nature  is  split  in  two. 
What  we  directly  perceive  (the  tissue  of  sense- 
objects)  is  divorced  from  the  realm  of  scientific 
objects,  which  latter  now  figure  precariously  as 
the  hypothetical  and  unverifiable  causes  of  the 
impressions  in  our  minds. 

Some  physicists,  straying  into  the  field  of  philo- 
sophy of  Nature,  have  endorsed  this  materialistic 
theory  under  the  impression  that  it  is  at  least  in 
harmony  with,  if  not  actually  implied  by,  the 
science  of  physics  itself.  But  these  adventurers  are 
misguided.  For,  closely  considered,  nothing  could 
well  be  less  in  harmony  with  this  theory  than  the 
actual  method  of  scientific  investigation.  As 
observer  and  experimenter,  the  physicist  gets  his 
evidence  of  what  Nature  is,  and  does,  in  the  first 
instance  through  his  senses.  Yet,  on  the  theory, 
this  evidence  consists  of  nothing  but  subjective 
impressions  in  his  mind,  and  he  is  still  .separated 
from  Nature  by  a  gap  which  he  can  bridge  only 
by  means  of  a  precarious  hypothesis  concerning  the 
imperceptible  Somewhat  which  may  have  caused 


72      MATTER,   LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

his  sensations.  In  fact,  were  his  practice  not 
better  than  this  theory,  he  could  hardly  move  a 
step.  Fortunately,  in  actual  practice  he  forgets 
all  about  the  theory  and  accepts  all  he  observes  as 
bona  fide  disclosures  of  Nature.  He  does  not 
hamper  himself  by  labelling  "  mental "  whatever 
he  perceives,  and  then  guessing  at  the  "  physical " 
world  "  behind  the  veil."  He  never  thinks  of 
sensations,  but  only  of  phenomena,  and  of  what 
may  be  needed  to  explain  them.  If  the  defender 
of  materialism  should  plead  Berkeley's  maxim  that 
"  we  ought  to  think  with  the  learned,  and  speak 
with  the  vulgar,"  we  shall  reply  that  the  resulting 
tangle  is  such  as  to  encourage  us  in  the  search  for 
a  theory  which  will  preserve  the  good  sense  in  the 
speech  of  the  vulgar  and  avoid  the  nonsense  in  the 
thought  of  the  learned. 

The  upshot  of  our  argument  is  that  we  are 
placed,  fair  and  square,  before  the  choice  between 
the  old  materialistic  philosophy  of  Nature  which 
divides  "  Nature  " — "  bifurcates  "  it,  is  Whitehead's 
picturesque  term  for  the  operation — into  mental 
sensations  and  their  material  causes,  and  the  new 
philosophy  of  Nature  which  proceeds  on  the  principle 
that,  from  the  first  moment  of  perception  to  the 
latest  hypotheses  of  scientific  speculation,  there  is 
a  continuously  growing  knowledge  of  Nature — a 
knowledge  for  which,  as  Whitehead  says,  "  every- 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    73 

thing  perceived  is  in  Nature  "  and  the  main  task 
is  to  follow  up  "  the  coherence  of  things  perceptively 
known."  The  programme  of  the  new  philosophy 
of  Nature  thus  calls  for  the  denial  of  "  matter  "  in 
our  fourth  sense,  and  for  a  fresh  analysis  of  how  the 
concepts  of  physics  are  founded  upon  the  data  of 
perception. 

4.  It  will  naturally  be  asked  how  it  has  come 
about  that  a  theory  so  false  has  had  so  long  a 
history  and  has  been  accepted  by  so  many  thinkers 
of  distinction.  Does  not  the  length  of  tradition 
and  the  weight  of  authority  throw  doubt  on  our 
diagnosis  of  it  as  an  error  ? 

The  explanation  of  this  phenomenon,  as  White- 
head  has  plausibly  suggested,  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  two  distinct  movements  of  thought  have 
united  to  produce  it.  One  of  these  movements 
goes  back  to  the  beginnings  of  European  speculation 
in  Ancient  Greece.  It  connects  the  "  matter " 
and  "  ether  "  of  modern  theories  by  direct  historical 
descent  with  the  water,  air,  fire,  out  of  which  the 
early  Ionian  thinkers  supposed  the  world  to  be 
made  up.  From  this  side,  "  matter  "  is  but  the 
last  chapter  in  the  long  tale  of  efforts  to  discover 
the  stuff,  so  to  speak,  of  which  all  things  are  com- 
posed. This  fundamental  stuff,  or  "  substance," 
is  naturally  regarded  as  occupying  space,  and 
science  is  the  attempt  to  give  an  intelligible  account 


74      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

of  the  adventures  and  transformations  which  it 
undergoes  in  the  course  of  time.  Thus  we  get  the 
close  association  of  matter,  space,  and  time  in 
current  theory.  A  nuance  of  sophistication  crept 
into  this  somewhat  naive  concept  of  a  universal 
stuff,  or  substance,  when  Aristotle,  in  his  Physics, 
imported  into  the  discussion  the  logical  concept  of 
a  "  subject "  of  which  "  attributes  "  can  be  predi- 
cated. "  Substance  "  and  "  subject  "  fused  in  the 
notion  of  a  "  substratum "  in  which  attributes 
"  inhere."  But,  this  very  language  suggested  a 
distinction  between  the  attributes  (e.g.,  the  colours, 
sounds,  touch-qualities,  etc.)  and  the  substratum 
(e.g.,  matter),  thus  facilitating  a  tendency  to  push 
the  substratum  into  the  position  of  an  unknowable 
and  indefinable  Something-or-other  to  which  the 
attributes  somehow  belong. 

This  tendency  received  additional  impetus,  and 
the  "  bifurcation  of  Nature  "  was  completed,  by 
the  rise,  in  the  seventeenth  century,  of  the  trans- 
mission theories  of  light  and  sound.  According  to 
these  theories,  what  we  see  are  colours,  but  what 
enters  the  eye  are  colourless,  and  indeed  invisible, 
waves  of  "  luminiferous  ether  "  ;  what  we  hear 
are  sounds,  but  what  enters  the  ear  are  air-waves, 
in  themselves  silent  and  soundless.  How,  then,  can 
colours  and  sounds  inhere  as  attributes  in  this  sort 
of  substance — an  oscillating  medium  ?  The  easiest 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"     75 

way  out  of  the  difficulty  was  to  cease  thinking  of 
colours  and  sounds  as  qualities,  and  to  think  of 
them  as  effects  instead,  viz.,  effects  produced  in 
the  observer's  mind  by  the  motions  in  the  physical 
substance.  Thus,  the  theory  of  matter  which  we 
are  criticizing  may  be  described  as  the  offspring 
of  an  unholy  marriage  between  the  old  search  for 
an  ultimate  substance  and  the  new  causal  theory 
of  colours,  sounds,  etc.,  as  sensations  produced  in 
our  minds.  This  twist  of  the  theory  makes  out  of 
the  world  actually  perceived  by  our  senses  a  subjec- 
tive illusion,  and  out  of  the  material  world  which 
causes  it  the  object  of  a  doubtful  guess.  One  half 
of  Nature,  as  Whitehead  puts  it,  becomes  a  "  dream," 
the  other  half  a  "  conjecture." 

Thus,  we  come  back  to  a  moral  which  must  be, 
by  now,  amply  familiar.  The  theory  which  declares 
the  colours,  sounds,  and  other  sense-objects  which 
we  perceive,  to  be  "  mental,"  and  which  postulates 
an  imperceptible  "  matter  "  as  the  cause  of  these 
mental  effects  is  untenable.  Present-day  criticism 
of  it  endorses  the  remark  which  Berkeley  already 
aimed  at  "  matter,"  taken  in  this  sense.  "  There 
can  be  no  use  of  matter  in  Natural  Philosophy," 
was  the  bishop's  blunt  way  of  putting  it,1  and 
through  Whitehead' s  mouth  modern  philosophy  of 
Nature  utters  its  agreement. 

1  Cf .  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  p.  50. 


76      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

5.  For  the  synoptic  point  of  view  of  these 
lectures  it  is  no  small  gain,  not  only  that  this  old 
error  is,  at  length,  being  laid  to  rest,  but  especially 
that  this  result  has  been  achieved  by  a  happy 
co-operation  between  philosophers  and  scientists. 
We  can  hardly  exaggerate  the  importance  of  the 
fact  that  the  sustained  philosophical  polemic 
against  the  theory  of  "  matter  "  (in  the  fourth  of 
the  senses  which  we  have  distinguished) — a  polemic 
which  has  commonly  been  misunderstood  as  an 
attack  on  the  very  foundations  of  science  itself — 
has  at  last  been  endorsed  by  a  spokesman  of  science 
so  acute  and  brilliant  as  Whitehead.  There  have 
been  scientists  before  Whitehead  who  had  gone  a 
^considerable  distance  in  the  same  direction,  e.g., 
Ernst  Mach  in  his  Analysis  of  Sensations  and  Karl 
Pearson  in  his  Grammar  of  Science,  but  their  attempts 
at  an  emancipation  of  natural  science  from  this 
sort  of  materialism  are  far  surpassed  by  Whitehead's 
thoroughness  and  originality. 

The  value  of  Whitehead's  work,  however,  lies 
not  only  in  what  he  pulls  down,  but  even  more  hi 
what  he  builds  up.  And  this  constructive  work, 
too,  is  full  of  promise  for  our  synoptic  programme. 
The  details  of  it,  involving  largely  a  new  technical 
language,  are  too  intricate  and  difficult  to  be 
presented  here  without  doing  them  a  grave  injustice. 
But  we  must  make  an  attempt,  at  least,  to  appreci- 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    77 

ate  the  general  direction  and  method  of  Whitehead's 
thought. 

If  we  rid  ourselves  of  the  notion  that  sense-objects 
are  mental  impressions,  and  regard  them  now, 
bona  fide,  as  phenomena  constituting  the  very 
substance  (so  to  speak)  of  Nature,  what  is  the 
constructive  problem  which  confronts  us  ?  It  is 
the  problem  of  showing  how  "  perceptual  objects," 
i.e.,  the  "  things "  of  everyday  parlance,  and 
"  scientific  objects,"  i.e.,  the  space,  the  time,  the 
atoms,  etc.,  of  the  theory  of  physics,  are  related 
to  the  sense-objects,  i.e.,  to  the  colours,  sounds, 
etc.,  which  supply,  first  and  last,  our  contact  with 
Nature,  which  are  our  directest  evidence  of  what 
goes  on  in  Nature.  The  empirical  foundations  of 
physical  theory  and  the  consistency  of  current 
physical  theory  with  the  empirical  data — these 
supply  the  problems  for  positive  construction.  For, 
reflexion  soon  bears  out  Whitehead's  severe  indict- 
ment :  "  Scientific  theory  is  shot  through  and 
through  with  notions  which  are  frankly  inconsistent 
with  its  explicit  fundamental  data."  We  must  be 
content  with  a  mere  mention  of  the  most  striking 
of  these  inconsistencies  as  pointed  out  in  the  opening 
pages  of  Whitehead's  Principles.  The  orthodox 
answer  of  speculative  physics,  as  Whitehead  reminds 
us,  to  the  demand  for  an  explanation  of  natural 
phenomena  "  has  invariably  been  couched  in  terms 


78       MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

of  Time  (flowing  equably  in  measurable  lapses), 
and  of  Space  (timeless,  void  of  activity,  euclidean), 
and  of  Material  in  space  (such  as  matter,  ether,  or 
electricity)."  In  its  extremest  and  purest  form 
this  theory  demands  an  analysis  of  Nature  into  a 
sequence  of  momentary  states,  each  state  embracing 
all  Nature  at  that  moment.  Thus,  any  one 
distribution  of  material  throughout  all  space  at  a 
durationless  instant  of  time  will  be  preceded  and 
followed  by  other  distributions  of  the  same  material 
throughout  the  same  space  at  other  durationless 
instants  of  time.  As  Whitehead  points  out,  the 
scheme  makes  it  very  difficult  to  deal  with  change, 
for  the  conception  of  a  durationless  instant  of  time 
excludes  the  reference  to  past  and  future  which 
change  involves.  Similarly,  there  is  no  room  in 
the  scheme  for  velocity,  acceleration,  momentum. 
Again,  the  biological  concept  of  an  organism  as  a 
unity  which  functions  in  time  and  is  spread  through 
space  conflicts  with  the  traditional  theory.  Above 
all,  that  theory  fails  to  include  the  immediate  facts 
of  perception  which  are  the  ultimate  data  of  scientific 
knowledge.  Its  concept  of  space,  for  example, 
assumes  the  existence  of  points  as  ultimate  given 
entities.  But  where  is  a  mathematical  point  ever 
given  in  perception  ?  Thus,  Geometry  as  an 
abstract  science  deduced  from  hypothetical  premises 
is  one  thing,  but  Geometry  as  a  "  physical  science  " 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"     79 

is  another,  and  has  to  do  with  the  question,  How 
is  space  rooted  in  experience  ?  Similarly,  every- 
thing we  perceive  has  a  certain  duration,  however 
short,  and  nothing  we  perceive  corresponds  to  the 
assumed  durationless  instants  of  time.  Lastly,  the 
traditional  theory,  in  its  neglect  of  the  immediate 
deliverances  of  sense-perception,  excludes  from  the 
terms  in  which  it  is  stated  all  the  facts  of  relativity, 
such  as  the  ways  in  which  colour,  shape,  sound, 
temperature,  vary  with  the  different  points  of  view 
of  different  observers,  or  of  the  same  observer  at 
different  times,  to  say  nothing  of  the  fact  that 
each  observer's  world  has  its  own  space-time  system. 

How  is  this  state  of  things  to  be  remedied  ? 
Whitehead's  full  answer,  as  we  have  already 
confessed,  is  too  technical  to  be  adequately  sum- 
marized here.  But,  we  may  not  unfairly  single 
out  three  general  features  of  it  from  which  we  may 
judge  both  its  striking  originality  and  its  significance 
for  the  kind  of  synoptic  philosophical  outlook  which 
we  are  here  attempting. 

(i)  The  first,  and  perhaps  most  striking,  feature 
of  Whitehead's  analysis  of  Nature  is  his  insistence 
that  the  immediate  data  of  perception — the  colours, 
sounds,  etc.,  which  make  up  the  varied  spectacle 
of  Nature  presented  to  our  senses — are  all  of  them 
happenings  or  events.  "  Perception,"  we  read,  "  is 
an  awareness  of  events,  or  happenings,  forming  a 


80      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND   GOD 

partially  discerned  complex  within  the  background 
of  a  simultaneous  whole  of  Nature."  And,  again, 
from  the  side  of  Nature  :  "  Nature  is  a  structure  of 
events  and  each  event  has  its  position  in  this 
structure  and  its  own  peculiar  character  or  quality." 
Whether  we  speak  of  Nature  as  one  whole  event 
or  as  a  tissue  of  many  events,  is  of  no  importance  : 
the  main  fact  is  that  there  is  a  continuous  coming 
to  be  and  passing  away  of  events.  Every  colour, 
every  sound,  every  touch,  be  its  duration  short  or 
long,  is  transient  in  this  transient  world  of  sense- 
data.  Within  this  continuous  stream,  no  event  is, 
for  perception,  marked  off  from  other  events  by 
definite  spatio-temporal  boundaries.  Events  are 
not  isolated  from  each  other  atomically,  like  beads 
on  a  string ;  rather,  they  melt  into  each  other. 
But  thought  demands  demarcation  and  definiteness. 
It  seeks  to  discriminate  fixed  terms  and  relations 
in  the  continuous  and  ever  freshly-varied  flow  of 
events,  in  order  that  science  may  express  the 
essential  concepts  of  time,  space,  and  material  as 
issuing  from  fundamental  relations  between  events 
and  from  recognitions  of  the  characters  of  events. 
Yet,  beneath  all  distinctions  of  thought,  and 
persisting  through  them,  Nature,  as  a  tissue  of 
events,  retains  its  fundamental  character  of 
"  passage."  But  this  passage  of  events  which 
is  the  very  being  of  Nature  is  no  mere  flux  or 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    81 

"  becomingness."  It  is  at  the  same  time  a  creative 
advance,  for  "  Nature  is  ever  originating  its  own 
development."  Indeed,  the  percipient,  as  a  part 
of  Nature,  is  intimately  involved  in  this  creative 
advance.  "  Hence  perception  is  always  at  the 
utmost  point  of  creation."  In  this  emphasis  on 
the  "  life  of  Nature  " — the  phrase  is  more  than  a 
poetic  metaphor  for  Whitehead  :  it  is  but  another 
expression  for  the  fundamental  fact  that  in  Nature 
nothing  is  at  rest,  all  is  movement,  happening, 
event — Whitehead  is  unique  among  physicists. 
But  a  philosophically-trained  ear  will  be  quick  to 
catch  the  affinity  with  Bergson's  elan  vital  and, 
through  it,  with  an  historic  strain  in  philosophy 
which  leads  right  back  to  Heraclitus'  iravra  /5eF 
(all  is  flowing). 

(2)  If  the  theory  of  events  is  the  first  feature  of 
Whitehead' s  analysis  of  Nature,  his  theory  of 
objects  is  certainly  the  second.  Here,  again,  a 
certain  similarity  to  Bergson  appears.  If  the 
senses  present  Nature  to  us  as  a  passage  of  events, 
thought  apprehends  in  the  stream  definite  objects 
with  definite  relations.  Thought,  as  Bergson  puts 
it,  "  immobilizes  "  and  "  fixes  "  the  ever-moving, 
ever-creating,  life-impulse.  It  "  attempts  to  catch 
nature  without  its  passage,"  as  Whitehead  puts  it. 
It  reveals  to  us  that  "passage  of  events  "  is  the 
first,  but  not  the  last,  word  about  Nature.  There 
6 


82      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND   GOD 

is  that  in  Nature  which  does  not  pass.  Events 
pass,  but  do  not  change.  Objects  can  change, 
because  they  are,  at  least  relatively,  permanent. 
This  permanence  of  objects  is  a  side  of  Nature  as 
important  for  perception  as  the  ever-fresh  profusion 
of  transient  events.  For,  it  makes  possible  the 
recognition  of  a  "  thing "  as  maintaining  itself 
amidst  the  flux  of  events,  as  self-identical  in  the 
change  of  what  we  call  its  "  qualities."  An  event 
can  never  be  repeated.  An  object  is  essentially 
the  kind  of  thing  which  can  "  be  again." 

Objects,  in  Whitehead's  terminology,  are 
"  situated  "  in  events,  and  conversely  the  "  charac- 
ter "  of  an  event  depends  upon  the  object,  or 
objects,  of  which  it  is  the  situation.  It  is  only 
by  means  of  the  objects  thus  situated  in  events 
that  we  can  effect  a  demarcation  of  events  and 
thus  state  the  laws  of  Nature.  "  Rational  thought 
.  .  .  would  be  intrinsically  impossible  without 
objects."  The  passage  of  events  implies  that 
"  something  is  going  on  everywhere  all  the  time." 
But  what  is  going  on  anywhere  at  any  time  we  can 
state  to  ourselves  only  in  terms  of  the  various  kinds 
of  objects  which  enter  Nature  through  being 
"  situated "  in  events,  and  which,  like  Plato's 
Forms,  are  exempt  from  passage  and  becoming  and 
can  thus  be  apprehended  in  their  self-identity. 

(3)  The  third  feature  is  Whitehead's  attempt  to 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    83 

distinguish  different  kinds  of  objects.  Among 
these,  "  scientific  objects/'  like  an  atom  or  an 
electron,  are  of  especial  importance  for  the  philosophy 
of  Nature.  But  this  part  of  the  theory,  it  must  be 
confessed,  has  been  left  by  Whitehead  in  a  very 
sketchy  and  undeveloped  state,  and  it  is  not  at  all 
easy  to  make  out  precisely  how  he  conceives  them 
to  be  related  to  perceptual  objects  ("  things  ")  or 
to  sense-objects  and  the  events  in  which  sense- 
objects  are  situated.  We  must,  here,  content 
ourselves  with  the  vague,  but  safe,  statement  that 
science  is  driven  to  infer,  or  postulate,  "  scientific 
objects "  in  the  effort  to  "  express  the  causal 
character  of  events,"  i.e.,  to  give  a  precise  and 
systematic  explanation  of  the  conditions  under 
which  sense-objects  are  found  situated  in  events. 
In  conclusion  :  it  is  obvious  how  well  this  fresh 
and  illuminating  analysis  of  Nature,  and  of  the 
empirical  foundations  of  physics,  lends  itself  to  our 
synoptic  purpose.  For,  the  method  which  White- 
head  here  employs  need  not  be  restricted,  as  he, 
in  fact,  does  restrict  it,  to  the  concepts  and  theories 
of  physics.  To  the  question,  what  kinds  of  objects 
thought  can  recognize  in  the  flux  of  sensible  events, 
more  sciences  than  one  supply  an  answer.  Percep- 
tual objects,  so  Whitehead  argues  (instancing 
Cleopatra's  Needle),  are,  compared  with  scientific 
objects,  too  vague  and  lacking  in  precision  to  serve 


84      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND   GOD 

the  explanatory  needs  of  physics.  Granted — but  it 
still  remains  true  that  these  same  perceptual  objects 
may  furnish  the  subject-matter  for  several  other 
sciences  which  study  in  them  characters  neglected 
by  the  physicist.  This  is  most  obviously  true  of 
all  those  perceptual  objects  which  we  distinguish 
as  "  organisms  "  from  the  inorganic  world,  and  of 
which  we  predicate,  "  life  "  and  in  their  higher  forms, 
"  consciousness."  These  characters  form  the  bases 
for  the  distinct  sciences  of  biology  and  psychology. 
Our  next  step  must,  therefore,  be  to  consider  how 
the  present-day  tendencies  of  thought  in  biology 
promise  to  fit  into  our  synoptic  pattern. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  Poynting,  J.  H.  "  Physical  Law  and  Life."     Hibbert  Journal, 

Vol.  I.   pp.  727  fl. 

2.  Mach,  Ernst.        The  Analysis  of  Sensations,   tr.    By  C.    M. 

Williams    &    S.    Waterlow    (Open    Court 
Publ.  Co.) 

3.  Pearson,  Karl      The  Grammar  of  Science,  3rd  Ed.,  Part  I. 

(A.  &  C.  Black,  1911.) 

4.  Russell,  The        Our  Knowledge  of  the  External  World.    (Open 

Hon.  Bertrand      Court  Publ.  Co.,  1914.) 

5.  Whitehcad,          The  Principles  of  Natural  Knowledge.  (Camb. 

A.  N.  Univ.  Press,  1919.) 

6.  Whitehead,          The     Concept    of    Nature.     (Camb.     Univ. 

A.  N.  Press,  1920.) 

7.  Eddington,          Space,  Time  and  Gravitation.     (Camb.  Univ. 

A.  S.  Press,  1920.) 

8.  Cauipbell,  N.       Physics,  The  Elements.     (Camb.  Univ.  Press, 

1921.) 

9.  Haldane,  The  Reign  of  Relativity.      (Murray,     1921.) 

Viscount 


THE  REVOLT  AGAINST  "MATTER"    85 

For  the  historical  background  of  the  problem  discussed  in 
Lecture  II,  students  of  philosophy  will  naturally  go  to  Berkeley's 
Principles  and  Dialogues,  Hume's  Treatise,  Kant's  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason,  and  Mill's  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
Philosophy. 

The  article  by  Professor  Poynting  (No.  i)  is  an  excellent 
example  of  the  position  taken  up,  about  the  turn  of  the  century, 
by  an  intelligent  physicist.  It  shows  him  hovering  in  uneasy 
equilibrium  between  an  ideal  of  physics  as  concerned  exclusively 
with  the  laws  of  "  sensible  events,"  without  recourse  to  "  hypo- 
thetical bridges,"  like  atoms,  etc.,  and  the  dim  perception  that 
the  part  played  by  such  objects  as  atoms  in  scientific  theory  is 
incompatible  with  their  being  nothing  more  than  indispensable 
fictions.  Typical,  also,  is  Poynting's  sense  of  the  impotence 
of  physics  when  confronted  by  the  phenomena  of  life  and 
consciousness. 

The  first  section  of  Campbell's  book  (No.  8)  contains  much 
interesting  discussion  of  the  relations  of  science  to  philosophy, 
and  of  the  senses  in  which  the  scientist  uses,  or  ought,  in  Camp- 
bell's opinion,  to  use,  the  terms  "  real  "  and  "  matter."  Camp- 
bell volubly  protests  against  being  mistaken  for  a  philosopher, 
but  he  forgets  that  the  only  safe  way  of  avoiding  that  label  is 
to  refrain  from  discussing  philosophical  problems. 

Professor  Eddington's  book  (No.  7),  apart  from  supplying  a 
most  stimulating  introduction  to  the  theory  of  relativity  for  all 
readers  with  some  mathematical  and  physical  knowledge,  has 
also  a  considerable  philosophical  interest,  especially  in  the 
Prologue,  "  What  is  Geometry  ?  "  and  in  Chapter  XII,  "  On 
the  Nature  of  Things."  Large  portions  of  the  latter  chapter  are 
confessedly  tentative,  such  as  the  suggestion  that  "  mind 
filters  out  matter  from  the  meaningless  jumble  of  qualities,  as 
the  prism  filters  out  the  colours  of  the  rainbow  from  the  chaotic 
pulsations  of  white  light  "  (p.  198) .  But  such  principles  as  these  : 
"  Physical  reality  is  the  synthesis  of  all  possible  physical  aspects^, 
of  nature  "  (p.  182),  and  "  Reality  is  only  obtained  when  all 
conceivable  points  of  view  have  been  combined  "  (ibid.),  apply 
within  the  realm  of  physics  the  synoptic  principle,  the  extension 
of  which  to  all  phenomena  to  be  met  with  in  human  experience 
we  are  emphasizing  in  these  lectures.  Another  example  of  the 
synoptic  method  is  Viscount  Haldane's  book  (No.  9),  which 
traces,  with  great  learning,  the  applications  of  the  concept  of 
relativity  in  science  and  philosophy. 

The  books  of  Mach  and  Pearson  (Nos.  2  and  3)  represent 


86      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

earlier  attempts  on  the  part  of  a  physicist  and  a  mathematician, 
respectively,  to  remind  physics  of  its  empirical  basis,  and  thereby 
to  restore  sense-data  to  their  fundamental  place  in  Nature. 

Mr.  Russell's  book  (No.  4)  has  important  points  of  contact 
with  the  argument  of  the  present  lecture.  He,  too,  rejects  the 
theory  that  sense-data  are  mental  effects  caused  by  material 
objects,  but  he  takes  a  line  of  his  own  in  the  theory  that  a 
physical  thing  is  a  "  logical  construction,"  or  "  class,"  of  sense- 
data. 


LECTURE  III 


THE    ORDER    OF    NATURE:     MECHANISM, 
VITALISM,   TELEOLOGY 


E 


i.  1  ^  VERY  student  of  the  influence  of  natural 
science,  and  more  especially  of  physics, 
upon  philosophy  is  aware  that,  next  to  the 
concept  of  "  matter,"  the  concept  of  "  machine  "  or 
"  mechanism  "  has  presented  the  greatest  obstacles 
to  a  synoptic  theory  of  the  universe.  Or,  rather, 
we  should  say  that  "  materialism "  and  the 
"  mechanical  theory  of  nature,"  going  hand  in  hand, 
have  themselves  claimed  to  be  the  one  all-sufficing 
synopsis.  Expanding  the  theories  of  physics  to 
the  dimensions  of  a  professedly  all-inclusive  philo- 
sophy, they  would  leave  no  room  for  anything  in  our 
experience  which  resists  absorption  into  their 
scheme.  All  is  matter,  all  is  mechanism ;  and 
what  is  neither  is  nothing,  or,  else,  is  a  mere 
"  epiphenomenon."  Mind,  for  example,  if  not 
denied  outright,  is  politely  segregated  and  quietly 
ignored,  rather  than  that  the  acknowledgment  of 
its  presence  and  effectiveness  in  the  world  should 

87 


88      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

be  allowed  to  disturb  the  trim  tidiness  of  the 
mechanistic  theory.  Yet,  to  call  mind  an  "  epiphe- 
nomenon  "  is  but  to  hide  the  bankruptcy  of  the 
theory  beneath  the  decent  obscurity  of  a  learned 
tongue. 

In  the  last  lecture,  we  had  noted,  as  of  the  utmost 
interest  for  our  synoptic  programme,  a  spontaneous 
revolt  among  certain  physicists  and  mathematicians 
against  "  matter  "  and  "  materialism  "  in  the  only 
sense  of  these  terms  in  which  philosophers  have  ever 
been  concerned  to  combat  and  deny  them.  In  the 
present  lecture,  similarly,  our  task  will  be  to  examine 
contemporary  thought  for  indications  of  dissatis- 
faction with  the  closely  allied  theory  of  "  mechan- 
ism." And,  just  as  before  we  found  that  the  criti- 
cism of  materialism  had  its  constructive  side  in  a 
fresh  analysis  of  Nature  as  "  what  we  perceive  by 
the  senses,"  so  here  we  shall  look  for  the  construct- 
ive side  of  the  criticism  of  mechanism  in  all  those 
movements  of  biological  thought  which  declare  the 
need  of  non-mechanical  principles,  both  for  the 
explanation  of  living  organisms  and  for  that  of 
Nature  as  the  "  fit "  environment  for  organisms  to 
live  in. 

2.  That  living  beings  present  obvious  difficulties 
to  the  mechanical  theory  may  be  admitted  even  by 
thinkers  who,  nonetheless,  believe  that  the  study  of 
living  beings  can  be  genuinely  "  scientific  "  only  so 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  89 

far  as  the  mechanical  theory  is  applicable  to  them. 
Hence  biology  is  the  field  where  the  battle  for,  and 
against,  mechanism  rages  most  fiercely  before  our 
eyes.  On  the  principle  that  offence  is  the  best 
defence,  the  mechanist's  most  effective  tactics  are 
to  show,  if  he  can,  that  all  proposed  alternatives, 
such  as  "  vitalism,"  are  open  to  even  greater  objec- 
tions than  the  mechanistic  theory  itself.  Further, 
he  will  claim  that  behind  any  "  vital  principle  " 
or  "  vital  force  "  there  lurk  in  shadowy  form  the 
concepts  of  "  mind  "  and  "  purpose,"  leading  to 
"  design  "  and  to  "  teleology  "  in  the  traditional 
sense  of  that  term.  The  situation,  thus,  is 
exceedingly  complex,  and  this  complexity  becomes 
most  marked  when  we  focus  our  attention 
on  the  higher  forms  of  animal  life.  "  Higher  " 
here  means,  roughly,  nearest  to  man  in  the 
series  of  vertebrates.  It  is  an  undeniable  fact, 
which  anyone  can  verify  by  a  cursory  survey  of 
contemporary  biological  literature,  that  evidence 
drawn  from  man,  for  all  that  he  is  classed  as  a  living 
organism  and  an  animal,  plays  a  comparatively 
small  part  in  shaping  biological  theory.  If  human 
behaviour,  as  displayed  in  business,  politics,  art, 
etc.,  were  included  by  biologists  in  their  field  as 
readily  as  they  so  include,  e.g.,  Jennings's  Contri- 
butions to  the  Study  of  the  Behaviour  of  Lower  Organ- 
isms ;  or  if  biologists  studied,  e.g.,  their  own 


90      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

conduct  as  scientists  with  the  same  loving  care  with 
which  they  study  the  "  tropisms  "  of  an  amoeba, 
we  can  hardly  doubt  that  the  concepts  of  biology 
would  be  very  different  from  what  they  are.1 
Biology,  as  ordinarily  understood  and  practised, 
treats  the  human  species  as  just  a  small  corner  of 
the  field  of  living  beings,  and  tends,  in  actual 
research,  to  concentrate  largely  on  the  non-human 
field.  This  is,  of  course,  due  to  a  variety  of  causes. 
One  of  them  is,  no  doubt,  that  the  human  corner  is 
already  being  very  thoroughly  worked  over  by  the 
medical  sciences.  Another  is  that  most  of  the 
experiments  made  on  non-human  animals  could  not, 
for  social  and  moral  reasons,  be  repeated  on  humans. 
Laboratory-technique  is  thus  compelled  to  sample 
life  in  the  form  of  plants,  or,  if  it  takes  animals,  in 
the  form  of  micro-organisms,  like  amoebae,  or  of 
insects,  or  of  frogs,  guinea-pigs,  etc.  But  it  is  worth 
reflecting  whether  our  theories  do  not  take  some 
colour  from  the  samples  of  life  we  work  with.  The 
mechanistic  tendency  is  observably  strongest  among 
those  biologists  who  sample  life  in  those  forms  of  it 
which  are  most  remote  from  the  human.  On  the 

1  It  is  the  merit  of  A.  D.  Darbishire's  Introduction  to  Biology 
to  have  drawn  attention  to  the  effect  on  biological  theory  of  its 
tendency  to  regard  as  the  proper  study  of  mankind  any  other 
living  thing  rather  than  man.  Bergson's  critique  of  biology 
(Creative  Evolution,  ch.  i)  is,  of  course,  based  on  the  principle 
that  we  must  take  our  clue  to  the  understanding  of  life  from 
where  we  can  sample  it  best,  viz.,  in  our  own  consciousness. 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  91 

other  hand,  even  the  most  determined  mechanist 
finds  it  rather  difficult  to  ignore  mind  when 
he  comes  to  human  life  and  behaviour.  Still, 
many  biologists  protect  themselves  from  a 
clear  realization  of  this  fact  by  keeping 
their  work  mainly  to  the  non-human  field, 
and  by  dealing  in  principles  which  are  equally 
applicable  to  the  non-human  and  the  human 
material,  the  lower  and  the  higher  forms  of  life. 
In  this  way  they  may  be  honestly  blind  to  their 
failure  to  deal  with  the  distinctive  characters  of  the 
higher  forms  of  life,  e.g.,  in  man  with  intelligence 
and  will  as  manifested  through  bodily  movements 
and  the  effects  thus  produced  on  the  surrounding 
world.  Or  they  may  cover  up  their  failure,  like 
Jacques  Loeb,  by  bold  dogmatic  assertions.  But 
the  ordinary  mechanist  is  only  too  eager,  as  a  rule, 
to  keep  off  such  dangerous  ground.  He  disclaims 
any  desire,  or  power,  to  deal  with  consciousness, 
and  finds  it  safest  to  concentrate  on  the  study  of 
those  forms  and  conditions  of  life  in  which  the 
problem  of  consciousness  is  least  likely  to  arise. 

No  one  can  honestly  say  that  the  resulting  bio- 
logical theory  is  either  stable  or  satisfactory.  The 
biologist's  programme  calls  for  a  study  of  the  whole 
province  of  living  beings,  of  all  the  manifestations 
of  life  of  whatever  degree  or  kind.  In  actual 
practice,  and  especially  in  experimental  research,  he 


92      MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

is  compelled  to  sample  life  by  selecting  here  and 
there  out  of  its  infinite  range  and  variety.  There 
is  an  immense  difference  between  sampling  life  in 
human  beings  and  sampling  it  in  infusoria  or  algae. 
There  is  an  even  more  profound  and  far-reaching 
difference  between  the  method  of  a  biology  which, 
in  the  name  of  being  "  objective,"  restricts  itself  on 
principle  to  what  an  observer  can  perceive  by  his 
senses  of  the  life  of  other  creatures  around  him, 
and  the  method  of  a  biology  which  includes  among 
the  evidence  admitted  as  relevant  the  observer's 
"  subjective  "  or  "  inward  "  self -observation.  It 
seems,  on  the  face  of  it,  unlikely  that  the  concepts 
which  suffice,  or  seem  to  suffice,  for  all  that  we,  as 
outside  spectators,  can  find  out  about  the  life  of 
infusoria  or  algae,  should  also  suffice  for  all  that  by 
self-observation  and  communication  with  others 
we  know  of  the  life  of  man.  No  wonder  that 
biologists,  as  Professor  R.  M.  Wheeler  of  Harvard 
University  points  out,  tend  to  fall  into  three  groups 
of  extremists : — the  mystery-mongers,  the  sim- 
plicists,  and  the  humanizers.  The  mystery-mongers 
appeal  to  some  quite  mysterious  force  or  factor, 
postulated  ad  hoc.  The  simplicists  leave  out,  not 
only  mind,  but  even  life  as  a  distinctive  character, 
and  reduce  whatever  goes  on  hi  a  living  being — be 
it  a  single  cell  or  a  multicellular  organism — to 
physico-chemical  processes.  The  humanizers  treat 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  93 

all  living  things  as  if  they  were  miniature  men  and 
women.  Each  of  these  types  of  extremists  is 
wedded  to  a  theory  which  it  is  determined  to  force 
upon  the  facts.  If  the  theory  does  not  fit,  so  much 
the  worse  for  the  facts.  Fortunately,  the  majority 
of  biologists  are  not  so  ready  to  compel  all  facts 
into  a  single  mould  for  the  sake  of  intellectual 
economy  or  tidiness.  They  realize  that  no  single 
formula  will  exhaust  the  infinite  variety  of  life, 
and  that  the  real  problem  of  a  "  philosophy  of  living 
nature  "  is,  as  Professor  J.  A.  Thomson  shows  in  his 
System  of  Animate  Nature,  essentially  synoptic — 
demanding  a  concept  of  living  beings  which  shall  be 
plastic  enough  to  fit  their  manifold  kinds  and  the 
diversity  of  their  dealings  with  each  other  and  with 
their  inorganic  environment ;  a  concept  which  has 
room  within  itself  for  the  physico-chemical  basis  of 
life  at  the  one  end  and  for  feeling  and  intelligence  at 
the  other. 

It  may,  perhaps,  be  thought  that  the  issue  between 
the  divergent  theories  in  biology  might  be  settled 
by  an  appeal  to  experiment.  And,  indeed,  experi- 
ments form  part  of  Driesch's  case  for  vitalism  against 
mechanism  as  they  form  part  of  Loeb's  case  for 
mechanism  against  vitalism.  But  we  are  coming 
to  see  that  in  such  ultimate  questions  as  these  there 
is  no  conclusive  appeal  to  the  verdict  of  a  crucial 
experiment.  The  experiment  yields  results,  no 


94      MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

doubt ;  but  the  correct  interpretation  of  these 
results — that  is  precisely  what  the  experiment  rarely 
settles.  What  answer  we  get  from  Nature  depends 
very  much  on  what  question  we  put.  And  it 
depends  also,  we  should  add,  on  what  answer  we  are 
determined  to  hear.  As  the  polemical  literature 
of  the  last  quarter  of  a  century  on  these  issues  amply 
shows,  he  is  a  poor  theorist  who  cannot  invent  a 
more  or  less  plausible  argument  for  disqualifying 
even  the  apparently  most  damaging  evidence  against 
his  own  theory.  Next  to  the  miracles  of  the  will 
to  believe  are  those  of  the  will  to  disbelieve.  At  any 
rate,  it  should  be  clear  that  the  extremist  positions 
in  biology,  especially  the  mechanistic  one,  are 
maintained,  not  because  the  evidence  imperatively 
demands  them  to  the  exclusion  of  every  rival,  but 
because  they  are  preferred  on  general,  and,  in  the 
last  resort,  philosophical  grounds.  This  will  become 
abundantly  clear  as  we  proceed. 

Summing  up,  we  may,  perhaps,  put  the  situa- 
tion which  confronts  the  biologist,  thus : — living 
beings  are  living  bodies,  perceptible  by  the  senses, 
and  belonging  by  this  test  to  the  realm  of  "  Nature." 
Whatever  their  distinctive  character  as  "  living  " 
may  be,  as  "  bodies  "  they  obey  the  laws  of  physics. 
The  substances  of  which  they  are  composed  are  the 
same  chemical  substances  which  compose  also  their 
inorganic  and  inanimate  environment.  Many  of 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  95 

the  chemical  compounds  which  occur  in  living  bodies 
have  been  artificially  synthesized  in  the  laboratory, 
and  the  chemical  character  of  many  of  the  most 
important  processes  by  which  life  is  maintained, 
such  as  breathing,  digestion,  metabolism,  has  been 
studied  and  exhibited  in  detail.  In  this  sense,  it  is 
possible  to  speak  of  organisms  as  "  physico-chemical 
machines,"  even  though  no  bit  of  living  substance 
(protoplasm),  and  still  less  a  living  cell,  has  actually 
been  manufactured  in  a  laboratory.  This  failure, 
however,  rightly  counts  for  little,  for  if  the  theory 
of  evolution  is  true,  Nature's  laboratory  must  have 
solved  the  problem  of  evolving  living  beings  out  of 
the  non-living.  On  the  other  hand,  for  all  its  con- 
nexion with  the  inorganic,  the  realm  of  life  exhibits 
a  character  unique,  distinctive,  and  in  the  order  of 
evolution  qualitatively  new.  There  is,  too,  the 
marked,  even  if  relative,  individuality  of  a  living 
thing,  be  it  cell  or  large-scale  organism.  The 
unity  and  self-identity  of  an  organism  are  not 
dependent  on  the  human  observer's  point  of  view  or 
interest,  but  are  given  as  the  recognizable  pattern 
of  the  organism's  form,  structure,  behaviour.  As 
Bergson  puts  it,  "  the  living  body  has  been  separated 
and  closed  off  by  Nature  herself.  It  is  composed  of 
unlike  parts  that  complete  each  other.  It  performs 
diverse  functions  that  involve  each  other."  It  is 
born  and  dies,  and  between  these  termini  it  grows, 


96      MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

matures,  ages.     Within  limits  it  regenerates  itself 
when  injured,  restores  the  wastage  of  tissue,  repro- 
duces itself  in  others  of  the  same  kind.     In  its 
reactions  to  its  environment  it  maintains,  as  far  as 
it  can,  its  own  existence,  i.e.,  it  continues  the  routine 
of  its  life  ;  and  its  resourcefulness  in  doing  so  ranges 
from  passive  adaptation  to  active  control.     Among 
the  higher  animals,  if  not  before,  and  certainly  in 
ourselves,  we  find  knowledge  and  foresight  in  the 
service  of  vital  needs.     At  the  human  level,  there  is 
an  ever-increasing  exploration  and  experimentation 
going  on  which  increase    man's    power  over  his 
environment,  which  make  his  behaviour,  singly  and 
co-operatively,  more  many-sided,  his  desires  and 
satisfactions  more  various,  his  experience  of  the 
world  richer.     The  student  who  enters  this  realm  of 
life  from  below  will  naturally  try  to  apply  the  con- 
cepts  which   suffice   for   physics   and   chemistry. 
The  student  who  begins  at  the  upper  end  will  as 
naturally  seek  to  extend  the  concept  of  mind  over 
the  whole  field.     The  vitalist  will  attempt  to  steer 
a  course  midway  between  these  two  and  assume 
with  Driesch  an  "  entelechy,"  or  with  Reinke  a 
"  dominant,"  conceived  as  other  than  mechanical, 
yet  as  not  intelligent  and  foreseeing  enough  to  be  of 
the  order  of  consciousness. 

Such,  broadly,  is  the  situation  hi  which  the  issue 
of  mechanism  presents  itself  at  the  present  day. 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  97 

3.  The  "  issue  of  mechanism  "  !  We  have  been 
glibly  following  the  prevailing  fashion  of  talking 
about  mechanism  as  if  we  were  all  agreed  on 
what  the  term  "  mechanism  "  means.  But,  pre- 
cisely, what  is  a  mechanical  explanation  ?  The 
proper  answer  to  this  question  is  curiously  difficult 
to  discover.  It  might  have  been  expected  that  in 
the  voluminous  controversial  literature  which  has 
been  evoked  by  the  debate  for  and  against  mechan- 
ism, the  disputants  would  have  taken  good  care  to 
define  unambiguously  just  what  they  are  affirming 
or  denying.  But  it  is  not  so.  Anyone  can  convince 
himself  of  this  by  collecting  typical  statements  from 
prominent  writers  on  both  sides,  or  even  by  looking 
up  the  philosophical  dictionaries  which  in  this 
matter  faithfully  reflect  the  prevailing  haziness.  He 
will  find  a  variety  of  vague  formulae,  differing  more 
or  less  from  each  other  in  terminology,  and  all 
perplexingly  difficult  to  fit  to  the  detailed  concepts 
and  laws  even  of  those  sciences  which,  like  physics 
and  chemistry,  ranker  excellence  as  "  mechanical." 

The  reason,  as  a  glance  at  the  history  of  the  con- 
troversy shows,  is  that  "  mechanism  "  is  prized  by 
its  advocates  rather  as  a  battle-cry  and  a  protest 
than  as  an  explanatory  theory.  It  is  valued  for 
what  it  denies  much  more  than  for  what  it  affirms. 
It  is  a  symbol  of  emancipation.  "  Do  mechanical 
laws  embrace  every  department  of  the  universe  ? 
7 


98      MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

Is  there  a  purpose  for  which  the  universe  was 
created,  or  a  goal  towards  which  it  is  tending  ?  Is 
there  a  religious  or  moral  significance  behind  nature, 
or  have  we  to  do  with  a  mere  clash  of  blind  and 
unintelligent  forces  ?  "  Such  is  the  choice  which  a 
recent  reviewer  of  Professor  J.  A.  Thomson's  System 
of  Animate  Nature  puts  before  us.  It  is  typical  of 
the  temper  to  which  mechanism  appeals.  In  these 
rhetorical  alternatives  the  negative  bias  is  plain.  It 
is  re-enforced  by  the  significant  iteration  of  the  ad- 
jective "  blind  "  in  the  same  writer's  programmatic 
statement  of  what  the  mechanist  positively  affirms  : 
"  all  the  functions  of  the  body  are  based  purely  on 
the  laws  of  physics  and  chemistry  ;  all  the  activities 
of  man  would  be  found,  if  our  knowledge  were  suffi- 
cient, to  be  no  more  than  an  immense  elaboration  of 
blind  physico-chemical  phenomena.  .  .  .  (living 
beings)  are  but  minute  and  special  cases  of  that 
vast  and  continuous  redistribution  of  matter  and 
energy,  of  which  no  complete  understanding  can 
ever  enter  the  mind  of  man." 

In  fact,  the  sting  of  mechanism  lies  in  its  three 
denials,  i.  It  denies  that  Nature  as  a  whole,  or 
in  its  living  parts,  is  the  creation  of  God.  2.  It 
denies  that  minds,  human  or  animal,  are  operative 
as  verae  causae  in  the  behaviour  of  living  beings. 
3.  It  denies  the  existence  of  any  "  vital  "  principle 
or  force.  It  is  a  protest  against  talking  of  natural 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  99 

phenomena  in  the  language  of  life,  or  of  mind,  or  of 
God.  It  proclaims  the  emancipation  of  the  physico- 
chemical  sciences  from  theology,  psychology,  and 
any  kind  of  biology  which  seeks  to  retain  its  own 
concepts  and  language,  at  the  same  time  that  it 
proclaims  the  determination  of  physics  and 
chemistry  to  dominate  the  whole  field  of  "  Nature  " 
and  to  tolerate  no  competitor  beside  themselves.  A 
reminder  of  the  controversies  between  scientists 
and  theologians  which  arose  out  of  Darwin's  theory 
of  evolution,  and  which  nowadays  are  happily  little 
more  than  a  literary  echo,  may  serve  to  illustrate 
the  point.  Biology  for  a  long  time  proved 
an  obstacle  to  the  victorious  advance  of 
mechanism.  The  triumphs  of  bio-chemistry 
were  still  to  come,  and,  in  the  absence  of  the 
theory  of  descent,  the  existence  of  living  beings 
seemed  to  point  to  special  creation,  just  as 
their  adaptation  to  their  environment  seemed  evi- 
dence of  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  Creator's 
design.  Darwin's  theory  of  the  origin  of  species  by 
the  accumulation  of  accidental  variations  and  by  the 
survival  of  those  specimens  which  had  the  good 
luck  to  fit  the  environment,  was  hailed  as  the 
conquest  of  the  realm  of  life  by  the  mechanical 
theory  of  nature.  The  fortress  of  biology  had  sur- 
rendered. But  what  was  there  "  mechanical " 
about  the  theory  ?  Nothing  but  the  part  assigned 


100    MATTER,   LIFE,  MIND,   AND  GOD 

to  "  accident  "  and  "  luck  " — a  part,  moreover, 
exaggerated  by  enthusiastic  disciples  of  the  new 
theory  far  beyond  Darwin's  own  sober  and  cautious 
statements.  It  was  enough  that  chance  eliminated 
design,  that  descent  was  put  in  the  place  of  creation, 
and  the  struggle  for  existence  ("  nature  red  in  tooth 
and  claw  ")  in  the  place  of  the  care  of  a  kindly  Provi- 
dence for  its  creatures.  The  fashion  of  theologizing 
in  biology  had  received  its  death-blow.  Thenceforth 
there  has  been  as  little  mention  of  God  in  biology 
as  there  already  was  in  physics  or  chemistry. 

At  this  time  of  day,  no  competent  judge  will 
dispute  the  gain  which  this  revolution  has  brought. 
The  present  position  of  biology  is  due  almost  wholly 
to  the  many  lines  of  experimental  research  which 
have  sprung  from  the  effort  to  test,  develop,  correct 
the  evolutionary  hypothesis.  The  days  of  theolo- 
gizing in  biology  are  definitely  past.  But  though 
the  victory  has  been  won,  the  victors  still  seem  to 
fear  the  resurrection  of  the  foe.  Whether  the  argu- 
ment be  about  Driesch's  "  entelechy,"  or  Bergson's 
elan  vital,  or  even  only  about  human  or  animal 
minds,  the  mechanists  in  biology  not  uncommonly 
talk  as  if  vitalism  or  psychology  were  but  thin 
ends  of  the  wedge  of  theology.  And  so  they  bolt 
and  bar  every  door  by  insisting  on  the  exclusive 
use  of  physico-chemical  terms,  lest  God  slip  in  again 
disguised  as  "  entelechy  "  or  "  consciousness." 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  101 

But  granted  that  theology  is  out  of  place  in 
biology,  and  indeed  in  natural  science  generally, 
this  emancipation  of  science  from  theology  still 
leaves  them  both  fellow-members  in  the  universe 
of  man's  spiritual  experience.  There  would  be 
occasion  enough  here  for  an  effort  at  synopsis,  even 
if  the  extension  of  mechanism  over  the  field  of 
biology  (including  physiology)  had  not  burdened 
our  psychology  and,  indeed,  our  whole  scheme  of 
thought  about  the  universe,  with  the  embarrassing 
problem  of  the  relation  of  body  and  soul,  matter 
and  mind.  It  was  one  of  the  first  mechanists  in 
biology,  Descartes,  who  bequeathed  to  us  the 
dualism  of  body  and  soul  with  its  attendant  conun- 
drums of  epiphenomenalism,  psycho-physical  paral- 
lelism, and  interaction,  of  which  the  first  two,  at  any 
rate,  are  nothing  but.  devices  for  making  the 
mechanical  scheme  tight  against  any  intrusion  of 
mind,  without  flying  so  far  in  the  face  of  experience 
as  to  deny  outright  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as 
mind  at  all.  The  last  chapter  in  this  long  con- 
troversy is  being  written  in  our  own  day  under  the 
title  of  "  behaviourism,"  and  we  shall  have  to  con- 
sider it  in  our  next  lecture.  Meanwhile,  we  may 
with  added  conviction  repeat  what  we  said  already 
in  the  first  lecture,  viz.,  that  the  interrelations 
between  the  various  sciences  present  no  less  urgent 
a  synoptic  problem  than  the  relations  between  the 


102    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

sciences  as  a  whole  and  the  other  great  realms  of 
experience  and  thought  in  which  as  civilized  men 
we  move. 

But  enough  of  the  negative  side  of  mechanism — 
what  of  its  positive  side  ?  As  applied  to  biology, 
it  amounts,  as  we  have  seen,  briefly  to  this  :  that 
biology  is  nothing  but  the  physics  and  chemistry 
of  organisms,  and  that  an  organism  is  nothing 
but  an  exceedingly  complex  physico-chemical 
machine.  For  practical  purposes,  mechanists 
generally  stop  at  this  point.  But  the  more  specula- 
tively  venturesome  among  them  go  further  and  set 
before  us,  as  the  ultimate  goal  of  all  scientific  endeav- 
our, the  reduction  of  the  concepts  and  laws  of 
ordinary  physics  and  chemistry  to  those  of  dynamics, 
to  "  matter  in  motion,"  as  the  popular  phrase  has 
it.  Thus,  one  of  the  leading  champions  of 
mechanism  at  the  present  day,  Jacques  Loeb,  in 
his  The  Organism  as  a  Whole  from  a  Physico- 
Chemical  View-point,  speaks  of  the  "  visualization 
of  all  phenomena  in  terms  of  the  groupings  and 
displacements  of  ultimate  particles."  This  is  that 
"  redistribution  of  matter  and  energy "  which 
Thomson's  reviewer  above  set  before  us  as  ultimate 
truth.  This  is  that  traditional  scheme  of  explana- 
tion in  terms  of  time,  space,  and  material  which  in 
our  last  lecture  we  found  Whitehead  criticizing. 
This  is  the  famous  ideal  of  Laplace's  calculator. 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  103 

There  are,  then,  as  we  see  even  now,  degrees  of 
mechanism.  We  may  be  mildly  mechanical  by 
talking  chemistry,  or  we  may  be  rigidly  mechanical 
by  talking  dynamics.  Two  questions  here  suggest 
themselves,  (i)  Is  there,  as  appears  to  be  alleged, 
a  continuous  transition  along  the  line  of  increasing 
generalization  and  greater  mathematical  precision 
from  mild  to  rigid  mechanism,  so  that  mild 
mechanism  is  but  a  crude  and  provisional  approxi- 
mation to  the  ideal  of  rigid  mechanism  ?  (2)  Does 
either  type  of  mechanism  really  deal  faithfully  with 
all  the  relevant  facts  ? 

4.  The  discussion  of  these  two  questions  must 
inevitably  be  somewhat  technical,  but  the  argument 
of  the  last  lecture  will  have  prepared  us  to  appreciate 
not  a  few  of  its  points. x  The  traditional  theory  of 
"  matter,"  it  will  be  recalled,  claims  to  explain  the 
facts  and  events  which  we  perceive,  as  sensations 
caused  in  our  minds  by  the  activity  of  hypothetical, 
imperceptible  particles.  Adapting  to  our  present 
purpose  the  convenient  terminology  of  the  physicist 
Lorenz,  we  may  say  that  "  macroscopic "  (i.e., 
perceptible  and  measurable)  bodies  and  movements 
are  explained  in  terms  of  "  microscopic "  (i.e., 

1  The  best  discussion  of  "  mechanism  "  known  to  me  is  to  be 
found  in  Professor  C.  D.  Broad's  paper  on  "  Mechanical  Explana- 
tion and  its  Alternatives,"  in  the  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian 
Society,  1918-1919.  The  present  section  of  this  lecture  owes 
more  than  I  can  easily  acknowledge  to  this  paper. 


104    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

imperceptible)  entities  and  motions.  This  scheme 
has  the  merit  of  extreme  simplicity,  in  that  it  takes 
Nature  to  be  composed  of,  say,  electrons  which 
are  all  qualitatively  exactly  alike,  but  which  have 
different  motions  and  are  combined  in  many  different 
kinds  of  structures.  But  it  cannot  be  said,  as  is 
sometimes  done,  that  the  very  possibility  of 
"  science  "  stands  or  falls  with  the  truth  of  just  this 
microscopic  type  of  mechanism.  The  fact  is  that 
most  sciences  do  not  come  within  measurable  dis- 
tance of  it,  and,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  are 
unlikely  ever  to  reach  it.  We  can,  and  do,  deal 
successfully  with  systems  much  more  complicated, 
and,  in  fact,  the  success  of  science  would  seem  to 
depend  mainly  on  the  fact  that  among  the  macro- 
scopic phenomena  with  the  observation  of  which 
science  begins  and  ends,  there  are  some,  viz., 
geometrical  magnitudes,  lapses  of  time,  masses, 
which  are  measurable  with  sufficient  precision  for 
determinate  quantitative  correlations  to  be  traced. 
Moreover,  whether  or  no  the  molecules  of  the  theory 
of  gases,  and  the  atoms  of  the  eighty  odd  chemical 
elements,  will  ultimately  be  exhibited  as  combina- 
tions of  electrons,  in  any  case  there  are  in  the 
macroscopic  world  different  kinds  of  substances  with 
specifically  different  chemical  properties,  and 
capable  of  differences  of  state  (gaseous,  fluid,  solid) 
which  modify  their  mechanical  action  on  each  other. 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  105 

Rigid  mechanism  would  be  so  palpably  false  if 
applied  to  these  macroscopic  phenomena  that  it 
must  assume  the  microscopic  form  to  save  itself. 
As  Broad  puts  it,  "  the  rigid  mechanist  would  wish 
to  assume  that  the  distinctions  between  one  kind 
of  matter  and  another,  e.g.,  wood  and  iron  ;  or 
between  one  state  of  matter  and  another,  e.g., 
between  an  unmagnetized  piece  of  iron  and  the  same 
piece  magnetized,  are  only  macroscopic  differences, 
and  that  their  microscopic  correlates  are  always 
differences  of  number,  configuration  and  density." 
But  that  they  are  so,  has  not  only  not  been  con- 
clusively made  out,  but,  on  the  contrary,  a  survey 
of  the  sciences  goes  rather  to  show  that  there  is  a 
hierarchy  of  laws  of  which  the  higher  are  not 
reducible  to  the  lower.  Delightful  as  it  would  be  if 
at  all  levels  of  Nature  we  could  treat  all  differences 
as  due  simply  to  differences  of  arrangement  and 
motion  of  the  ultimate,  homogeneous  particles, 
we  are  compelled  at  present  rather  to  acknowledge 
something  like  qualitative  breaks,  or  novelties,  from 
level  to  level.  Taking  the  sciences  in  ascending  order, 
we  find  that  ever  fresh  independent  variables — now 
characters  of  elements,  now  characters  of  groups  or 
compounds  or  systems  of  elements — are  introduced 
into  our  laws,  and  that  the  laws  of  a  higher  stage 
cannot  be  reduced  to,  or  predicted  from,  or  treated 
as  particular  cases  of,  the  more  general  laws  of 


106    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

a  lower  stage.  If  this  is  the  actual  situation,  it 
explains  why  scientists,  whatever  their  program- 
matic professions,  do  not  actually  work  with  the 
theory  of  pure  mechanism.  In  this  connexion,  too, 
it  is  worth  remembering  that  no  mechanical  explana- 
tion ever  employs  nothing  but  the  "  laws  of  motion." 
For,  by  themselves,  these  are  purely  regulative, 
somewhat  like  the  laws  of  logic.  They  define  the 
limits  within  which  all  possible  motions  fall,  but 
they  do  not  determine  that  any  particular  motion 
happens,  or  when,  or  in  detail  the  way  in  which 
one  motion  will  cause  other  motions.  For  all  this 
we  need  further  data,  and  these  may  be  of  various 
sorts,  chemical,  thermal,  magnetic,  electric,  etc. 

Thus,  when  we  are  sent  to  "  mechanism,"  we  find 
no  simple  or  single  theory.  The  atomic  theory  in 
chemistry,  for  example,  in  so  far  as  it  assumes 
different  kinds  of  atoms  and  does  not  assume  that 
the  interactions  of  atoms  can  be  formulated  in  terms 
of  the  laws  of  motion,  is  not  strictly  mechanical, 
for  all  that  its  atoms  are  "  microscopic."  In  fact, 
mechanistic  biologists,  like  Loeb,  are  content  to 
claim  that  they  have  found  a  "  mechanistic " 
explanation,  either  (a)  when  they  have  discovered 
a  quantitative  correlation  between  two  phenomena 
(e.g.,  when  the  behaviour  of  heliotropic  animals 
conforms  to  the  Roscoe-Bunsen  law  for  photo- 
chemical reactions)  ;  or  (b)  when  they  have  produced 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  107 

a  vital  phenomenon  by  non- vital  means  (e.g.,  when 
the  egg  of  a  sea-urchin  is  stimulated  into  develop- 
ment, not  by  a  spermatozoon,  but  by  the  prick  of  a 
needle).  A  mechanism  so  mild  that  it  is  content 
with  the  discovery  of  quantitative  correlations,  can 
hardly  be  said  any  longer  to  exclude  or  forbid  the 
recognition  of  yet  higher  laws,  though  the  terms 
of  which  these  laws  affirm  the  correlation  may  no 
longer  permit  measurement. 

Before  we  close  this  examination  of  mechanism, 
we  may  just  in  a  word  remind  ourselves  that,  so  far 
as  the  traditional  microscopic  mechanism  involves 
the  "  bifurcation  of  Nature  "  and  the  depreciation 
of  colours,  sounds,  etc.,  to  mere  impressions  in  an 
observer's  mind,  these  macroscopic  appearances  do 
not  in  any  real  sense  receive  a  "  mechanical " 
explanation,  nor  is  the  action  of  matter  on  mind 
by  which  these  impressions  are  supposed  to  be 
produced,  in  any  intelligible  sense  a  "  mechanical  " 
action. 

Thus  mechanism,  closely  inspected,  turns  out  to 
be  full  of  ambiguity  and,  at  critical  points,  full,  too, 
of  incoherence.  The  use  which  has  sometimes  been 
made  of  it  in  argument  has  been  sheer  bluff.  Its 
main  value,  we  repeat,  is  negative,  not  positive. 
Only  its  mildest  forms  are  actually  used  by 
biologists,  and  so  far  from  being  a  complete  explana- 
tory theory  of  all  vital  phenomena,  mechanism  is 


108    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

really  little  more  than  a  proclamation  of  the  right, 
and  the  will,  to  apply  all  the  resources  of  physical 
and  chemical  experimentation  to  the  study  of  the 
facts  of  life.  But  this  programme  obviously  cannot 
be  twisted  into  an  in  junction  against  the  recognition, 
in  biology,  of  laws  the  terms  and  relations  of  which 
are  not  of  the  physico-chemical  order  at  all.  In 
short,  mechanism  may  play  its  part  among  the  tools 
of  the  biologist  without  destroying  the  autonomy  of 
biology  as  a  science.  Huxley,  with  that  vividness 
of  phrase  of  which  he  was  a  master,  once  summed  up 
an  organism  as  "  nothing  but  the  constant  form  of 
a  turmoil  of  material  molecules."  Stripping  the 
phrase  of  its  metaphor,  let  us  grant  whatever  truth 
it  may  seem  to  us  to  possess,  but  then  let  us  reflect 
how  far  it  is  from  describing,  or  making  intelligible, 
the  dominant  character  of  life  as  exhibited  in  the 
observable  behaviour  of  living  beings. 

5.  It  is  one  thing,  however,  to  criticize  the 
mechanical  theory  of  Nature  and  to  point  out  that, 
at  best,  it  covers  only  the  lower  levels  in  the  hier- 
archy of  Nature's  laws,  and  that  this  limitation 
comes  more  and  more  fully  into  view  in  proportion 
as  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  higher  forms  of  life 
in  animal  and  man.  It  is  another  thing  to  decide 
what  concepts  are  needed  to  supplement  it.  Our 
next  task,  therefore,  is  to  pass  in  review,  very  briefly, 
a  number  of  contemporary  tendencies  of  thought 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  109 

which  have  at  least  this  in  common  : — they  seek  in 
one  way  or  another  to  express  the  fact  that  our 
experience  of  living  beings,  and  of  our  dealings  with 
them,  leaves  upon  us  a  peculiar  and  distinctive 
impression  of  life  as  a  unique  and,  as  such,  not 
further  analyzable  quality  or  character,  or,  as 
Whitehead  has  it,  "  rhythm  "  and  "  pattern."  The 
difference  between  what  is  living  and  what  is  dead, 
what  is  inorganic  and  inanimate  and  what  is  organic 
and  alive,  is  the  fundamental  datum  of  observation 
upon  which  biology  is  built  up.  Hence,  as  J.  S. 
Haldane  points  out,  "  in  dealing  with  life  we  not 
only  use  a  whole  series  of  special  terms,  but  these 
terms  appear  to  belong  to  a  specific  general  concep- 
tion which  is  never  made  use  of  in  the  physical 
sciences."  We  may  illustrate  this  for  ourselves 
by  reflecting  that  when  we  study  living  beings  as 
physico-chemical  machines,  their  character  as  living 
is  simply  irrelevant.  So  far  from  being  explained, 
it  is  rather  ignored.  It  is  not  part  of  the  physicist's 
or  chemist's  universe  of  discourse.  The  very  term 
"  organic,"  which  a  biologist  uses  only  of  what  is 
living,  has  lost  in  the  chemist's  mouth  all  reference 
to  the  living.  Organic  chemistry  is  simply  the 
chemistry  of  carbon-compounds,  regardless  of 
whether  they  are  found  or  produced  in  the  living 
or  in  the  non-living. 
The  concept  of  life,  then,  is  a  distinctive  concept, 


110    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

of  a  different  order  from  physical  or  chemical 
concepts,  and  not  reducible  to  them  by  analysis. 
Life  is  sui  generis,  qualitatively  unique.  And  the 
concept  of  life  is  derived  from  our  experience  of 
living  beings,  and  has  in  that  experience  its  obser- 
vational root  and  datum.  A  living  being  is  an  ob j  ect 
perceptible  by  the  senses,  but  an  object  which  in 
structure,  behaviour,  intercourse  with  its  environ- 
ment, makes  upon  us  a  unique  total  impression 
which  we  signalize  by  the  terms  life,  living,  alive, 
and  seek  to  express  more  in  detail  by  describing  a 
living  being  as  "an  active  autonomous  whole  " 
(J.  S.  Haldane  and  others),  or  by  speaking,  with 
J.  A.  Thomson,  of  "  an  insurgent  self-assertiveness," 
and  even  of  "an  endeavour  after  well-being " 
observable  in  living  creatures.  The  proverbial 
"  will  to  live  "  and  Bergson's  elan  vital  are  more 
generalized  terms  for  the  same  impression. 

We  said  just  now  "  observable."  But  our  right 
to  use  this  term  will  be  challenged.  We  shall  be 
told  that  the  deliverance  of  our  senses  includes 
nothing  so  psychological  as  will,  endeavour,  self- 
assertion,  or  even  autonomous  activity.  The  most 
which  the  critics  will  allow  to  be  observable  by  the 
senses  is  motion — bodily  movement,  change  of  place, 
change  of  state.  They  will  boggle  even  at  White- 
head's  rhythm  and  pattern.  Very  well,  let  us 
humour  the  critics,  and,  lest  we  quarrel  merely  about 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  111 

words,  concede  that  "  observation  "  is  limited  as 
they  suggest.  Let  us  say  that  we  know  life,  when 
we  meet  it,  by  "  interpretation,"  or,  with  a  learned 
flavour,  by  "  empathy  "  (Einfuhlung).  If  we  were 
not  alive  ourselves,  if  we  did  not  know  life  (know 
what  it  feels  like,  so  to  speak)  by  living,  we  should 
hardly  recognize  it  in  the  world  about  us.  Inter- 
pretation or  empathy  just  express  that  certain 
objects  of  perception  by  their  structure  and 
behaviour — or,  if  the  critics  insist,  by  their  composi- 
tion and  movement — elicit  from  us  a  certain  response 
or  attitude,  which  is  an  essential  ingredient  in  our 
way  of  perceiving  or  apprehending  them,  and  which 
involves  feeling  and  acting  as  well  as  perceiving. 
In  evoking  this  peculiarly  complex  experience  on 
our  part,  the  life  which  confronts  us  reveals  itself 
to  us.  As  J.  S.  Haldane  quaintly  but  accurately 
puts  it,  "a  biologist  feels  it  in  his  very  bones  " 
that  he  is  dealing  with  living  structure  and  living 
activity.  This  interpretative  manner  of  perceiving 
is  no  more  infallible  than  any  other  ;  perhaps  rather 
less  so.  We  certainly  learn  by  experience,  i.e.,  by 
trial  and  error,  the  limits  within  which  objects  both 
demand  and  permit  this  manner  of  apprehending 
them.  We  may  use  it  on  occasions  when  it  should 
not  be  used  and  fail  to  use  it  when  we  should  ;  in 
other  words,  we  may  feel  and  behave  and  talk  as 
if  there  were  life  when  there  is  none,  and  fail  to 


112    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

recognize  it  when  it  is  present.  But  experience 
here,  as  elsewhere,  makes  expert  and  supplies  its 
own  correctives. 

At  any  rate,  the  point  we  have  to  note  is  that  all 
biologists  who  regard  mechanistic  concepts  as  inade- 
quate for  the  analysis  of  life,  do  in  effect  assert  that 
life  is  unique  and  sui  generis,  and  that  we  need  a 
special  language  and  special  concepts  to  express  our 
experience  of  it. 

Let  us  illustrate  this,  and  at  the  same  time  com- 
ment on  the  strength  or  weakness  of  the  resulting 
theory,  by  taking  the  views  of  Hans  Driesch,  Henri 
Bergson,  and  J.  S.  Haldane. 

For  Driesch,  the  empirical  datum  is  the  "  factual 
wholeness  "  of  an  organism,  as  "  a  type  of  manifold- 
ness  which  is  at  the  same  time  a  unity,"  not  merely 
in  form,  but  in  function,  i.e.,  in  what  it  does.  It 
grows,  it  repairs  itself,  it  adapts  itself,  and  in  these 
and  other  "  teleological "  processes  builds  up, 
restores,  maintains  its  factual  wholeness.  More- 
over, many  of  the  activities  of  an  organism  have  an 
historical  quality.  An  organism  does  not  merely 
repeat  its  movements  like  a  machine,  but,  within 
wider  or  narrower  limits,  learns  to  modify  them  by 
repetition  so  as  to  correspond  more  closely  to  vary- 
ing stimuli.  No  machine,  so  Driesch  holds,  can 
do  any  of  these  things,  and  therefore  no  mechanistic, 
i.e.,  physico-chemical,  explanation  of  them  is 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  113 

possible.  Hence,  we  must  postulate  an  impercept- 
ible factor  of  a  different  order  which  Driesch,  borrow- 
ing an  Aristotelian  term,  calls  an  "  entelechy." 
With  this  empirical,  or  inductive,  argument  Driesch 
couples  a  speculative  logical  argument  which  is  built 
on  the  principle  that  there  cannot  be  more  in  the 
effect  than  there  is  in  the  cause.  Now,  in  the  growth 
of  an  organism  there  is  a  visible  increase  in  com- 
plexity or  manifoldness,  from  which  Driesch  infers, 
with  the  help  of  the  principle  just  stated,  that  the 
cause,  i.e.,  the  visible  starting-point  of  growth  (such 
as  a  fertilized  ovum),  must  involve  an  impercept- 
ible factor  or  agent  to  which  the  building  up  of  the 
complex  organism  is  due.  This  agent  is  the 
entelechy.  It  is  not  conceived  by  Driesch  as  a 
conscious  mind,  but  neither,  on  the  other  hand,  is  it 
a  physical  thing.  It  is  something  intermediate 
between  these,  and  produces  its  effects  by  control- 
ling and  directing  the  physico-chemical  processes, 
now  suspending,  now  releasing  them. 

This  particular  way  of  dealing  with  the  unique 
character  of  life  has  found  no  favour  with  biologists 
at  large,  not  even  with  those  who  share  Driesch's 
conviction  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  mechanistic 
theory.  In  truth,  an  entelechy  is  too  hypothe- 
tical a  creature  to  command  conviction.  It  is  too 
obviously  a  stop-gap  invented  ad  hoc.  Driesch's 
arguments  consist  in  pointing  out  lacunae  in 
8 


114    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

the  mechanistic  account  and  then  invoking 
the  entelechy  to  fill  them.  At  the  same 
tune,  the  hypothesis  of  entelechies  is  weak 
just  where  the  mechanistic  theory  is  strongest. 
The  latter  has  been  immensely  fertile  in 
suggesting  problems  for  experimental  research, 
whereas  the  vitalistic  hypothesis  has  been  barren 
in  this  respect.  In  fact,  the  vitalistic  hypothesis 
cannot  be  strictly  either  verified  or  disproved 
by  experiment.  Its  "  verification,"  if  we  are  to 
call  it  so,  consists  hi  its  being  invoked  at  all  the 
points  at  which  mechanism  is  said  to  fail.  But  we 
cannot  well  blame  mechanists  for  regarding  it  as  a 
mere  symbol  of  ignorance,  and  for  hoping  that 
further  research  will  discover  mechanistic  explana- 
tions for  the  processes  which  Driesch  ascribes  to 
the  activity  of  entelechies. 

The  fact  is  that  Driesch's  entelechy  is  a  product 
of  the  same  vice  of  "  bifurcation  "  which,  as  we 
saw  in  the  last  lecture,  has  also  produced  the 
traditional  theory  of  "  matter."  Instead  of  deriving 
the  concept  of  lif e  from  the  facts  of  lif e  as  experienced 
by  us,  he  postulates  an  imperceptible  agent  as  the 
hypothetical  cause  of  these  facts.  The  philosophical 
nakedness  of  this  device  is  but  thinly  disguised  by 
the  venerable  title  "  entelechy." 

But,  among  the  empirical  characters  of  life 
emphasized  by  Driesch  there  is  one  which  connects 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  115 

his  theory  with  Bergson's,  viz.,  the  "  historical " 
character  of  vital  activity,  its  plasticity  through 
memory  (so  to  speak).  In  an  older  generation, 
Semon,  Hering,  and  Samuel  Butler  had  already 
made  attempts  to  follow  up  this  clue  and  make  it 
available  for  precise  theory.  It  leads  to  such 
suggestions  as  that  the  "  mechanical "  routine  of 
physico-chemical  processes  is  akin  to  habits,  now 
fixed  by  age-long  repetition,  but  once  formed  by 
living  endeavour  and  experiment.  The  most 
familiar  version  of  this  view  at  the  present  day  is 
Bergson's  theory  of  "  matter  "  as  the  deposit  of 
the  elan  vital  in  its  slackening,  and  of  "  real  time," 
or  "  duration,"  as  the  way  in  which  the  elan  vital, 
enriched  by  its  whole  past,  creates  unceasingly 
unpredictable  novelties.  Biologists  who  take  a 
philosophical  interest  in  their  subject  cannot  afford 
to  ignore  these  theories  wholly,  for  they  serve  to 
bring  vividly  before  our  minds  a  character  of  life 
which  else  we  are  apt  to  ignore — its  resourcefulness 
and  fertility  of  invention.  But  even  non-mechanistic 
biologists  have  so  far  been  unable  to  make  much 
positive  use  of  Bergson's  concepts,  probably  be- 
cause they  are,  as  Bergson  frankly  acknowledges 
them  to  be,  of  the  psychological  order  and 
thus  make  consciousness,  or  some  analogon  of 
consciousness,  coextensive,  or  even  identical,  with 
life.  This  is  a  step  which  most  biologists  are 


116     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

not    prepared   to    take.     Their  topic  is   life,  not 
mind. 

The  position  of  those  who  "  see  no  use  for  the 
hypothesis  that  life  as  a  whole  is  a  mechanical 
process,"  is  perhaps  best  represented  by  the  writings 
of  Professors  J.  A.  Thomson  and  J.  S.  Haldane, 
the  latter  of  whom  goes  so  far  as  to  say  that  the 
mechanistic  theory  seems  to  him  to  be  a  serious 
hindrance  to  the  progress  of  biology.  More  clearly 
than  any  other  biologists  these  two  scientists  affirm 
that  biology  rests  on  the  concept  of  life,  that  we  have 
been  led  to  this  concept  by  our  experience  of  life, 
and  that  only  in  subordination  to  this  concept  does 
physico-chemical  knowledge  become  relevant  in  the 
study  of  living  beings.  Thus  J.  S.  Haldane  writes  : 
"  The  bodily  processes — for  instance,  the  apparent 
mechanical  or  chemical  processes  of  movement  of 
the  limbs,  of  breathing,  of  circulation,  of  digestive 
changes,  of  the  taking  up  and  giving  off  of  various 
forms  of  matter  and  energy — become  nothing  but 
the  expression  of  organic  activity.  Their  main- 
tenance and  working  during  life  are  only  phases 
of  the  organic  determination  which  is  the  key  to 
all  the  phenomena  of  life.  They  must  be  looked 
at  from  the  physiological  or  biological  standpoint, 
and  not  merely  from  that  of  the  physical  sciences." 

And  Thomson  places  the  same  point  of  view  in 
a  wider  synoptic  context,  in  his  System  of  Animate 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  117 

Nature,  by  surveying  the  whole  "  web  of  life  " 
and  invoking  all  sides  of  our  experience  of  the 
spectacle  of  life  in  its  natural  setting,  including  its 
appeal  to  our  sense  of  beauty  and  to  religious 
emotion. 

But  both  these  biologists  are  also  philosophers, 
and  this,  no  doubt,  explains  why  they  do  not  close 
their  minds  to  the  wider  outlook,  and  why  their 
biological  theory  is  capable  of  forming  part  of  a 
synoptic  philosophy. 

6.  So  far  we  have  avoided  the  mention  of  one 
concept  which  holds  a  time-honoured  place  in  all 
discussions  of  life.  It  remains  for  us  to  consider 
briefly  what  recent  thought  has  contributed  to  the 
elucidation  of  teleology  in  nature. 

The  endeavour  to  explain  living  beings  by  the 
application  to  them  of  the  concept  of  purpose  or 
design  reaches  back  almost  as  far  as  philosophy 
itself.  The  striking  form  and  organization  of 
living  beings,  their  behaviour  directed  towards 
their  own  preservation  and  welfare,  their  fitness 
for  their  environment  and  their  environment's 
fitness  for  them — all  these  topics  have  been  elabor- 
ated in  infinite  detail  as  evidences  of  intelligent 
and  benevolent  design.  But  design  implies  a 
designer.  Where  shall  we  look  for  the  designing 
mind  and  will  ?  Two  possibilities  only  seem  open. 
We  must  attribute  the  guidance  and  purpose  either 


118     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

to  the  mind  of  the  living  organism  itself,  or  else 
we  must  refer  the  whole  system  of  Nature  with  all 
the  manifold  life  in  it  to  the  design  of  a  divine 
creator.  On  the  former  view,  consciousness  must 
be  supposed  to  be  coextensive  with  the  realm  of 
living  beings  ;  indeed  every  living  thing  must  not 
only  have  a  mind,  but  a  mind  sufficiently  developed 
to  know  in  anticipation  what  it  wants.  This 
requires  foresight ;  and  foresight,  in  turn,  requires, 
if  not  constructive  reasoning,  at  least  memory — 
the  recollection  of  what  in  previous  experience  has 
followed  from  similar  situations.  But  to  distribute 
mentality  of  this  high  order — and  nothing  less  will 
really  do  the  work  of  intelligent  guidance — through- 
out the  whole  realm  of  life  is  a  speculative  venture 
which  has,  indeed,  been  made  by  such  eminent 
thinkers  as  Samuel  Butler  and  James  Ward,  but 
against  which  there  are  at  least  two  strong  argu- 
ments. The  first  is  that  the  hypothesis  by  far 
outruns  the  evidence,  even  in  animals,  let  alone  in 
plants.  The  other  is  that  in  man,  where  intelligent 
control  is  a  factor,  a  great  part  of  the  routine  of 
life  is  carried  on  "  automatically  " — often  without 
consciousness  of  what  is  going  on,  and  certainly 
without  explicit  purpose.  Neither  of  these  argu- 
ments is,  indeed,  absolutely  conclusive,  but 
together  they  form  a  strong  presumption  against 
the  hypothesis  that  the  organization  and  behaviour 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  119 

of  a  living  being  are  due  to  its  own  thought  and 
will.  "  The  orchid  could  have  no  mind  that  could 
contrive  its  fertilization,  any  more  than  man  has  a 
mind  which  could  teach  him  to  swallow  or  digest, 
or  could  choose  the  place  or  century  of  his  birth  " 
(Bosanquet).  Samuel  Butler  suggests  that  for 
automatic  performances  no  conscious  purpose  is 
needed,  because  the  living  creature  knows  so  well 
how  to  do  them,  having  practised  them  an  untold 
number  of  times  in  successive  incarnations.  But 
it  is  impossible  to  imagine  how  the  process  of 
acquiring  the  automatic  routine  or  skill  should 
ever  have  got  started  without  an  already  existing 
basis  of  physical  organization,  and  the  argument 
about  choice  of  time  and  place  of  birth  is  not  met 
at  all.  Bergson,  clearly,  takes  a  safer  line  in 
excluding  "  finalism,"  i.e.,  conscious  purpose, 
altogether  from  life,  even  when  it  is  most  creative. 
The  other  view,  postulating  a  divine  designer 
and  creator,  has  shared  with  other  theological 
concepts  the  fate  of  elimination  from  science.  The 
contest  between  it  and  "  mechanism  "  has  ended 
with  the  definite  victory  of  the  latter.  The  famous 
Bridge-water  Treatises  are  the  last  example  (on  a 
comprehensive  scale)  of  the  attempt  to  exhibit  in 
detail  the  goodness,  power,  and  wisdom  of  God  as 
manifested  in  natural  creation.  There  is  no  need 
to  recapitulate  the  fluctuating  fortunes  of  this 


120    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

debate,  from  Bacon's  epigram  about  the  barrenness 
of  final  causes,  which  inspired  Cowley,  in  his  ode 
to  the  Royal  Society,  to  write  "  Bacon  has  broke 
that  scar-crow  Deity,"  to  Paley's  Evidences  ;  from 
Newton's  acceptance  of  the  argument  for  design  to 
Laplace's  "  I  have  no  need  of  that  hypothesis."1 
From  the  judgment-seat  of  philosophy  first 
Hume,  and  next,  with  greater  force  and  finality, 
Kant,  pronounced  the  verdict  against  the  "  physico- 
theological "  argument  for  the  existence  of  God. 
Science  no  longer  looks  for  evidences  of  God's 
design,  nor  is  it  satisfied  to  explain  any  given 
phenomenon  by  saying  that  it  is  "  best "  so,  and 
that  God  willed  it  for  this  reason. 

1  The  Ideological  argument  has  been  made  ridiculous  largely 
by  its  own  extravagances.  As  Spinoza  suggests,  it  tempts 
the  lazy  and  ignorant  to  substitute  a  facile  reference  to  God's 
presumed  purposes  for  the  patient  exploration  of  the  actual 
and  necessary  nexus  of  facts.  Theology  cannot  do  the  work 
of  natural  science,  and  should  not  be  substituted  for  it.  But 
after  science  has  done  its  work  by  its  own  methods,  is  there  not 
room  for  recognizing  that  Nature  evokes  the  religious  experience, 
too  ?  And  is  there  not  a  problem  here  for  synopsis  ?  A 
passion  for  knowledge  and  for  truth  is  not  incompatible  with 
worship,  and  it  seems  clear  that  for  a  man  like  Newton  the 
traditional  metaphor  of  divine  design  expressed  the  very  genuine 
experience  of  the  way  in  which  every  fresh  insight  into  the  order 
of  Nature  accorded  with,  and  heightened,  his  religious  response. 
It  is  worth  recalling,  too,  as  one  of  the  curiosities  of  this  debate, 
that  many  thinkers  originally  adopted  the  mechanical  theory 
precisely  because  it  seemed  to  facilitate  the  argument  for  design. 
To  call  anything  a  "  machine  "  ipso  facto  implied  a  maker  whose 
knowledge  and  power  were  commensurate  with  the  scale  and 
intricacy  of  his  work.  The  cosmos  as  a  machine  required 
nothing  less  than  God  as  its  author.  From  this  crudely  anthro- 
pomorphic argument  Hume  and  Kant  have  delivered  us. 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  121 

But  the  acceptance  of  this  result  has  given  rise 
to  two  fresh  problems.  It  has  set  us  seeking,  first, 
for  a  new  and  deeper  interpretation  of  the  relation 
of  natural  science  to  religion ;  and,  secondly,  for 
a  way  of  dealing  in  science  with  those  facts  and 
relationships  which  the  teleological  argument  had 
interpreted  as  evidences  of  intelligent  purpose. 
To  the  former  problem  we  shall  return  in  Lecture  V. 
To  the  latter  Professor  L.  J.  Henderson  has  recently 
made  a  remarkable  contribution,  which  we  must 
now  consider. 

The  line  of  investigation  which  Henderson  has 
pursued  in  his  two  books  on  The  Fitness  of  the 
Environment  and  on  The  Order  of  Nature,  may  be 
summarized  as  follows.  Two  aspects  of  Nature 
have  impressed  themselves  upon  the  inquiring 
mind.  One  is  the  determination  of  phenomena 
according  to  causal  law,  which  has  been  elaborated 
into  the  mechanical  theory  of  Nature.  The  other 
is  the  existence  of  living  organisms,  whose  structure, 
behaviour,  and  relation  to  their  environment  have 
seemed  to  demand,  almost  irresistibly,  an  explana- 
tion in  terms  of  purpose  and  design.  This  "  teleo- 
logical appearance  "  cannot  be  denied  or  argued 
away.  Yet,  what  can  science  do  to  make  it  intelli- 
gible ?  The  mechanical  theory  throws  no  light 
on  the  matter  :  for  it,  the  teleological  appearance 
is  an  "  accident."  On  the  other  hand,  neither 


122    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

theology  with  its  concept  of  design,  nor  psychology 
with  its  concept  of  animal  or  human  intelligence, 
nor  vitalism,  be  it  of  Bergson's  kind  or  of  Driesch's, 
can  fill  the  gap.  The  way  out  of  this  impasse 
which  Henderson  explores  is  that  science  has 
overlooked  an  order  among  the  properties  of  the 
constituent  elements  of  Nature,  and  among  their 
laws,  uniquely  adapted  to  the  needs  of  life.  This 
order  or  "  pattern "  is  missed  when  Nature  is 
considered  statically,  or,  rather,  unhistorically. 
But,  it  comes  into  view  when  history,  i.e.,  evolution, 
is  taken  into  account,  or,  in  other  words,  when  we 
consider  the  physico-chemical  constitution  of  Nature 
in  the  light  of  the  fact  that  living  beings  have 
evolved  on  the  basis  of  it.  Organisms  are  indivi- 
duals, i.e.,  stable,  durable  systems  maintaining 
their  equilibrium  (or  self-identity)  in  the  flux  of 
physico-chemical  processes.  Hume  was  the  first 
to  perceive  this  problem,  viz.,  how  to  account  for 
that  "  economy  of  Nature  "  which  explains  the 
constancy  of  organic  forms  in  a  world  of  matter 
in  motion.  But  Hume's  suggestion  was  too  far 
in  advance  of  the  science  of  his  time,  and  it  was 
forgotten.  It  needed  the  concurrent  development 
of  physics,  chemistry,  and  biology  during  the 
nineteenth  century  to  enable  scientists  to  recognize 
that  living  beings  are  systems  functioning  according 
to  a  pattern  of  their  own,  and  that  their  existence 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  123 

points  to  a  specific  pattern  or  order  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  Nature.  The  clue,  so  Henderson  claims, 
is  to  be  found  in  the  thermodynamic  researches  of 
Willard  Gibbs,  culminating  in  the  rigorous  statement 
of  the  concept  of  a  physico-chemical  system.  "  Just 
as  Newton  first  conclusively  showed  that  this  is  a 
world  of  masses,  so  Willard  Gibbs  first  revealed  it 
as  a  world  of  systems."  Organisms  are  systems 
the  formation  and  stability  of  which  we  can  now 
correlate  definitely  with  a  unique  pattern  in  the 
environment.  For,  by  far  the  most  abundant 
chemical  elements  in  the  environment  of  life  are 
hydrogen,  oxygen  and  carbon.  These  are  also  the 
most  active  elements,  give  rise  to  the  most  numerous 
compounds,  form  the  most  complex  molecular 
structures,  yield  the  most  energy  in  their  mutual 
transformations.  In  all  these  ways,  they  make 
the  actual  environment  the  fittest  possible  for  life. 
If,  for  example,  water,  carbonic  acid,  and  the 
carbohydrates  did  not  play  the  part  in  the  economy 
of  Nature  which  we  find  them  playing,  life  as  we 
know  it  would  be  impossible.  Yet  this  ensemble 
of  properties  is  so  infinitely  improbable  when 
considered  as  the  result  of  mere  chance,  that  we 
can  make  it  intelligible  to  ourselves  only  by  regard- 
ing it  as  a  "  preparation  "  for  life. 

The     term     "  preparation,"     thus,     sums     up 
Henderson's  recognition  of  a  teleological  pattern 


124    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,   AND  GOD 

in  Nature.  It  is  his  substitute  for  "  design."  In 
fact,  when  we  compare  his  Order  of  Nature  with, 
say,  Prout's  volume  in  the  Bridge-water  Treatises, 
we  perceive  that  his  argument  is  in  principle  that 
of  the  Bridgewater  Treatises — but  with  the  science 
brought  up-to-date  and  with  God  left  out. 

The  significance  of  such  a  view  for  a  synoptic 
philosophy  lies  in  the  suggestion  that  the  teleo- 
logical  character  of  life  is  deeply  rooted  in  the 
physico-chemical,  or  "  mechanical,"  constitution 
of  Nature.  It  is  neither  an  accident,  nor  a  miracle. 
And,  what  is  thus  true  of  life  may  be  true  of  those 
other  appearances  which  commonly  rank  as  teleo- 
logical — the  beauty  of  natural  objects  which  is 
revealed  to  the  artist  and  the  perfection  to  which 
religious  feeling  responds  in  worship.  As  Bosanquet 
reminds  us,  the  beauty  of  a  flower,  the  curl  of  a 
wave,  the  form  of  a  precipice  are  appearances  as 
deeply  rooted  in  the  ultimate  data  and  laws  of 
Nature  as  the  motion  of  the  solar  system  or  the 
formation  of  a  chemical  compound.  They  are 
neither  an  "  accidental  by-product  of  the  inter- 
action of  elements  in  whose  nature  and  general 
laws  of  combination  no  such  result  is  immanent," 
nor  are  they  ab  extra  superinduced  upon  Nature 
by  the  operation  of  a  mind  working  on  the  analogy 
of  a  human  artist.  "  We  must  interpret  the  nature 
of  Nature  as  much  by  the  flower  as  by  the  law  of 


THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE 


125 


gravitation."     In  other  words,  we  need  the  synoptic 
use  of  all  the  resources  of  our  experience. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1 .  Merz,  J .  T.        A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nine- 

teenth Century.     (W.  Blackwood  &  Sons.) 

2.  Loeb,  Jacques  The    Dynamics   of    Living   Matter.     (Mac- 

millan  &  Co.,  1910.) 

3.  Loeb,  Jacques  The  Organism  as  a  Whole.     (G.  P.  Putnam's 

Sons,  1919.) 

4.  Loeb,  Jacques  "  Forced  Movements,  Tropisms,  and  Animal 

Conduct."  Vol.  I  of  Monographs  on 
Experimental  Biology.  (Philadelphia  and 
London  :  J.  B.  Lippincott  &  Co.,  1920.) 

5 .  Driesch,  Hans   The  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism, 

2  vols.     (A.  &  C.  Black,  1907,  1908.) 

6.  Driesch,  Hans   The    Problem    of   Individuality    (Macmillan 

&  Co.,  1914.) 

7.  Bergson,  H.       Creative  Evolution,  tr.  A.   Mitchell.     (Mac- 

millan &  Co.,  1914.) 

8.  Butler,  Samuel  Life  and  Habit.     (A.  C.  Fifield,  1916.) 

9.  Darbishire,        An  Introduction  to  Biology.      (Cassell  &  Co., 
A.  D.  1917.) 

10.  Ward,  James     The  Realm  of  Ends.     (Camb.  Univ.  Press, 

1911.) 
n.  Haldane,  J.  S.   Mechanism,    Life    and    Personality.     (John 

Murray,  1913.) 

12.  Thomson,  The  System  of  Animate  Nature.     (Williams 

J.Arthur  &  Norgate,  1920.) 

13.  Henderson,        The  Fitness  of  the  Environment.     (Macmillan 

L.  J.  &  Co.,  1913.) 

14.  Henderson,        The  Order  of  Nature.     (Harvard  Univ.  Press, 

L.  J.  1917-) 

15.  Bosanquet,  B.   "  The   Meaning    of     Teleology."     (Reprint 

from  Proceedings  of  the  British  Academy, 
Vol.  II,  London  :  Henry  Froude,  1906.) 

16.  Broad,  C.  D.      "  Mechanical    Explanation    and    its    Alter- 

natives." (Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian 
Society,  Vol.  XIX.) 


126    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

17.  Hoernl6.  Studies  in  Contemporary  Metaphysics.     (New 

R.  F.  A.  York  :   Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co. ;   London  : 

Kegan  Paul,  1920.) 

In  this  list  mechanism  is  represented  in  an  extreme,  but 
typical  form  by  Loeb  (Nos.  2,  3,  4),  vitalism  by  Driesch  (Nos.  5, 
6),  Bergson  (No.  7)  and  Butler  (No.  8).  Butler's  Evolution, 
Old  and  New  (A.  C.  Fifield,  1916),  too,  is  worth  consulting. 
Another  variant  of  the  argument  which  traces  mechanism  back 
to  purposive  intelligence  is  to  be  found  in  No.  10 ;  cf .  also  Ward's 
Henry  Sidgwick  Memorial  Lecture  on  Heredity  and  Memory 
(Camb.  Univ.  Press,  1913).  Darbishire  (No.  9)  illustrates  what 
use  an  experimental  biologist  claims  to  be  able  to  make  of 
Bergson's  and  Butler's  points  of  view.  Haldane  (No.  n)  and 
Thomson  (Nov.  12)  represent  the  attempt  to  overcome  the  anti- 
thesis of  mechanism  and  vitalism  by  studying  life  as  an  "  appear- 
ance "  (i.e.  as  something  definitely  appearing  or  revealing  itself 
to  empirical  observation),  which  is  neither  to  be  referred  to  an 
hypothetical  factor  or  impulse,  nor  to  be  treated  as  mental  or 
conscious.  Henderson  (Nos.  13,  14)  tries  to  give  a  meaning  to 
teleology  in  science  as  recognition  of  a  definite  physico-chemical 
pattern  in  nature,  favourable  to  life.  The  history  of  the  con- 
troversy between  vitalism  and  mechanism  in  the  nineteenth 
century  may  be  studied  in  Merz  (No  i).  Bosanquet's  paper 
(No.  15)  is  the  best  treatment  of  teleology  from  the  point  of  view 
of  an  idealist  metaphysician ;  cf .  also  his  Principle  of  Individuality 
and  Value,  Lecture  IV.  Broad's  paper  (No.  16)  is  the  best 
critical  examination  of  mechanism.  The  argument  in  section 
4  of  the  Lecture  is  mainly  based  on  it.  Both  Nos.  15  and  16 
should  be  carefully  studied  by  everyone  interested  in  the  philo- 
sophical criticism  of  scientific  concepts  and  methods.  A  further 
discussion  of  the  topic  of  the  Lecture  by  the  Lecturer  will  be 
found  in  No.  17,  chs.  vi  and  vii. — Among  the  older  literature, 
Robert  Boyle's  Disquisition  about  the  Final  Causes  of  Things. 
London,  1688,  is  still  worth  reading  ;  it  shows  the  emancipation 
of  scientific  method  from  theology  in  the  making. 


LECTURE  IV 

THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND 


I 


I.  "WN  the  last  lecture  we  had  found  ourselves 
trembling  more  than  once  on  the  very  thres- 
hold of  "  mind."  It  is  not  easy,  as  we  saw, 
for  biology  to  vindicate  for  itself  a  place  as  an 
autonomous  science  between  physics  and  chemistry 
on  the  one  side,  and  psychology  on  the  other. 
Biological  thinking  is  pulled  in  opposite  directions. 
One  party  tries  to  make  biology  nothing  but  a 
branch  of  physics  and  chemistry ;  the  other  relies 
on  analogy  in  an  effort  to  extend  psychological 
concepts  over  the  whole  field  of  the  li ving.  Between 
these  two  extremes,  a  middle  party,  embarrassed 
by  a  "  vitalistic  "  left  wing,  tries  to  hold  to  "  life  " 
as  a  fact  in  the  order  of  nature  and  of  evolution, 
which  is  more  than  "  matter  "  and  less  than  "  mind." 
True,  we  can  hardly  deny  minds  to  the  higher 
animals,  and  still  less  to  homo  sapiens,  but  to 
attribute  minds  to  lower  animals  becomes  an 
increasingly  precarious  procedure.  And  what  of 

127 


128    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

plants  ?     Sir   Jagadis   Chunder    Bose   has   shown 
experimentally  that  plants  exhibit  in  their  responses 
to  stimuli  a  sensitiveness  and  irritability  which  we 
can  readily  parallel  with  similar  responses  in  animals. 
Again,  the  "  tropisms  "  of  plants  have  so  close  a 
counterpart  in  certain  features  of  animal  behaviour, 
that  Loeb  can  in  all  seriousness  formulate  the  pro- 
gramme of  reducing  even  the  highest  activities  of 
men,  via  the  instinctive  behaviour  of  animals  and 
the  tropisms  of  plants,  to  purely  physico-chemical 
reactions.     But  what   are  we   to  make   of  these 
affinities  ?     The   appeal   to   continuity   cuts   both 
ways.     If  the  pull  of  the  argument  is,  in  one  direc- 
tion, back  to  matter  and  mechanism,  it  is  also,  in 
the  other  direction,  forward  to  mind.     It  is  just 
as   easy   to  postulate — and  it  is  constantly  being 
done — that     mind     cannot     have     evolved     out 
of    the    non-mental,    or    life     out     of    the  non- 
living,   as    it     is    easy    to  assert    that    what    is 
once  physico-chemical  is  always  physico-chemical 
and  never  anything  but  physico-chemical.     But, 
as  we  saw  in  the  last  lecture,  if  we  take  evolution 
seriously,  we  must  expect  to  find  discontinuity  as 
well  as  continuity,  the  emergence  of  qualitatively 
new  appearances  in  the  world,  as  well  as  the  per- 
sistence of  the  old.    Where  to  draw  the  line,  may 
often  be  difficult  to  say.     The  exercise  of  good 
judgment  in  difficult  border-line  cases  requires  a 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND   129 

quality  akin  to  tact — an  expertness  only  to  be 
gained  by  long  and  close  familiarity  with  the  facts. 
Biologists  appear  to  be  able  to  get  on  without 
feeling  the  need  to  attribute  minds  to  living  cells, 
or  to  plants.  But  no  less  clearly  are  they  compelled 
to  recognize  minds  in  human  beings  and  many  of 
the  other  higher  animals.  So  sound  an  observer 
as  Jennings  regards  even  the  behaviour  of  protozoa 
as  being  of  the  psychological  order.  The  presence 
or  absence  of  a  central  nervous  system  furnishes 
an  additional  test,  for  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume 
that  the  formation  of  so  distinctive  a  structure  is 
the  basis  for  the  emergence  of  the  new  quality  or 
power  which  we  call  "  mind."  However,  with  the 
problem  where  to  draw  the  line  we  are  not  con- 
cerned. It  is  enough  for  us  if  the  occurrence  of 
mind  is  granted.  At  least,  except  by  way  of  abuse, 
we  shall  not  deny  the  presence  of  mind  in  each 
other. 

And  so  it  is  now  our  task  to  review  the  tendencies 
in  contemporary  psychology  in  order  to  discover 
what  they  may  hold  of  promise  for  our  synoptic 
programme. 

2.  What  sort  of  a  thing  is  a  "  mind  "  ?  No 
question  seemingly  could  be  simpler  to  answer. 
We  all  have  minds,  we  all  use  them  (more  or  less)  ; 
indeed,  to  put  it  more  strongly  still,  we  all  are  minds. 
If  each  of  us  has  that  most  intimate  acquaintance 
9 


130    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

with  what  a  mind  is  which  comes  from  being  a  mind, 
where  is  the  difficulty  ?     Yet  this  innocent  question 
confounds    all    the    experts.     It    is    a    somewhat 
humiliating  confession  to  make,  but  it  cannot  be 
avoided :    psychology  at  the  present  day  has  no 
single,  straightforward  answer  to  give.    There  are 
different  schools  of  psychology  which  are  more  or 
less  at  war  with  each  other  about  the  fundamental 
principles  of  their  science,  and  hence  about  the  very 
language  in  which  we  are  to  speak  about  the  mind. 
An  unsettled  terminology  is  a  sure  symptom  of 
unsettled  thinking,  and  every  candid  psychologist 
will  have  to  admit,  what  kindly  critics  do  not  tire 
from   pointing  out,   that  psychology   as  a  whole 
presents  a  spectacle  of  chaos  and  confusion.     It 
is  like  a  patient  in  a  critical  condition,  with  a 
multitude  of  doctors  disagreeing  on  diagnosis  and 
treatment.     This   is  not   to   deny   that   vigorous 
research  and  consequent  development  of  theory 
are  constantly  going  on  in  many  directions.     From 
psychical  research  to  psycho-analysis,  from  animal 
to  human,   from  physiological  and  experimental 
to  introspective  psychology,  from  the  psychology 
of  industry  or  of  crime  to  the  psychology  of  aesthetic 
or  of  religious  experience,  there  is  no  lack  of  activity. 
But  the  trouble  is  that  the  outcome  of  all  this 
activity    does    but    make    the    confusion    worse 
confounded. 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND     131 

There  are  many  reasons,  as  we  shall  presently 
see  more  in  detail,  for  this  state  of  things,  but  the 
most  fundamental  reason  of  all  may  be  suggested 
at  once.  Indeed,  we  shall  do  well  to  bear  it  in  mind 
throughout  this  lecture,  for  it  contains  both  the 
problem  and  the  promise  of  a  synoptic  treatment. 

This  fundamental  reason  is  that  mind  is  manifestly 
a  quality  or  power  which  admits  of  infinite  degrees 
and  variations.  As  we  watch  the  animal  world 
around  us,  nay,  as  we  watch  ourselves,  we  find 
here  more,  there  less,  of  mind.  In  the  individual, 
mind  develops  and  increases  and,  again,  it  de- 
generates and  shrinks.  Indeed,  it  fluctuates  within 
varying  limits  in  every  one  of  us  in  the  course  of 
every  twenty-four  hours.  To  catch  anything  so 
mobile,  so  tidal  in  its  energies,  so  manifold  in  its 
forms,  in  the  comparatively  rigid  network  of  a 
theory  is  no  easy  task.  And  we  can  easily  under- 
stand how  it  is  that  different  students,  concen- 
trating upon  some  of  the  facts  of  mind  and  forgetting 
others,  have  framed  different  concepts  and  used 
apparently  incompatible  languages.  Yet  the  broad 
fact  which  we  have  just  pointed  out  is  nothing 
recondite  or  technical.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  the 
most  familiar  fact  of  everyday  experience,  con- 
stantly acknowledged  by  us  in  practice  and  in  many 
a  current  turn  of  speech.  In  countless  ways,  we 
are  constantly  comparing  minds,  and  thereby 


182     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

treating  them  as  something  of  which  there  can  be 
more  or  less.  Minds  differ  in  range,  in  depth,  in 
organization,  in  intelligence,  in  will-power  ;  in  fact, 
in  every  property  which  can  be  predicated  of  a 
mind.  In  current  judgments  on  each  other,  and 
by  special  tests  like  intelligence-tests,  we  are 
always  comparing  and  sorting  and  grading  minds. 
We  recognize  special  aptitudes  which  some  minds 
possess  and  others  lack,  e.g.,  for  music,  or  for 
mathematics,  or  for  the  leadership  of  men,  and 
which  the  minds  that  possess  them  have  in  all 
sorts  of  degrees  and  nuances.  We  know  that  minds 
differ  in  range — a  child's  from  an  adult's,  one 
adult's  from  another's,  an  animal's  from  a  man's. 
Each  profession  has  its  characteristic  type  of  mind, 
and  different  types  will  deal  differently  with  the 
same  situation,  e.g.,  a  lawyer  and  a  scientist,  a 
business-man  and  an  artist.1  In  old  age,  mind 
tends  gradually  to  fail,  but  there  are  oscillations 
in  range  and  power  throughout  an  individual's 
life,  and  even  within  a  day  his  mind  waxes  and 
wanes  in  energy  :  it  is  not  always  at  its  best,  nor, 
indeed,  always  active  at  all.  The  same  fact  can  be 
brought  out  even  more  strikingly  by  turning  to 

1  Consider,  e.g.,  the  current  attitude  of  the  technical  expert  to 
the  politician.  The  books  on  the  war,  and  on  the  making  of  the 
peace,  abound  in  examples  of  conflicts  of  different  types  of  mind. 
See  the  contrast  of  Wilson's  professorial  and  Lansing's  legal 
mind  in  the  latter's  The  Peace  Negotiations  :  A  Personal  Narra- 
tive. (Constable,  1921.) 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    133 

what  is  the  crux  of  the  mind,  viz.,  consciousness. 
There  is,  surely,  no  denying  that  there  are  degrees 
and  fluctuations  of  consciousness.  To  be  conscious, 
so  it  is  commonly  held,  is  to  feel,  to  will,  to  think. 
But  these  are  blanket-terms.  Feeling  covers  ex- 
periences as  various  as  pleasure  and  pain  (or 
"  displeasure,"  as  some  psychologists  prefer  to  say 
in  order  to  distinguish  the  feeling  from  the  sensation 
of  pain),  and  all  the  emotions,  simple  or  complex. 
Willing  covers  desire,  wish,  impulse — in  short, 
every  form  of  conation  or  striving.  Thinking 
covers  sensing,  perceiving,  imagining,  reasoning, 
and  many  more.  Clearly  all  these,  which  together 
make  up  "  consciousness,"  occur  in  all  sorts  of 
degrees  and  variations  in  different  creatures,  and  in 
the  same  creature  at  different  times.  They  all 
admit  of  more  or  less.  Moreover — and  this  is 
perhaps  the  most  important  point  of  all — it  does 
not  avail  us  much  to  classify  the  contents  or  pro- 
cesses of  consciousness  under  these  three  heads  of 
feeling,  willing,  thinking,  unless  we  go  on  to  con- 
sider what  a  given  mind,  or  type  of  mind,  feels, 
wills,  thinks.  The  truly  important  differences 
between  minds  in  range,  organization,  power,  do 
not  emerge  until  we  throw  the  emphasis  on  what 
it  is  that  they  feel,  will,  think.  This  gives  us  the 
world  of  each  mind,  or  better  still,  each  mind  as  a 
world,  a  microcosm,  a  cross-section  of  the  universe, 


184     MATTER,   I  JFK,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

as  such  constantly  expanding  and  shrinking ; 
growing  and  failing ;  retaining  old,  absorbing  new, 
experiences ;  at  its  best  transforming  itself,  and 
its  world,  by  an  activity  which  is  both  creative  and 
logical.  But  to  say  this  is  to  anticipate  our  con- 
clusion, viz.,  the  direction  in  which  a  synoptic 
theory  of  mind  promises  to  move.  So  far  we  have 
not  given  a  theory,  but  merely  reminded  ourselves 
of  a  fact  by  which  we  can  measure  the  adequacy 
of  the  theories  which  are  currently  offered. 

3.  Apart  from  the  fundamental  difficulty  which 
we  have  just  pointed  out,  the  chaos  in  modern 
psychology  is  due  to  special  causes  which  we  may 
conveniently  divide  into  two  groups. 

One  group  consists  of  difficulties  due  to  the 
ramifications  of  psychological  research  at  the  present 
day.  Specialization,  here  as  elsewhere,  has  meant 
divergence,  and  in  diverging  the  workers  in  psycho- 
logy have  lost  touch  with  each  other  and  with  the 
unity  of  their  topic.  Moreover,  coming  into 
contact,  along  their  different  lines  of  work,  with 
different  theoretical  influences  from  other  sources, 
from  physics,  or  biology,  or  philosophy,  or  religion, 
or  medicine,  they  have  almost  forgotten  how  to 
speak  a  common  language  or  how  to  understand 
each  other.  The  psychologists  of  the  laboratory 
and  of  the  market-place  have  gone  their  different 
ways,  and  sometimes  seem  even  resentful  of  the 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    135 

synoptic  philosopher's  attempt  to  bring  them 
together  again. 

And,  secondly,  this  centrifugal  tendency  has  been 
intensified  by  the  past  history  of  psychology  which, 
culminating  in  the  discovery  of  "  consciousness," 
has  embarrassed  us  with  the  dualism  of  matter 
and  mind,  or  body  and  soul — perhaps  the  most 
formidable  obstacle  to  synopsis  in  the  whole  welter 
of  modern  theories. 

Let  us  glance  at  each  of  these  special  sources  of 
difficulty  in  turn,  beginning  with  the  first-mentioned, 
viz.,  the  divergences  of  present-day  psychological 
research.  Under  this  heading,  four  points  deserve 
our  notice. 

(a)  There  is  considerable  disagreement  about  the 
range  of  facts  which  "  scientific "  psychology 
should  include.  Most  psychologists  fight  shy  of 
the  whole  realm  of  psychical  research.  Now, 
granted  that  spiritualism  is  a  field  in  which  deceit 
and  trickery  are  rampant,  and  fraudulent  mediums 
too  often  exploit  the  will  to  believe  of  an  ignorant 
public,  yet,  after  all  deductions,  there  would  seem 
to  remain  a  very  substantial  residue  of  phenomena 
the  genuineness  of  which  is  sufficiently  well  attested 
to  justify  the  attempt  to  investigate  them  further, 
and  more  especially  to  bring  them  under  experi- 
mental control,  so  that  the  conditions  of  their 
occurrence  may  be  determined.  Whether  among 


136     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

the  various  kinds  of  mediumistic  phenomena  we 
attach  the  greater  importance  to  the  alleged  com- 
munications from  departed  spirits  and  the  implied 
evidence  for  survival  of  death,  or  to  such  feats  of 
materialization  as  the  late  Mr.  W.  J.  Crawford  has 
been  investigating  with  the  help  of  photography 
and  experimental  apparatus,  in  either  case  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  our  current  theories  of  what 
a  mind  is  and  what  it  can  do  would  require  ex- 
tensive remodelling,  if  these  groups  of  phenomena 
were  once  accepted  as  well-established. — In  another 
direction,  orthodox  psychology  tends  to  look  askance 
at  investigations  which  claim  for  animals  a  greater 
degree  of  intelligence  than  we  commonly  concede 
to  them.  The  "  Kluge  Hans,"  and  other  horses, 
after  having  been  investigated  by  several  commis- 
sions of  experts,  appear  to  have  had  the  claims  to 
well-nigh  human  intelligence,  which  were  made  for 
them  by  their  owners  and  trainers,  disallowed. 
But  experiments  in  developing  the  minds  of  animals 
have  not  ceased.  Dogs  have  been  taught  to  express 
themselves  in  a  semi-phonetic  alphabet,  in  which 
each  sound  is  represented  by  a  fixed  number  of 
taps  with  the  paw.  Cases  are  reported  of  their 
using  this  language  for  the  spontaneous  com- 
munication of  their  experiences,  and  in  Germany 
the  Letters  and  Reminiscences  of  the  dog  "  Rolf  " 
have  actually  been  published  in  an  edition  de  luxe. 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    137 

Should  these  stories  be  authenticated,  they  will 
at  least  warn  us  not  to  set  dogmatic  limits  to  the 
powers  of  an  animal  mind. 

(b)  A  second  source  of  trouble  is  the  disagreement 
about  methods  and  principles.  Psychologists  who 
seek  to  frame  all  explanations  in  physiological 
terms  are  confronted  by  others  who  hold  that  mind 
is  sui  generis  and  must  be  described  in  its  own 
terms  ;  and  there  is  a  middle  party  which  muddles 
through  somehow  on  a  mixed  intellectual  diet  of 
bits  of  physiology  and  bits  of  psychology.  Behind 
these  differences  there  looms  the  time-honoured 
problem  of  the  relation  of  body  to  mind.  Are  they 
different  entities  or  "  substances  "  ?  If  so,  can 
they  exist  apart  ?  And  how  are  they  connected 
so  as  to  co-operate  ?  For,  a  mind-body  creature 
somehow  acts  as  a  whole,  as  if  it  were  all  of  one 
piece,  so  to  speak,  not  a  compound  of  heterogeneous 
substances  mysteriously  coupled  together. — In 
another  direction,  students  of  human  minds  and 
students  of  animal  minds  are  driven  apart  by  the 
fact  that  human  beings  can  make  objects  of  their 
own  minds,  whereas  animals,  apparently,  cannot. 
Or,  at  least,  the  power  of  self-objectification  is  useless 
to  the  psychologist  without  communication  by 
language.  In  animal  psychology,  therefore,  we  are 
in  the  position  of  external  spectators,  and  at  once 
the  question  arises  whether  we  can  really  observe 


188     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

the  animal's  mind  at  all.  The  animal's  behaviour 
— yes,  but  its  mind  ?  We  can  watch  what  its 
body  does,  but  can  we  know  what  goes  on  "  inside  " 
its  mind  ?  If  we  say,  "  Yes,  we  can,  viz.,  by 
inference  or  interpretation,"  the  question  becomes, 
Have  we  good  grounds  for  such  inference  ?  Will 
it  not  be  safer  and  more  scientific  to  stick  to  what  we 
can  observe,  and,  avoiding  hypotheses  which  we 
cannot  check,  to  frame  our  explanations  in  terms 
capable  of  being  tested  by  observation  ?  That 
way  lies  "  behaviourism."  But,  at  least,  it  may  be 
urged,  we  know  our  own  minds  from  inside.  Yes, 
each  perhaps  his  own  mind  ;  but  his  neighbour's  ? 
Are  we  not  towards  each  other  in  the  same  position 
of  external  spectators  of  behaviour  in  which  we 
stand  towards  animals  ?  Self-objectification,  then, 
or  "  introspection,"  might  possibly  furnish  auto- 
biographies, but  will  these  furnish  a  science  of  mind 
as  such  ?  True,  there  is  language  :  we  can  tell 
one  another  what  is  going  on  in  our  own  minds, 
and  this  does  modify  very  profoundly  our  relation 
towards  each  other  even  as  external  observers. 
For,  speaking  is  not  merely  behaviour  but  expressive 
behaviour.  The  words  have  a  meaning  because 
they  express  a  feeling  or  act  of  thought  or  of  will, 
in  short  an  experience,  a  bit  of  the  life  of  a  mind. 
We  understand  another's  language  by  taking  his 
words  to  express  what  we  should  express  in  the 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND     139 

same  words.  It  follows  that  language  makes  a 
very  profound  difference  even  to  introspection,  for 
it  breaches  that  privacy  of  introspection  which, 
at  first  sight,  threatens  to  make  introspection  so 
utterly  useless  an  instrument  for  psychology.  For, 
what  would  it  avail  the  psychologist,  if  his  field 
of  investigation  were  narrowed  down  inexorably 
to  his  own  mind,  when  his  aim  is  to  achieve  a  theory 
of  mind  as  such,  and  to  discover  laws  which  will  be 
true  for  other  minds  no  less  than  for  his  own  ? 
Now,  introspection  or  self-observation  yields  theory 
only  so  far  as  the  facts  it  discovers  are  put  into 
words ;  but  whence  does  the  psychologist  take 
his  words  except  from  the  common  stock  of  language, 
fashioned,  ready  for  his  use,  by  the  self-expression 
of  other  minds  ?  Yet,  if  this  reflexion  disposes  of 
the  difficulty  of  privacy,  it  does  not  release  us  from 
all  our  troubles.  The  language  of  introspective 
analysis  and  the  language  of  external  observation 
require  to  be  harmonized,  for  even  where  the 
vocabulary  is  the  same,  the  meaning  may  be 
different.  The  statement,  for  example,  that  an 
animal  hears  a  sound  may  mean,  in  terms  of  what 
an  observer  can  perceive,  that  the  animal "  responds 
to  an  auditory  stimulus,"  i.e.,  that  it  pricks  its 
ears,  looks  around,  gets  ready  to  fly  or  fight  or 
catch  a  prey,  etc.  In  introspective  terms,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  will  mean  that  a  sound  (an  "  auditory 


140     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

sensation ")  occurs  in  the  animal's  "  stream  of 
consciousness "  and  receives  attention.  Whilst 
some  psychologists  are  doing  their  best  to 
synthesize  these  two  languages,  others  (the  "  be- 
haviourists ")  are  striving  to  force  them  apart, 
with  the  professed  aim  of  eliminating  the  intro- 
spective method  and  its  language  altogether  from 
psychology.  As  long  as  psychologists  thus  pull 
in  opposite  directions,  confusion  cannot  but  continue 
to  reign  in  their  science. 

(c)  A  third  source  of  trouble,  closely  connected 
with  the  preceding,  is  that  language  is  used  by  a 
speaker  to  express  what  he  is  conscious  of.  But  is 
"  consciousness  "  co-extensive  with  "  mind  "  ?  Are 
the  two  words  synonymous  ?  There  is  a  tendency 
so  to  treat  them,  especially  among  introspective 
psychologists.  Introspection  is  said  to  bring  to 
attention  and  make  accessible  to  analysis  "  what 
goes  on  in  consciousness."  The  well-known  defini- 
tion of  mind  as  the  "  stream  of  consciousness  "  is 
typical  of  this  line  of  psychology.  Of  course,  over 
and  above  the  processes  which  introspection  dis- 
covers going  on  in  the  mind,  the  introspective 
psychologist  must  assume  also  a  structure  of  mind. 
He  will  be  found  talking  of  "  mental  dispositions  " 
and  of  "  laws "  of  mental  process,  in  short,  of 
uniformities  which,  though  revealed  by  his  analysis, 
are  not  part  of  "  consciousness  "  in  the  sense  hi 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    141 

which  it  is  the  datum  for  introspection.  But  to 
explain  consciousness  by  reference  to  "  unconscious  " 
dispositions  and  laws  is  one  thing ;  it  is  quite 
another  thing  to  assume  unconscious  processes  to 
be  going  on  all  the  time  in  the  mind,  and  this  is  the 
hypothesis  which  another  school  of  psychologists 
regards  as  indispensable.  On  this  view,  conscious- 
ness is  but  the  apex,  as  it  were,  of  the  mind — its 
luminous  peak  ;  and  the  bulk  of  the  mind  extends 
"  below  the  threshold  "  of  consciousness,  just  as 
the  bulk  of  an  iceberg  is  below  the  surface  of  the 
water.  Thence  it  is  but  a  step  to  the  hypothesis 
that  the  moving  forces  are  mainly,  or  even  wholly, 
down  there,  out  of  sight  as  it  were.  Consciousness, 
then,  becomes  a  sort  of  stage,  the  marionettes  on 
which  are  being  pulled  by  invisible  strings  from  an 
underworld  of  sub-conscious  or  unconscious  mental 
factors.  In  this  sense  Professor  G.  Stanley  Hall 
once  asserted  in  a  lecture  that  "  consciousness  never 
says  what  it  means."  Whatever  goes  on  in  con- 
sciousness will  thus  be  symbolic  of  the  play  of 
forces  which  never  appear  in  propria  persona,  but 
only  in  disguises  more  or  less  complete.  This 
view,  of  course,  is  extreme,  yet  recent  psycho- 
analysis— itself  already  split  into  several  more  or 
less  hostile  schools — certainly  throws  the  emphasis 
in  the  study  of  mind  on  to  that  portion  of  mind 
which  lies  below  consciousness.  It  offers  an  in- 


142     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

creasingly  elaborate  account  of  the  layers  or  strata 
there  to  be  found,  and  of  the  mechanism  or  structure 
by  which  the  processes  in  consciousness  are  deter- 
mined, as  when  a  dream  is  analyzed  as  the  fulfilment 
in  imagination  of  a  repressed  wish,  or  a  slip  of  the 
tongue  as  a  betrayal  of  a  similar  repression.  On 
the  other  hand,  however,  the  whole  technique  of 
psycho-analysis  depends  on  identifying  the  con- 
stituents of  the  unconscious  realm  by  dragging 
them  into  consciousness.  It  is,  apparently,  only 
through  consciousness  that  the  unconscious  can 
be  studied,  and  the  various  methods  employed 
have  the  common  aim  of  locating  and  breaking  down 
the  resistances  which  prevent  the  unconscious 
factors  from  emerging  in  their  own  true  character. 
The  curative  effect  of  psycho-analysis  seems  to 
depend  wholly  on  the  extent  to  which  the  repressed 
memories  or  wishes,  which  cause  morbid  dis- 
turbances of  consciousness,  can  be  brought  into  the 
light  of  consciousness  so  that  rational  self-control 
may  be  regained.  Hypnotism,  as  employed  in 
psychiatry,  has  the  same  purpose,  viz.,  to  explore 
what  is  normally  hidden  in  the  unconscious,  by 
letting  it  come  to  the  surface,  or  evoking  it,  in  the 
hypnotic  trance.  Meanwhile,  psycho-analysts, 
whilst  they  agree  in  dividing  the  whole  mind  into 
conscious  and  unconscious  strata,  differ  profoundly 
on  the  origin  of  the  unconscious.  The  extreme 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    143 

Freudian  view  seems  to  be  that  the  unconscious 
mind  consists  wholly  of  repressed  materials.  On 
the  other  hand,  Jung  and  his  adherents  regard  the 
unconscious  rather  as  the  primitive  basis  of  mind 
out  of  which  consciousness  has  arisen.  Here, 
again,  therefore,  we  find  conflict  rather  than  unity. 
(d)  A  last  source  of  trouble  consists  in  the  im- 
portation into  psychology  of  concepts  and  theories 
borrowed  from  other  sciences,  and  assumed  to  be 
valid  for  psychology  too.  Not  infrequently  the 
point  of  view  from  which  mind  is  approached 
exhibits  some  such  theoretical  bias  which  inevitably 
is  reflected  in  the  limitations  of  the  resulting  account. 
An  enquirer,  for  example,  trained  to  work  with  the 
concepts  of  physics  or  even  of  physiology,  is  very 
commonly  ill  at  ease  in  psychology  and  distinctly 
hampered  in  dealing  with  the  more  spiritual  forms 
of  experience.  On  the  other  hand,  a  student  who 
approaches  psychology  with  theological  habits  of 
thought  will  constantly  use  language  which  to  his 
scientific  neighbour  will  seem  illegitimate,  if  not 
unintelligible.  Again,  if  we  start  by  taking  for 
granted  the  two-substance  theory  of  body  and  mind 
in  the  form  of  epiphenomenalism  (i.e.,  the  theory 
that  mind  is  a  mere  by-product  of  the  bodily 
machine)  or  psycho-physical  parallelism  (i.e.,  the 
theory  that  mental  and  physical  processes  run  side 
by  side  without  influencing  each  other),  we  are 


144     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

committed  to  regarding  mind  as  completely  ineffec- 
tive and  otiose.  It  is  there,  but  it  does  nothing. 
It  has  no  assignable  function.  It  does  not  determine 
behaviour :  it  neither  receives  anything  from,  nor 
gives  anything  to,  the  physical  world.  Either  of 
these  dualistic  theories  brings  us  at  once  into 
conflict  with  the  evolutionary  view  that  mind  is 
useful  in  the  struggle  for  existence,  as  an  organ  for 
better  adaptation  to  the  environment,  and  hence 
for  survival.  Intelligent  behaviour,  learning  by 
experience,  guidance  of  conduct  by  cunning  and 
knowledge  simply  have  no  place  in  the  pattern  of 
epiphenomenalism  or  parallelism.  But  even  the 
evolutionary  point  of  view,  though  it  does  assign 
to  mind  a  function,  yet  fails  to  do  justice  to  it, 
because,  as  a  rule,  it  takes  as  its  standard  the 
function  of  mind  in  animal  life  rather  than  the 
range  and  power  of  which  it  shows  itself  to  be  capable 
in  human  achievements  at  their  best.  Whether  we 
take  mind  to  be  distributed  over  a  wider  or  a 
narrower  area  within  the  realm  of  living  organisms, 
on  any  view  there  is  between  the  lowest  and  the 
highest  types  of  mind  an  infinite  range  of  differences 
in  feeling,  in  knowledge,  in  foresight  and  construc- 
tive purpose.  In  the  past  the  introspective 
psychologist  has  conspired  with  the  physiologist  to 
work  on  the  assumption  of  the  mind-body  dualism, 
with  the  result  that  he,  from  whom  a  more  complete 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    145 

treatment  of  mind  might  have  been  expected,  has 
filled  our  text-books  with  abstract  generalities,  to 
the  neglect  of  the  study  of  mind  in  its  concrete 
manifestations,  in  social  life,  in  economics,  in 
politics,  and,  again,  in  the  creation  or  enjoyment 
of  works  of  art,  or  in  the  varieties  of  religious 
experience.  It  is  only  within  comparatively  recent 
times  that  more  detailed  studies  in  social,  or  aesthetic, 
or  religious  psychology  have  appeared,  but  very 
commonly  they  have  suffered  from  the  prevailing 
confusion  in  the  theoretical  groundwork  of 
psychology. 

It  is  chiefly  for  these  reasons  that  present-day 
psychology  cannot  with  its  whole  authority  give 
any  single  answer  to  the  question,  What  is  and 
what  does  a  mind  ? 

4.  Moreover,  the  answer  to  this  question,  as  has 
already  been  mentioned,  is  not  made  easier  by  the 
legacy  of  problems  which  psychology  owes  to  its 
history.  It  will  repay  us  to  glance  at  this  history, 
for,  without  it,  we  can  hardly  appreciate  the 
significance  of  the  most  recent  movements  in 
psychology. 

If  psychology  began  when  man  first  learned  to 
recognize  the  soul,  its  origin  lies  hidden  in  the  mists 
of  the  past.  But  an  imaginative  reconstruction  of 
the  early  story  may  be  attempted  with  a  fair  degree 
of  plausibility.  Primitive  man  was  both  daring 


146     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

and  ingenious  in  his  speculations  about  the  facts 
which  struck  his  attention.  Foremost  among  these, 
we  may  suppose,  must  have  been  death,  and  the 
plainly  observable  difference  between  the  dead  and 
the  living.  A  living  body  is  warm,  breathes,  and 
moves.  A  dead  body  is  cold,  stark,  and  motionless. 
What  more  natural  than  to  explain  the  difference 
by  supposing  the  presence  of  something  in  the 
living  which  is  absent  from  the  dead  ?  This  some- 
thing is  the  original  "  soul,"  the  Latin  name  of 
which,  anima,  still  bears  witness  to  its  birth  in 
breath.  This  is  the  nucleus  from  which  have 
developed,  through  many  vicissitudes  of  specula- 
tion, the  "  consciousness  "  and  the  "  behaviour  " 
of  modern  psychologists. 

The  heat  of  the  living  body  would  readily  suggest 
that  the  soul  must  be  akin  to  fire,  and  the  identi- 
fication of  fire  and  spirit,  literally  or  metaphorically, 
has  remained  ever  since  a  persistent  strain  in 
religious  language  and  symbolism.  Again,  the 
breath,  impalpable,  invisible,  yet  real,  must  have 
helped  towards  the  concept  of  the  soul  as  having 
these  same  qualities  and  as  made  of  a  substance 
more  tenuous  and  refined  than  the  body.  Thus 
was  mediated  the  transition  to  the  concept  of  the 
soul  as  "  immaterial,"  and  this  immaterial! ty, 
together  with  imperceptibility  to  the  senses  of  an 
observer,  has  been  inherited  by  the  modern  concept 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    147 

of  "  consciousness."  Further,  sooner  or  later, 
speech  and  other  purposive  actions  must  have  been 
singled  out  among  the  movements  especially  of  the 
human  body,  and  the  concept  of  the  soul  as  the 
source  of  these  must  have  been  expanded  so  as  to 
include  the  power  of  perception,  thought  and  feeling. 
But  many  centuries  had  to  pass  before  the  concept 
of  "  consciousness "  was  formed  and  fixed  in  a 
distinctive  word.  Even  during  the  classical  period 
of  Greek  Philosophy  we  find  no  clear  recognition 
of  consciousness  as  distinct  from  bodily  life.  It 
is  not  until  the  second  century  of  our  era  that  a  term 
for  it  appears  in  the  literature.  In  other  words, 
the  soul  began  its  career  simply  as  a  principle  of 
life. 

With  this  first  strand  of  soul-theory  very  early 
a  second  must  have  mingled,  representing  in  its 
junction  with  the  first  an  even  more  venturesome 
flight  of  synthesis  on  the  part  of  primitive  man. 
Not  accustomed  to  distinguish,  as  we  do,  between 
dreams  as  unreal  and  waking  perceptions  as  real, 
and  inclined,  moreover,  to  attribute  to  dreams  a 
special  significance,  primitive  man  may  well,  so  it 
has  been  suggested,  have  fused  the  dream- 
appearances  of  departed  persons  with  his  concept 
of  soul.  If  the  soul  is  present  in  the  living  body, 
absent  from  the  dead,  it  must  soon  have  been  con- 
ceived as  distinct  and  separable  from  the  body  and 


148     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

capable  of  independent  existence.  Thence  it  was 
but  a  step  to  the  two-substance  theory  of  body  and 
soul,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  belief  in  survival 
of  death  and  immortality,  on  the  other.  It  is  need- 
less to  dwell  on  the  elaboration  of  this  motif  in 
mythology  and  religious  belief,  from  ancestor- 
worship  to  the  transmigration  and  re-incarnation 
of  souls,  from  the  dismal  abode  of  bloodless  shades 
in  Hades  to  the  Isles  of  the  Blest  in  Greek  story  or 
the  Happy  Hunting  Grounds  of  the  Red  Indian 
brave.  The  heaven  and  hell  of  popular  theology 
have  here  their  ultimate  roots,  but  they  have 
become  interwoven  with  a  belief  in  the  moral 
government  of  the  world,  requiting  sin  with  punish- 
ment and  rewarding  repentance  with  redemption. 
We  strike  here  a  third  strain,  and  a  much  later 
one  ;  attributable  in  Western  thought,  if  Professor 
J.  Burnet  is  right,  to  no  less  a  thinker  than  Socrates. 
This  is  the  truly  "  spiritual  "  conception  of  the  soul 
as  that  in  ourselves  the  moral  excellence  or  cor- 
ruption of  which  ought  to  be  our  foremost  concern. 
Henceforth  the  condition  of  the  soul  in  respect  of 
virtue  or  vice,  purity  or  pollution,  becomes  a  matter 
of  care  and  solicitude.  We  are  on  the  threshold  of 
the  concept  of  it  as  something  requiring  to  be 
"  saved."  From  Socrates,  by  way  of  Plato  and  th? 
Stoics,  we  are  led  to  the  Christian  doctrine  of  sin 
and  salvation  which  has  dominated  Western  man's 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND   149 

interest  in  the  nature  and  destiny  of  rnVsoul,  when- 
ever he  has  approached  these  questions  from  the 
point  of  view  of  his  religion.  The  great  Eastern 
religions  almost  all  offer  variants  of  the  same  theme. 
For,  though  they  have  conceived  salvation,  and  the 
way  to  it,  and  the  need  for  it,  somewhat  differently, 
yet  the  underlying  principle  of  an  escape  from  the 
bondage  of  illusion,  intellectual  or  moral,  into  the 
freedom  of  union  with  God,  or  the  All,  is  the  same. 

Adventurous  indeed  has  been  the  journey  of  the 
original  life-principle,  and  amazing  the  synthetic 
power  which  human  thought  has  exhibited  in 
working  so  many  heterogeneous  strands  into  the 
tissue  of  a  single  theory.  Indeed,  the  web  has 
become  so  large  and  complicated,  and  the  connexions 
in  places  so  loose,  that  it  is  little  wonder  that  some 
of  the  intellectual  interests  which  had  participated 
in  the  weaving  of  it,  should  have  broken  free  and 
sought  a  development  along  their  own  lines. 

One  of  the  obvious  breaking  points  in  the 
synthesis  is  death.  The  living  creature — an  em- 
bodied soul  or  a  besouled  body,  as  we  may  choose 
to  take  it — we  can  observe  and  study.  What  may 
befall  it  after  death  is  guess-work ;  fit  matter,  in 
Plato's  language,  for  "  myth,"  not  for  "  knowledge." 
If,  then,  we  drop  the  setting  of  religious  metaphysics, 
what  remains  ?  Precisely  the  standpoint  of 
Aristotle's  psychology — an  unprejudiced  study  of 


150     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

"  soul "  as  exhibited  by  diverse  kinds  of  living 
beings,  or  rather  living  bodies.  A  living  body  is 
"  besouled,"  for  Aristotle,  when  it  is  actively 
exercising  its  proper  functions.  What  seeing  is  to 
the  eye,  that  the  soul  is  to  the  organism  as  a  whole. 
The  soul,  in  Aristotle's  technical  language,  is  the 
"  form  "  or  "  entelechy  "  of  the  body.  In  other 
words,  it  is  the  body  in  action,  all  organs  doing  their 
appropriate  work,  and  through  them  the  whole 
body  functioning  as  a  whole.  A  plant-soul  consists 
in  the  nutritive  and  generative  processes  the  cycle 
of  which  constitutes  the  life  of  the  plant.  Animals 
add  sensation,  appetition,  locomotion  to  these 
functions.  The  human  soul  shares  all  these  lower 
functions,  but  consists  specifically  in  the  rational 
activities  which  man  alone  possesses.  Thus,  for  a 
human  being  to  be,  or  have,  a  soul  is  to  do  whatever 
things  a  human  body  can  do.  A  human  soul  is, 
we  may  say  outright,  a  human  body  engaged  in  all 
the  various  activities,  from  metabolic  processes  to 
philosophizing,  which  make  up  a  typical  human 
life. 

Aristotle's  theory  of  the  soul  is  clearly,  in  our 
modern  jargon,  "  functional  "  or  "  behaviouristic." 
In  fact,  his  "  soul "  is  what  we  mean  by  "  be- 
haviour," especially  if  we  take  the  latter  term  in 
a  sense  sufficiently  wide  to  include  all  the  rational 
activities  which  are  specifically  human.  Some  of 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    151 

our  modern  behaviourists,  like  E.  B.  Holt,  are 
fully  aware  that  their  theory  is  a  return  to  Aristotle's 
position. 

Meanwhile,  after  Aristotle,  the  history  of  the  soul 
took  a  turn  which  led  away  from  behaviour  to  the 
discovery  of  "  consciousness."  It  is  commonly, 
and  rightly,  held  that  this  turn  was  due  to  the 
increased  emphasis  of  Christianity  on  inwardness, 
on  the  moral  quality  of  man's  feelings  and  thoughts, 
on  the  opposition  of  flesh  and  spirit.  The  effort 
to  scrutinize  the  spiritual  condition  of  the  soul 
inevitably  encouraged  introspection  and  self- 
analysis,  and  led  to  the  noticing  and  distinguishing 
of  states  and  processes  of  consciousness  taken  as  a 
realm  opposed,  as  it  were,  to  the  outer  and  material 
world  of  which  the  body  forms  part.  At  the  same 
time,  the  Christian  scheme  of  salvation  incorporated 
the  belief  in  the  survival  of  death,  and  therefore  in 
the  soul  as  a  "  substance  "  distinct  from  the  body 
and  capable  of  existing  independently  from  it. 
The  identification  of  this  soul-substance  with  that 
which  is  conscious,  and  the  opposition  of  both  to 
body  and  matter,  brings  us,  on  the  threshold  of  the 
modern  period,  to  Descartes'  dualism,  i.e.,  two- 
substance  theory,  according  to  which  matter  is 
res  extensa,  substance  which  occupies  space,  and 
soul  is  res  cogitans,  substance  which  thinks  or  is 
conscious.  It  is  no  mere  accident  that  Descartes 


152     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

was  one  of  the  founders  of  modern  physiology. 
In  strict  consistency  with  his  dualism  he  tried  a 
double  book-keeping,  dealing  with  the  behaviour 
of  the  body  in  terms  of  the  nervous  system,  con- 
ceived as  a  mechanism  for  responding  with  appro- 
priate movements  to  sensory  stimuli,  and  with  the 
processes  of  consciousness  in  terms  of  sensations, 
ideas  and  volitions.  That  he  was  compelled  to 
postulate  the  interaction  of  body  and  soul  through 
the  pineal  gland  shows  how  the  unity  of  the  conscious 
organism  took  its  revenge  upon  his  dualism. 

The  rest  of  the  story  is  briefly  told.  Broadly, 
it  has  consisted  of  the  effort  to  get  rid  of  the  soul- 
substance  ;  and  thereby  of  the  body-soul  dualism. 
First  came,  chiefly  through  Hume  and  Kant,  the 
attack  upon  "  Rational  Psychology "  with  its 
theological  affiliations,  i.e.,  upon  the  theory  of  the 
soul  as  a  spiritual  substance,  one,  simple,  indi- 
visible, indestructible,  immortal.  Side  by  side 
with  this,  and  largely  under  the  influence  of  the 
theory  of  knowledge,  there  developed  "  Empirical 
Psychology,"  i.e.,  the  analysis,  mainly  introspective, 
of  the  stream  of  consciousness,  without  reference 
to  a  soul-substance — in  short,  a  "  psychology 
without  a  soul."  But  consciousness,  thus  studied, 
is  still  burdened  with  the  problem  of  its  relation  to 
the  body.  It  is  still  an  immaterial  Somewhat  in 
a  dualistic  scheme,  a  mysterious  appendage  of  a 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    153 

physical  body.  Some  propose  to  surmount  this 
dualism  by  the  desperate  expedient  of  denying 
consciousness  outright  and  leaving  only  the  body. 
The  mind  is  the  brain,  they  say.  Others  try  to 
cling  to  the  double  book-keeping  device  and  advocate 
psycho-physical  parallelism.  Some,  like  William 
McDougall,  in  Body  and  Mind,  return  to  the  soul- 
substance  concept.  Bergson  identifies  the  soul 
with  the  cosmic  elan  vital.  Most  recently,  the 
behaviourists  have  tried  to  escape  from  the  tangle 
by  means  of  the  concept  of  "  behaviour,"  but  the 
extremists  among  them,  like  John  B.  Watson,  are 
stultifying  themselves  by  refusing  to  include  con- 
sciousness in  their  theory  of  behaviour,  and  by 
professing  to  believe  that  psychology  as  the  science 
of  consciousness  will  go  the  way  of  pseudo-sciences 
like  alchemy  and  astrology. 

This  is  where  we  stand  now.  The  "  soul "  (as 
substance)  is  gone.  "  Consciousness,"  if  not  going, 
is  threatened.  Between  the  "  unconscious  "  of  the 
psycho-analysts  and  the  "  behaviour "  of  the 
behaviourists,  what  is  the  outlook  for  psychology  ? 
Can  we  discern  anywhere  the  promise  of  a  movement 
towards  synopsis  ? 

5.  Yes,  we  can  discern  such  a  promise.  At  any 
rate,  it  is  as  if  the  stage  were  all  set  for  a  synoptic 
movement  to  begin.  We  have  no  right,  perhaps, 
to  prophesy  that  such  a  movement  will  actually 


154     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

take  place  merely  because  all  the  conditions  seem 
eminently  favourable,  but  we  have  a  right  at  least 
to  point  out  what  these  favourable  conditions  are. 
(a)  In  the  first  place,  there  is  common  ground  in 
the  almost  universal  acceptance  of  evolution  as  the 
context  within  which  a  theory  of  "  finite,"  i.e., 
animal  or  human,  mind  must  be  framed.  The 
evolutionary  point  of  view  is  shared  by  nearly  all 
psychologists.  Even  those  whose  method  is  analytic 
and  introspective  will  not  deny  that  minds  fall 
within  the  realm  of  the  living,  and  that  they  pre- 
suppose, so  far  as  empirical  evidence  goes,  the 
existence  of  living  bodies  in  good  working  order. 
There  really  seems  no  good  ground  for  denying  that 
the  ingestion  of  food  is  as  essential  to  "  mental," 
as  it  is  to  "  bodily,"  work,  or  that  efficiency  in 
thinking  and  willing  requires  a  varied  equipment 
of  bodily  responses  and  adjustments,  technically 
called  "  motor-sets,"  ready  for  use  as  occasion 
demands.  Minds,  then,  presuppose  living  bodies, 
both  in  the  order  of  evolution,  and  as  conditions  of 
their  existence  and  development  here  and  now. 
Behaviouristic  psychologists  certainly,  one  and  all, 
are  found  to  stress  this  fact  and  even  to  exaggerate 
its  importance.  And  philosophers,  on  their  side, 
whether  they  be  realists  or  idealists,  appear  ready 
to  agree  on  this  point,  even  to  the  very  language  in 
which  they  express  it.  To  a  realist,  like  Professor 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    155 

S.  Alexander,  mind  is  a  new  quality  or  level  of 
existence  in  the  order  of  evolution,  which  comes 
into  being  with  living  bodies  possessing  a  nervous 
system.  It  is  a  "  perfection  "  supervening  upon 
the  appropriate  bodily  conditions.  Precisely  the 
same  is  the  verdict  of  an  idealist,  like  Bernard 
Bosanquet,  who  recalls  Hegel's  account  of  an 
actuelle  Seele  as  "  the  perfection  of  a  living  body 
highly  trained  and  definitely  habituated."  Con- 
scious behaviour,  they  all  agree,  cannot  be  construed 
as  the  guidance  of  the  bodily  machine  by  a  separate 
soul  somehow  attached  to  it.  The  most  original 
or  creative  thinking  is  only  made  possible  by,  and 
grows  out  of,  the  whole  organized  system  built  up 
through  the  accumulation  of  conscious  and 
unconscious  doings  and  experiences. 

(6)  Secondly,  the  concept  of  "  behaviour " 
signalizes  a  return  to  a  more  concrete  study  of 
mind.  It  is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  closely  akin 
to  Aristotle's  concept  of  mind,  and  definitely 
emancipates  us  from  the  abstractions  which  the 
dualistic  separation  of  body  and  mind  inflicts  upon 
us.  A  behaviourist,  whose  programme,  like  that 
of  E.  B.  Holt,  includes  the  study  of  man  as  "  work- 
ing or  playing,  reading,  writing,  or  talking,  making 
money  or  spending  it,  constructing  or  destroying, 
curing  disease,  alleviating  poverty,  comforting  the 
oppressed,  and  promoting  one  or  another  sort  of 


156     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

orderliness,"  cannot  be  accused  of  neglecting 
anything  that  goes  to  make  a  man's  mind  what  it 
is.  It  is  all  to  the  good  that  human  activities 
should  not  here  be  described  in  parallel  languages, 
viz.,  on  the  one  side,  in  physiological  terms  as  more 
or  less  complex  responses  to  more  or  less  complex 
stimuli,  and,  on  the  other,  in  terms  of  purely  "  in- 
ward "  feelings,  thinkings,  willings.  The  concept 
of  behaviour,  so  we  would  deliberately  and  em- 
phatically suggest,  has  precisely  the  great  merit 
that  it  permits  us  to  use  the  terms  of  ordinary  life, 
the  total  meaning  of  which  combines  within  itself 
the  experience  of  the  observer  describing  others 
and  the  experience  of  the  subject  expressing  his 
feelings  and  thoughts.  The  meaning,  e.g.,  of 
"  playing  "  is  derived  hardly  less  from  seeing  others 
play  than  from  playing  oneself.  Neither  way  of 
experience  by  itself  is  adequate  or  sufficing.  One 
has  to  do  or  suffer  a  thing,  in  order  to  "  know  what 
it  feels  like,"  to  realize  it  in  terms  of  one's  own 
sensations  of  movement  with  their  attendant 
pleasure  or  pain.  This  helps  one  to  interpret  what 
one  observes  others  doing  or  undergoing.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  observation  of  others  in  turn 
helps  one  to  interpret  the  meaning  of  one's  own 
feelings  and  sensations.  It  supplies  that  fuller 
understanding  which  comes  from  realizing  what 
one's  own  conduct  looks  like  to  others  and  what 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    157 

feelings  and  judgments  it  evokes  in  them.  The 
total  fact  requires  the  fusion  of  both  points  of  view. 
In  short,  we  are  welcoming  the  concept  of  be- 
haviour as  delivering  us  from  the  body-soul  dualism 
which  compels  us,  in  effect,  instead  of  studying 
the  living  creature  as  a  whole  in  its  world  as  a  whole, 
to  split  up  our  study  of  it  into  physiology  on  the 
one  hand  and  introspective  psychology  on  the  other. 
How  far  behaviourists  will  accept  this  use  of  their 
concept  is  for  the  moment  doubtful.  E.  B.  Holt 
comes  nearest  to  the  position  for  which  we  are  here 
pleading.  He  makes  it  very  clear,  in  discussing,  e.g., 
the  behaviour  of  a  bee,  that  it  will  not  do  to  analyze 
its  behaviour  merely  into  separate  reflexes  answering 
to  successive  stimuli,  whilst  wholly  ignoring  the 
total  pattern  of  its  behaviour,  viz.,  that  it  is 
collecting  honey  and  carrying  it  home  to  the  hive. 
The  physiological  side  here  is  duly  subordinated, 
but  when  Holt  turns  to  human  behaviour,  it  is  not 
equally  clear  how  far  he  recognizes  and  incorporates 
the  fact,  that  an  agent's  experience  of  the  action 
which  he  performs  is  different  from  the  outside 
observer's  experience  who  is  merely  looking  on. 
He  writes  as  if  the  analysis  were  always  conducted 
from  an  observer's  point  of  view.  So,  indeed,  it 
must  be  with  the  bee,  for  the  bee  cannot  tell  us 
what  her  doings  feel  like.  But,  every  word  of  our 
language  which  expresses  human  activity  has,  as 


158     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

we  said  above,  a  meaning  in  the  full  understanding 
of  which  the  knowledge  which  we  get  by  observation 
of  others  and  the  knowledge  which  we  have  as 
agents  must  be  joined  and  fused.  From  extreme 
behaviourists,  like  J,  B.  Watson,  who  reject  the 
language  of  consciousness  altogether,  we  must  at 
this  point  part  company.  They  impoverish  the 
concept  of  behaviour  too  much  to  serve  our  synoptic 
purpose. 

(c)  Even  the  current  controversy  about  "  con- 
sciousness "  and  "  introspection  "  brings  grist  to 
our  mill.  Watson  argues  as  if  there  were  no 
alternative  between  introspection,  "  looking  into 
one's  own  mind,"  and  external  observation  of 
another's  bodily  behaviour,  and  he  would  hold 
psychology  strictly  to  the  latter  method.  But 
this  appears  to  overlook  the  fact  that  language 
serves  for  self -expression,  and  that  we  constantly 
make  statements  of  psychological  import  about 
ourselves,  without  first  going  through  the  elaborate 
procedure  of  "  turning  our  attention  inwards  upon 
ourselves "  and  "  making  an  object  of  our  own 
minds."  When  we  say  that  we  feel,  believe,  doubt, 
think,  want,  intend,  etc.,  we  are  expressing  and 
communicating  our  minds,  and  need  no  intro- 
spection for  doing  so.  The  meaning  which  these 
verbs  have  comes  to  them,  not  merely  from  our 
watching  the  behaviour  of  others  or  hearing  their 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    159 

language,  but  from  our  own  experience  of  what  it 
is  to  do  these  things.  In  short,  self-expression  by 
language,  the  meanings  of  which,  coming  from  two 
sources,  are  subject  to  a  twofold  check,  is  a  form  of 
behaviour  which  emancipates  the  study  and  descrip- 
tion of  behaviour,  among  human  beings  at  least, 
from  exclusive  restriction  to  the  observer's  point 
of  view. 

Psychologists  rarely  acknowledge  this  fact  in  so 
many  words,  though  they  always  acknowledge  it 
by  acting  upon  it.  The  explicit  recognition  of  it, 
we  submit,  permits  and  demands  the  expansion  of 
the  concept  of  behaviour  so  as  to  include  the  normal 
language  of  consciousness.  There  is,  if  this  be 
admitted,  no  need  to  force  upon  all  psychological 
terms  a  meaning  which  is  either  technically  physio- 
logical, or  else  intelligible  only  from  an  outside 
observer's  point  of  view.  With  this  correction, 
the  obvious  objections  which  at  present  He  against 
the  concept  of  behaviour,  as  advocated,  e.g.,  by 
J.  B.  Watson,  cease  to  apply  and  "behaviour" 
may  well  become  the  most  useful  term  in  the 
psychologist's  vocabulary. 

(d)  Consciousness,  then,  if  we  are  right,  can  be 
incorporated*^!  behaviour,  but  we  need  not  claim, 
therefore,  that  all  behaviour  is  conscious.  On  the 
contrary,  the  concept  of  behaviour,  taken  as  covering 
a  range  within  which  conscious  behaviour  forms  the 


160     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

higher  levels,  makes  it  possible,  not  only  to  take 
full  account  of  all  the  habits  and  automatisms, 
acquired,  or  innate,  which  consciousness  presupposes, 
but  also  to  include  the  "  unconscious "  of  the 
psycho-analysts.  The  way  in  this  direction  has  been 
shown  by  E.  B.  Holt's  Freudian  Wish,  which 
restates  Freud's  principle  in  a  most  original  way, 
making  it  available  for  the  psychology  of  the 
normal  mind  instead  of  merely  for  that  of  the 
pathological  mind.  What  the  psycho-analyst  is 
studying  is  persistent  tendencies  to  behaviour 
which,  though  powerful  in  themselves,  are  so 
strongly  repressed  by  dominant  behaviour-systems 
more  powerful  than  they,  that  they  do  not  appear 
in  consciousness  at  all,  except  in  a  disguised  form 
in  dreams,  or  by  misfits  and  derangements  of 
conscious  behaviour  indicative  of  hidden  conflict. 
(e)  And,  lastly,  there  is  a  convergence  of  philo- 
sophical theories  from  very  different  sides  upon  a 
view  of  mind  which  may  fitly  round  off  our  tale. 
A  creature's  behaviour  is  relative  to  its  environment, 
is  a  "  function  "  of  it,  in  the  technical  language 
which  some  psychologists  have  borrowed  from 
mathematics.  Vice  versa,  the  environment  is 
relative  to  the  creature  :  its  world  is  what  it  responds 
to,  what  it  takes  account  of  in  its  behaviour.  A 
dog's  philosophy,  so  it  has  been  said,  would  be  : 
What  smells  is  real ;  what  does  not  smell  is  nothing. 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    161 

This  is  probably  unfair  to  the  dog  who,  we  would 
gladly  believe,  loves  his  master  for  more  than  his 
smell,  even  if  he  recognizes  him  chiefly  by  his  smell. 
But  the  principle  is  sound  :  a  creature's  world  is 
denned  by  what  it  responds  to,  including,  of  course, 
conscious  response  where  that  occurs.  Its  world 
is  a  selection  out  of  the  wider  universe,  a  "  cross- 
section."  Creatures  with  a  keener  sense  of  smell 
than  ours,  for  example,  have  to  that  extent  a  wider 
world  than  we.  The  same  principle  applies  to  the 
human  world.  The  world  in  which  each  one  of  us 
lives  is  defined  for  him  by  his  responses  and  interests. 
This  is  quite  a  familiar  fact  recognized  in  every 
comparison  of  mind  with  mind.  One  man  is  aware 
of,  and  loves  to  contemplate,  study,  and  enjoy, 
things  of  the  very  existence  of  which  most  of  his 
neighbours  are  unaware.  Or,  even  when  they  are 
aware  of  the  same  things,  one  man's  understanding 
of  them  may  be  far  completer  than  another's. 
Or,  again,  one  man's  range  of  interests  may  com- 
prehend and  include  those  of  many  lesser  minds ; 
take,  e.g.,  the  mind  of  a  Leonardo,  or  a  Goethe,  or 
a  Napoleon.  The  point  is  not  affected,  even  if 
with  some  of  the  English  realists,  like  Alexander, 
Laird,  and  others,  we  insist  on  distinguishing 
between  the  mental  acts  of  apprehending  and  the 
non-mental  objects  apprehended.  For  it  will  still 
remain  true  that,  when  we  rank  and  estimate  minds, 


162     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

be  it  in  respect  of  their  scientific  knowledge,  be  it 
for  skill  in  business,  or  wisdom  in  statesmanship, 
be  it  merely  for  wit  or  humour  in  conversation, 
we  value,  not  their  acts  of  apprehension  in  the 
abstract,  but  the  worlds  to  which  they  show  them- 
selves responsive.  A  mind,  in  fact,  as  we  said 
earlier  in  the  lecture,  is  a  world,  when  we  think  of 
what  habitually  engages  its  interests,  elicits  its 
feelings  and  purposes,  is  the  object  of  its  thoughts 
and  actions.  On  some  such  concept  of  mind  a 
behaviourist,  like  Holt  (from  whom,  above,  we 
borrowed  the  term  "  cross-section),  and  an  idealist, 
like  Bosanquet,  appear  to  converge.  Of  course, 
"  cross-section "  must  be  interpreted  to  cover 
past  experiences  as  well  as  present,  and  like- 
wise anticipations  of  future  events  and  plans  to 
meet  them.  It  must  cover  equally  the  behaviour 
of  a  thinker  who  focuses  the  experiences  and 
studies  of  a  lifetime  into  the  writing  of  a  book, 
and  that  of  a  general  who  plans  a  campaign.  A 
mind,  according  to  its  range  and  power,  focuses 
within  itself  a  more  or  less  varied  section  of  the 
universe.  Consciousness,  according  to  its  degree, 
makes  for  wider  and  also  more  systematic  respon- 
siveness. Above  all,  it  seems  that  only  where 
there  is  consciousness  do  we  find  a  measure  of  self- 
direction,  of  freedom,  initiative,  experiment  and 
exploration  in  practical  construction  and  invention, 


THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF  MIND    163 

creative  originality  in  the  search  for  truth  and  for 
beauty.  Activities  such  as  these  are,  by  every 
usage  of  the  term,  credited  to  "  mind,"  but  they 
are  "  behaviour,"  too — behaviour  which  is  con- 
scious— indeed,  which  is  of  that  intensely  conscious 
kind  described  by  Bergson  as  the  "  spear-point " 
of  creative  advance.  In  some  such  way  as  this  we 
must  conceive  the  mind  of  man,  of  which  we  spoke 
in  the  first  lecture  as  moulding  Nature  to  its  needs 
and  using  Nature's  materials  and  forces  in  the 
building  up  of  its  civilization. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  Alexander,  S.     Space,  Time  and  Deity.     (Macmillan  &  Co., 

1920.) 

2.  Bergson,  H.       Matter    and    Memory.       (George    Allen    & 

Unwin,  1913.) 

3.  Bergson,  H.       Creative     Evolution.      (Macmillan     &    Co., 

1914.) 

4.  Bosanquet,  B.    The  Principle  of  Individuality  and   Value. 

(Macmillan  &  Co.,  1912.) 

5.  Burnet,  John     "  The  Socratic  Doctrine  of  the  Soul  "  (Pro- 

ceedings of  the  British  Academy,  Vol.  VII.) 

6.  Crawford,  The  Psychic  Structures  at  the  Goligher  Circle. 

W.  J.  (J.  M.  Watkins,  1920.) 

7.  Hoernle',  Studies  in  Contemporary  Metaphysics.     (New 

R.  F.  A.  York  :    Harcourt,  Brace  &  Co.    London  : 

Kegan  Paul,  1920.) 

8.  Holt,  E.  B.        The     Concept     of    Consciousness.     (George 

Allen  &  Co.,  1914.) 

9.  Holt,  E.  B.        The  Freudian   Wish.     (Henry  Holt  &  Co., 

IQI5-) 

10.  Merz,  J.  T.        A    Fragment    on    the    Human    Mind.     (W. 
Blackwood  &  Sons,  1919.) 


164     MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

11.  McDougall,  W.Body  and  Mind.     (Methuen  &  Co.,  1911.) 

12.  Richardson,       Spiritual  Pluralism  and  Recent  Philosophy. 
C.  A.  (Camb.  Univ.  Press,  1919.) 

13.  Tansley,  A.  G.   The   New  Psychology.         (George   Allen   & 

Unwin,  1920.) 

14.  Watson,  J.  B.    Psychology  from   the   Standpoint    of  a   Be- 

haviourist.    (J.  B.  Lippincott,  1919.) 


For  behaviourism  in  its  extremest  form  the  reader  may 
consult,  in  addition  to  No.  14,  Professor  Watson's  very  illuminat- 
ing paper  under  the  title,  "  Is  Thinking  merely  the  Action  of 
Language  Mechanisms  ?  "  in  the  British  Journal  of  Psychology, 
Vol.  XI,  Part  I.  Behaviourism  in  its  broader  and  more  philo- 
sophical form  is  best  studied  in  No.  9.  The  concept  of  mind 
as  a  "  cross-section  "  of  the  universe  is  taken  from  No.  8,  ch.  ix. 
Otherwise,  this  book  should  be  used  with  caution,  as  no  longer 
representing  Professor  Holt's  views.  No.  13  gives  a  convenient 
account  of  the  influence  of  psycho-analysis  on  the  theory  of  mind . 
It  avoids  the  sensationalism  of  which  psycho-analytic  literature 
is  sometimes  guilty.  The  realistic  theory  of  mind  as  a  tissue  of 
mental  acts  is  most  fully  set  forth  in  No.  i.  But  the  reader 
might  also  refer  to  Professor  John  Laird's  Problems  of  the  Self 
(Macmillan  &  Co.,  1915)  and  A  Study  in  Realism,  ch.  viii  (Camb. 
Univ.  Press,  1920).  Nos.  2,  3,  n  and  12  may  be  studied  for 
views  of  mind  at  variance  with  the  view  adopted  in  this 
lecture  as  best  fitting  into  a  synoptic  pattern.  This  latter  view 
has  been  greatly  influenced  by  No.  4,  especially  chs.  ii-v.  No. 
7,  ch.  viii,  may  also  be  consulted.  No.  10  traces  in  an  interesting 
manner  the  way  in  which  the  world  of  mind  develops.  No.  6 
is  the  most  recent  record  of  the  attempts  of  an  English  scientist, 
by  profession  a  lecturer  on  engineering,  to  apply  the  methods  of 
physical  science  to  the  study  of  materializations.  The  same 
investigator's  The  Reality  of  Psychic  Phenomena  (J.  M.  Watkins, 
1917),  and  Experiments  in  Psychical  Science  (ibid.,  1919)  may  be 
referred  to  for  earlier  reports.  It  must,  however,  be  pointed 
out  that  all  Dr.  Crawford's  books  are  popular  expositions  rather 
than  scientific  treatises,  and  that  the  experiments  of  other 
investigators  with  the  Goligher  circle,  made  after  Dr.  Crawford's 
death,  have  led  to  negative  results  and  thrown  a  great  deal  of 
doubt  on  the  adequacy  of  his  methods.  For  wider  reading  on 
all  the  lines  of  evidence  commonly  summed  up  as  "  psychical 
research,"  and  for  their  bearing  on  our  theories  of  the  soul, 
Students  will  be  well  advised  to  go  straight  to  the  Proceedings 


of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research  (London  :  Francis  Edwards). 
They  must  judge  for  themselves  how  far  they  will  adopt  the 
very  positive  and  confident  conclusions  put  forward,  e.g.,  by 
Sir  Oliver  Lodge  in  The  Survival  of  Man  and  in  Raymond,  or  by 
Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle. 


LECTURE  V 

RELIGION  AND  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  " 


"  The  feeling  of  the  Divine  is  justified,  as  we  shall  see  ;  yet 
not  all  opinions  based  on  it  are  justifiable." — Varisco,  The  Great 
Problems. 


IN   our  last    lecture,  greatly  daring,  we  had 
ventured  to  suggest  that  the  concept  of  "  be- 
haviour "    might    prove    elastic    enough    to 
incorporate  within  itself  "  consciousness  "  as  well 
as  "  the  unconscious,"  and  to  overcome,  also,  the 
dualism  which  splits  the  unity  of  living  man  into  an 
"  inward  "  stream  of  experiences  and  an  "  outward  " 
body — a  ghost-soul  mysteriously  linked  to  a  piece 
of  physical  mechanism. 

It  is,  however,  only  right  that  we  should  acknow- 
ledge that  there  are  philosophers  and  psychologists 
of  the  first  rank  who  still  advocate  the  contrary 
view  that  body  and  mind  are  absolutely  distinct 
entities.  Thus,  Bergson,  partly  on  general  meta- 
physical grounds,  partly  on  evidence  drawn  from 
disturbances  of  memory,  argues  that  the  function 

1 66 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     167 

of  brain  and  body  is  solely  to  supply  motor- 
mechanisms  through  which  the  mind  can  act  on 
the  environment ;  and  that  "  the  mind  overflows 
the  brain,"  i.e.,  that  much  goes  on  in  the  mind  for 
which  there  is  no  physical  basis,  or  counterpart, 
in  the  brain. 

Again,  McDougall  occupies  an  exceptional  posi- 
tion among  psychologists  in  maintaining  that  body 
and  soul  are  distinct  and  that  the  soul  can  con- 
tinue to  exist  by  itself  after  its  separation  from 
the  body.  In  his  Body  and  Mind  he  offers  a  varied 
assortment  of  arguments  in  support  of  this  view. 
Among  them  the  most  striking  is  his  declaration 
that  it  is  hardly  conceivable  that  without  the 
belief  in  immortality  "  whole  nations  could  rise 
to  the  level  of  an  austere  morality,  or  even  maintain 
a  decent  standard  of  conduct."  Hence,  he  regards 
it  as  extremely  desirable  that  psychology  should 
furnish,  if  possible,  scientific  support  for  the  belief 
that  the  soul  survives  bodily  death.  And  he 
quotes  with  apparent  approval  Tylor's  dictum,  in 
Primitive  Culture,  that  "  animism  "  (which  is  the 
technical  name  for  the  theory  of  the  soul  as  an 
entity  independent  of  the  body)  is  the  groundwork 
of  religion  from  the  savage  up  to  civilized  man. 
'  The  future  of  religion  is  intimately  bound  up  with 
the  fate  of  animism." 

We  have,  h^re,  but  another  instance  of  a  linkage 


168    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

of  ideas  which,  reaching  across  all  abstract  boundary 
lines,  demands  synoptic  treatment.  By  an  effort  of 
abstraction  we  can  limit  our  concepts  to  narrowly- 
defined  fields  and  uses,  and  shut  our  eyes  to  all 
problems  which  press  in  from  beyond  our  boundary- 
lines.  But  such  problems  do  not  cease  to  exist 
because  we  may  choose  methodically  to  ignore  them. 
Life  and  literature  keep  forcing  them  again  and 
again  on  our  notice,  and  when  we  have  once  noticed 
them  we  cannot,  except  at  the  price  of  intellectual 
dishonesty,  refuse  to  make  the  attempt  to  adjust 
our  different  accounts  of  different  fields  to  each 
other  and  to  form  them  into  a  coherent  whole. 

Our  final  task,  therefore,  in  this  present  lecture 
is  to  bring  religious  experience  and  thought  within 
the  scope  of  our  survey.  Let  us  take  stock  of  what 
appear  to  be  the  chief  movements  of  thought  in 
contemporary  philosophy  of  religion,  especially  as 
they  bear  on  the  central  problem  of  all,  viz.,  the 
existence  of  God. 

2.  If  we  would  be  fair  to  our  subject,  we  must 
confess  at  once,  and  bear  in  mind  throughout,  that 
religion  is  far  too  vast  a  topic  to  be  adequately 
handled  within  the  limits  of  time  of  a  single  lecture. 
If  we  want  to  say  anything  worth  saying  at  all,  we 
must  select  and  concentrate,  and,  in  order  to  do  so, 
we  must  needs  ignore  many  problems  which 
religion  raises  and  be  content  on  many  others  to 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     169 

take  for  granted,  without  debate,  positions  which 
would  have  to  be  debated  in  a  fuller  treatment. 
The  problem  which  lies  at  the  heart  of  religion  is 
obviously  the  problem  of  God.1  But  before  we 
can  approach  this  problem  directly,  there  is  some 
preliminary  spade-work  to  be  done.  Even  at  the 
risk  of  seeming  dogmatic,  we  have  to  lay  down, 
briefly,  certain  positions  and  to  establish  certain 
distinctions,  in  order  to  appreciate  correctly  the 
significance  of  recent  contributions  to  the  philo- 
sophy of  religion. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  almost  inevitable  that  to 
all  of  us  who  are  brought  up  in  the  tradition  of 
Christianity,  the  word  "  religion  "  should  suggest 
exclusively  the  Christian  religion.  Whatever  is  most 
vivid  in  the  meaning  of  "  religion  "  for  each  of  us 
must  needs  be  drawn  from  that  religion  with  the 
creed  and  ritual  of  which  we  are,  by  education  and 

1  Or  gods  ;  but  we  may  claim  that  the  simplification  is  per- 
missible in  view  of  the  evolution  of  religion  from  polytheism  to 
monotheism,  and  the  almost  universal  consent  that  mono- 
theistic religions  are  "  higher,"  i.e.,  exhibit  the  true  nature  of 
religion  more  fully.  The  Buddhism  of  Gautama  is  the  only  great 
historic  religion  which  has  in  it  nothing  analogous  to  a  personal 
God  or  gods.  It  may  be  questioned,  for  this  reason,  whether 
it  is  strictly  a  religion  at  all.  But,  as  is  explained  further  on 
in  the  lecture,  it  is  impossible  to  frame  any  definition  of  religion 
which  can  be  rigidly  applied,  and  Buddhism  is  certainly  more 
than  merely  a  moral  theory  inculcating  a  manner  of  life.  Like 
all  religion,  it  bases  its  teaching  of  salvation  on  a  definite  theory 
of,  and  attitude  towards,  the  universe  as  a  whole,  and  its  inexor- 
able law  of  Karma  has  for  a  Buddhist's  life  and  thought  much  of 
the  meaning  which  God  has  for  a  Christian's. 


170    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,    AND  GOD 

participation,  in  some  degree  familiar.  Yet  the 
philosopher  of  religion,  though  in  a  Christian 
milieu  he  will  draw  his  readiest  illustrations  from 
Christianity,  cannot  accept  any  limitation  of 
religion  to  Christianity.  Even  though  he  may 
agree  that  Christianity  is  the  highest  and  truest  of 
religions,  he  cannot  identify  himself  with  the 
theological  ardour  which  would  divide  humanity 
into  believers  and  unbelievers,  Christians  and 
heathens.  He  cannot  make  it  his  business  to  take 
sides  in  the  quarrels  about  orthodoxy  and  hetero- 
doxy which  have  disrupted  Christendom  into 
hostile  sects  and  denominations.  It  is  not  even 
part  of  his  task  to  prove  to  the  world  at  large  that 
Christianity,  in  some  one  or  other  form  of  it,  is  the 
only  true  religion,  and  that  all  other  religions  are 
false  and  their  votaries  destined  to  eternal  damna- 
tion. It  is  not  in  any  such  sense  as  this  that  the 
philosopher  comes  forward  as  a  "  defender  of  the 
faith."  What,  then,  is  the  relation  of  philosophy 
to  religion  and,  further,  to  theology?  Briefly, 
we  must  answer  that  philosophy,  with  the 
help  of  anthropology,  psychology,  and  the  history 
of  religions,  takes  a  comparative  survey  and 
recognizes  in  religion  a  phenomenon  that  is 
universal  in  the  human  race  at  every  stage  of  its 
civilization  and  in  every  period  of  its  history.  At 
the  same  time,  philosophy  recognizes  also  that 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     171 

religion  occurs  in  different  types  or  forms,  and  that 
each  type  occurs  in  manifold  degrees  of  complete- 
ness. And,  lastly,  such  a  survey,  guided  by  the 
clue  of  evolution,  enables  the  student  also  to  dis- 
tinguish more  primitive  from  more  advanced, 
cruder  from  more  refined,  types.  The  facts  supply 
their  own  standard  for  grading ;  they  exhibit  the 
essence  of  religion  more  or  less  perfectly,  and  the 
most  perfect  examples,  here  as  elsewhere,  must 
guide  the  philosopher  in  his  interpretation  of  the 
whole  range  of  the  phenomenon.  The  one  thing 
that  philosophy  ought  not  to  do  is  to  estimate,  or  rank, 
religion  by  a  non-religious  standard. 

Every  religion  has  as  its  centre  a  creed,  and  this 
is  true  even  of  those  religions  in  which  much  more 
importance  is  attached  to  the  due  performance  of 
ritual  than  to  the  performer's  belief  in  the  creed. 
Even  though  the  community  may  not  exact  from  the 
individual  more  than  conformity  in  ritual,  yet  the 
ritual,  in  the  last  resort,  presupposes  the  creed ; 
and  "  every  creed,"  as  a  recent  writer  has  put  it, 
"  is  a  view  of  the  universe,  a  theory  of  man  and  the 
world,  a  theory  of  God."  In  short,  religion  always 
includes  theology,  in  however  rudimentary  a  form, 
and  all  the  more  developed  theologies  owe  much  to 
philosophy,  are  indeed  philosophical  systems  on  a 
religious  basis.  But,  for  this  very  reason,  there  is 
a  clear  difference  between  theology  and  philosophy 


172    MATTER,   LIFE,  MIND,    AND  GOD 

of  religion.  Although  theology  might  be,  and 
occasionally  has  been,  studied  in  an  attitude  of 
detached  and  unbelieving  curiosity,  it  is  normally 
the  central  point  of  the  professional  training  for  the 
ministry  or  priesthood  of  a  given  religion.  The 
theologian  stands  on  a  particular  denominational 
basis.  He  is  not  only  religious,  but  the  member 
of  a  particular  religious  community,  or  church, 
and  it  is  the  tradition  and  doctrine  of  his  church 
which  he  sets  himself  systematically  to  expound 
and  defend,  accepting  it  sincerely  as  the  truth  with 
which  his  religion  stands  or  falls. 

Philosophy  of  religion,  by  contrast,  is  not  tied  to 
a  particular  religion,  but  takes  religion  as  such  for 
its  province.  It  tries  to  understand  religion  in  all 
its  varied  forms  and  degrees,  to  appreciate  its  place 
and  function  in  human  civilization,  and  in  the 
individual.  Above  all,  it  tries  to  evaluate  religion, 
to  justify  it  as  a  reasonable  attitude  for  reasonable 
beings.  In  this  general  sense,  philosophy  has  been, 
and  still  is,  a  "  defender  of  the  faith." 

3.  This  last  statement  may  well  provoke  objec- 
tion. And  this  is,  perhaps,  our  best  opportunity 
for  considering  shortly  the  diverse  tendencies  in 
modern  life  and  thought  which  are  hostile  to 
religion  in  any  form  in  which  it  is  more  than 
"  morality  tinged  with  emotion."  As  a  statement 
of  fact,  indeed,  our  assertion  is  fairly  secure. 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     173 

Almost  all  the  great  philosophers  of  modern  times 
have  taken  religion  seriously.  Without  neces- 
sarily defending  all  the  details  of  the  Christian,  or 
of  any  other,  theology,  they  have  yet  defended 
religion  as  such.  They  have  tried  to  show  that 
the  nature  of  the  universe  sustains  and  justifies,  in 
principle,  the  religious  attitude.  But,  as  a  state- 
ment of  how  philosophy  ought  to  deal  with  religion, 
our  assertion  will  be  challenged  by  all  who  hold  that, 
so  far  from  justifying  religion,  it  is  the  function  of 
philosophy  to  emancipate  the  human  mind  from  its 
bondage  to  religion.  There  has  been  growing, 
throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  a  steady 
counter-current  of  revolt  against  religion,  which 
has  reflected  itself  in  sharp  criticism  of  every 
philosophy  of  religion  which  does  not  either  identify 
religion  with  morality  or,  else,  treat  it  as  a  super- 
stition to  be  overcome  by  the  advance  of  civiliza- 
tion and  science.  The  roots  of  this  movement  are 
spread  so  widely  through  every  province  of  human 
thought  and  activity,  that  its  advocates  have  some 
excuse  for  their  claim  to  be  the  heralds  of  the  future, 
the  leaders  of  "  progress."  The  philosophically 
most  powerful  representative  of  this  tendency  is 
"  positivism,"  and  in  Comte's  law  of  the  three 
stages  of  human  thought — theological,  meta- 
physical, positive — it  has  found  the  classical  formula 
for  its  interpretation  of  history  and  for  its  gospel  of 


174    MATTER,   LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

progress.  The  emancipation  of  science  from 
theology,  of  which  we  took  note  throughout  the 
preceding  lectures,  though  its  beginnings  date  back 
beyond  positivism,  yet  received  from  it  a  fresh 
impetus.  Everywhere  positivism  stands  for  the 
rejection  of  all  beliefs  in  the  supernatural  as  mere 
survivals  of  pre-scientific  modes  of  thought.  History, 
anthropology,  psychology  are  studied  from  a 
naturalistic  angle,  and  then  in  turn  invoked  to 
reinforce  the  positivistic  conclusion  about  religion. 
The  very  fact  that  to  the  anthropologist  the  beliefs 
of  primitive  peoples  which  he  studies  are  nothing 
but  superstitions  and  myths,  and  their  ritual  full 
of  magic,  opens  his  eyes  to  many  survivals  of 
myth  and  magic  in  the  symbols  and  language  of 
his  own  religion.  Thus  a  process  of  detachment 
and  scepticism  has  set  in.  Religion  in  all  its  forms 
is  approached,  not  as  something  which  is  being 
believed,  accepted,  lived,  by  the  student,  but  as  an 
object  for  aloof  intellectual  curiosity.  All  human 
beliefs,  it  appears,  can  be  studied  as  facts,  in  entire 
abstraction  from  the  question  of  their  truth.  Die 
Wissenschaft  kennt  keine  Werturteile 1  is  the  classic 
maxim  for  this  attitude.  Indeed,  if  the  student 
begins  by  regarding  primitive  forms  of  religion  as 
obviously  false,  this  judgment  will  inevitably 

1  It  is  not  the  business  of  science  to  pass  judgments  of  value 
(scil.,  on  the  objects  which  it  studies). 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     175 

extend  to  the  higher  forms,  too.  If  religion  began 
as  superstition,  why  should  it  not  end  as  such  ? 
Similarly,  psychology,  working  on  Mr.  A.  J.  Balfour's 
principle,  "  Scratch  a  reason  and  you  will  find  a 
cause,"  shows  that  beliefs  are  commonly  induced 
by  a  variety  of  non-rational  causes,  and  may  persist, 
not  only  in  the  absence  of  objective  reasons  for 
them,  but  in  the  face  of  patent  counter-evidence  or 
inherent  improbability.  Even  concerning  meta- 
physical beliefs,  one  of  the  greatest  living  meta- 
physicians, Mr.  F.  H.  Bradley,  has  remarked  that 
"  metaphysics  is  nothing  but  the  finding  of  bad 
reasons  for  what  we  believe  upon  instinct."  True, 
he  goes  on,  at  once,  to  add  that  "  to  find  these 
reasons  is  itself  an  instinct,"  nor  does  its  origin  in 
instinct  necessarily  imply  that  a  belief  is  false. 
Still,  the  reaction  against  religion  persists,  gaining 
no  little  strength  from  the  ill-judged  insistence  of 
the  orthodox  on  the  literal  acceptance  of  much  in 
the  traditional  doctrine  which  deserves  to  give  way 
to  better  knowledge  or  finer  feeling.  The  cause  of 
religion  has  suffered  at  the  hands  of  its  friends  by 
their  attempt  to  retain  much  bad  science  in  the 
bible,  and  much  bad  logic  in  theology. 

That  the  positivists  themselves  should  have 
founded  a  church  of  the  "  religion  of  humanity," 
which  enlisted  the  enthusiasm  of  some  of  the  finest 
spirits  of  the  age,  like  John  Stuart  Mill,  is  no  doubt  a 


176    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

tribute  to  the  strength  of  the  demand  for  religion  in 
human  nature.  But  what  is  most  significant  about 
the  new  religion  is  the  point  of  its  challenge  to  the 
old.  For  the  ineffective  love  of  a  supernatural,  or 
even  non-existent,  God  it  seeks  to  substitute  the 
effective  love  of  actual  men  and  women.  From 
preoccupation  with  the  salvation  of  his  soul  in  a 
life  after  death  it  seeks  to  turn  man  to  the  service 
of  his  kind  in  this  life.  It  aims  at  making  the 
energy  of  religion  available  in  the  cause  of  human 
progress,  for  the  fight  against  disease,  poverty, 
ignorance,  crime.  It  preaches  a  crusade  against 
remediable  ills  in  the  cause  of  a  better  future  for  the 
human  race  on  this  earth.  Thus,  positivism  in  its 
opposition  to  the  supernatural  is  as  characteris- 
tically the  philosophy  of  a  scientific  age,  as  in  its 
moral  fervour  for  the  amelioration  of  the  human 
lot  it  is  the  philosophy  of  a  philanthropic  age. 
The  "  meliorism  "  of  William  James  and  the  prag- 
matists  echoes  the  similar  attitude  of  Mill.  Both 
point  to  the  existence  of  evil  as  incompatible  with 
the  perfection  of  the  universe,  be  that  perfection 
predicated  in  the  name  of  the  God  of  theology  or 
in  the  name  of  the  Absolute  of  philosophy.  Both 
declare  that  the  belief  in  perfection  must  corrupt 
the  moral  effort  at  its  source.  Is  it  not  illogical 
to  try  to  better  a  world  which  is  already  as  good  as 
it  can  be  ?  If  this  is  the  best  of  all  possible  worlds, 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     177 

morality  is  meaningless,  and  either  resignation,  or 
the  taking  of  "  moral  holidays,"  is  the  only  logical 
course.  On  the  traditional  view,  the  existence  of 
evil  presents  an  insoluble  theoretical  problem.  On 
the  meliorist  view,  there  is  no  problem  of  evil  except 
the  practical  one,  how  best  to  do  away  with  it.  This 
moralistic  strain  of  thought  has  exercised  an 
influence  upon  religious  thought  far  beyond  the 
borders  of  positivism  proper.  It  has  revived  the 
old  problem  of  whether  God's  goodness  and  wisdom 
are  compatible  with  his  omnipotence,  and  a  philo- 
sopher like  James  Ward,  a  theologian  like  Dean 
Rashdall,  are  found  inclining  to  a  "  limited " 
Deity — finite  in  power,  infinite  in  goodness — as 
the  most  reasonable  escape  from  the  horns  of  the 
dilemma. 

This  is  undoubtedly  one  of  the  gravest  problems 
which  the  philosophy  of  religion  has  to  face.  For 
a  full  discussion  of  it  this  is  not  the  place.  But 
the  outline  of  an  answer  to  the  melioristic  view  may 
be  briefly  sketched,  (i)  In  the  first  place,  the 
evidence  of  religious  experience  is  decisively  against 
the  attempt  of  meliorists  to  shrink  religion  to  a 
moralistic  pattern,  or  to  fix  the  attitude  of  uncom- 
promising hostility  to  evil  as  the  exclusive  attitude 
of  religion.  The  saintliest  of  men  have,  as  a  rule, 
risen  beyond  the  antagonism  of  good  and  evil,  and 
yet  there  has  been  no  weakening  of  their  efforts  or 


178    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

their  influence  for  righteousness,  as  the  records  of 
their  lives  abundantly  show.  To  quote  but  one 
recent  example.  The  Bengali  saint  and  mystic, 
Ramakrishna,  said  towards  the  end  of  his  life  : 
"  I  have  now  come  to  a  stage  of  realization  in  which 
I  see  that  God  is  walking  in  every  human  form 
and  manifesting  Himself  alike  through  the  saint  and 
the  sinner,  the  virtuous  and  the  vicious.  Therefore 
when  I  meet  different  people,  I  say  to  myself : 
'  God  in  the  form  of  the  saint,  God  in  the  form  of 
the  sinner,  God  in  the  form  of  the  unrighteous  and 
God  in  the  form  of  the  righteous  !  '  He  who  has 
attained  to  such  realization  goes  beyond  good  and 
evil,  above  virtue  and  vice,  and  realizes  that  the 
Divine  is  working  everywhere."1  Examples  such 
as  this  might  be  multiplied  indefinitely.  They 
show  that  the  moralists  in  religion  commonly 
ignore  the  mystical  attitude  altogether.  (2)  The 
concepts  of  God's  love,  of  redemption,  atonement, 
forgiveness  of  sins,  take  us,  not  indeed  towards  any 
condonation,  still  less  towards  any  encouragement, 
of  evil,  yet  in  a  direction  very  different  from  the 
meliorist's  hope.  They  do  not  weaken  the  springs 
of  moral  effort,  but  they  warn  us  not  to  overestimate 
their  strength.  They  teach  us — and  here,  surely, 

1  Gospel  of  Ramakrishna,  p.  88.  See  also  Max  Mdller,  The 
Life  and  Sayings  of  Ramakrishna.  I  owe  quotation  and  refer- 
ence to  J.  B.  Pratt's  The  Religious  Consciousness  (Macmillan  & 
Co.,  1920),  pp.  132-3. 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     179 

they  are  at  one  with  common  experience — not  to 
expect  the  complete  disappearance  of  evil  through 
the  complete  perfecting  of  human  nature  by  human 
effort.  The  roots  of  good  and  evil  lie  very  deep  in 
human  nature  and  also  very  close  together.  The 
moral  problem  presents  itself  afresh  to  each  genera- 
tion, and  in  terms  which  change  with  every  new 
development  in  civilization,  with  new  powers  and 
new  opportunities  giving  rise  to  new  desires  and 
altered  human  relationships.  For  all  a  parent's 
efforts  to  hand  on  the  hard-won  moral  heritage  to 
his  children  by  precept  and  example,  he  knows 
well  enough  that  in  the  main  they  must  acquire 
the  knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  by  which  they  will 
actually  live,  through  their  own  trial  and  error. 
Eritis  sicut  deus,  scientes  bonum  et  malum.1  The 
"  knowledge "  here  in  question  must  be,  for  us 
human  beings,  not  a  mere  spectator's,  but  an 
agent's  knowledge — a  knowledge  gained  by  the 
good  or  evil  which  we  personally  feel  and  do.  Again, 
self-control  conies  only  with  self-knowledge,  and 
self-knowledge  is  never  complete  so  long  as  we 
constantly  find  ourselves  in  new  situations  to  which 
in  temperament,  judgment,  and  purpose  we  may 
prove  unequal.  These  hazards  seem  inherent  in 
human  life,  and  no  meliorist  has  yet  shown  a  way 

1  Ye  shall  be  like  unto  God,  knowing  good  and  evil.    Cf. 
Goethe's  Faust. 


180    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

to  eliminate  them.  And  even  if  they  could  be 
eliminated,  how  many  of  us  would,  with  Huxley, 
be  willing  to  surrender  the  management  of  our  own 
lives  and  be  regulated  like  a  clock,  on  condition  of 
never  going  wrong  ? 

It  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  this  whole  reaction 
against  religion  is,  as  a  movement  in  the  Christian 
world,  a  reaction  against  Christianity.  But  the 
meaning  of  "  Christianity  "  is  not  simple  or  single. 
It  may,  e.g.,  mean  the  bare  gospel-record  of  the 
teaching  of  Christ ;  it  may  mean  the  whole  body  of 
doctrine  built  upon  that  foundation  by  the  Church  ; 
it  may  mean  the  Church  as  an  organization,  the 
acts  and  policies  of  which,  quite  apart  from  its 
spiritual  teachings,  make  it  a  force  in  human  affairs. 
If  the  positivist  reaction  was  provoked  in  part  by 
certain  metaphysical  and  moral  features  of  Christian 
theology,  it  was  also  directed  against  the  Church  as 
a  powerful  instrument  of  dominion  over  the  lives 
and  minds  of  men.  Symptomatic  of  this  is  the 
fact  that  the  word  "  laique  "  has  taken  on,  in  the 
sociological  theories  of  religion  of  the  Durkheim 
school,  the  meaning  of  "  anti-clerical,"  reflecting 
the  antagonism  of  church  and  state  in  the  political 
life  of  France. 

At  the  same  time,  the  trial  of  the  war  has  made 
it  clear  that  perhaps  the  profoundest  reaction  of 
men  against  the  Christianity  of  the  churches  is  due 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     181 

to  the  perception  of  the  fact  that  the  churches 
have,  on  the  whole,  failed  to  make  the  teaching  of 
Christ  an  effective  force  in  the  lives  of  Christian 
communities.  The  most  obvious  criticism  which 
an  intelligent  non-European  will  invariably  make 
upon  the  white  man's  civilization  is  that,  by  and 
large,  Christians  do  not  practise  what  they  preach, 
and  do  not  seriously  try  to.  And  who  will  con- 
fidently deny  the  charge  ?  Religion,  whatever  else 
it  may  be,  is  not  departmental.  It  claims  to 
control  and  pervade  the  whole  of  life.  It  is  not  an 
affair  of  special  moods  or  exceptional  moments. 
It  is  not  intended  to  be  shelved  on  weekdays  and 
exhibited  on  Sundays  by  going  through  a  con- 
ventional routine.  It  is  a  thing  to  live  by,  always. 
Now,  this  being  so,  it  is  a  simple  question  to  ask  : 
How  far  are  our  policies  and  institutions,  political 
or  economic,  ordered  with  any  definite  reference 
to  the  Christian  ideals  which  we  profess  ?  The 
facts,  surely,  are  rather  that  since  we  have 
abandoned  the  mediaeval  ideal  of  a  theocratic  state 
on  earth,  both  politics  and  economics  in  their 
public  or  communal  aspects  have  emancipated 
themselves  from  the  control  of  religious  ideals,  the 
sphere  of  which  in  consequence  has  shrunk  to  the 
individual's  private  conduct.  Religion  is,  no  doubt, 
the  direct  relation  of  the  individual  to  God,  yet 
it  does  not  follow  that  the  social  order  which  so 


182    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

largely  determines  the  individual's  aims,  duties, 
and  standards  of  judgment,  is  indifferent  and 
negligible.  Yet,  this  is  exactly  what  the  social 
order  is  all  too  often  treated  by  the  churches  as 
being.  The  most  vital  and  burning  problems 
which  at  the  present  day  divide  men's  minds  centre 
precisely  round  the  values  for  which  the  existing 
order  stands.  Yet,  in  the  main,  the  churches, 
which  claim  to  be  our  guides  and  guardians  in 
questions  of  value  affecting  the  whole  conduct  of 
our  lives,  stand  timidly  aloof  and  their  leaders  but 
too  often  utter  only  benevolent  exhortations,  from 
which  neither  they  nor  their  hearers  trouble  to  draw 
the  practical  consequences. 

That  the  churches  should,  as  is  commonly  acknow- 
ledged, be  losing  their  hold,  and  that  much  genuinely 
religious  life  should  be  alienated  from  them  and  seek 
an  outlet  through  other  channels  or  languish  for 
lack  of  an  outlet,  is  in  the  circumstances  not  a  matter 
for  wonder.  But,  in  spite  of  this,  the  philosopher, 
taking  a  comprehensive  survey  of  human  experience 
and  thought,  has  little  difficulty  in  discerning  the 
central  place  which  "  religion  " — a  term  which  hi 
this  assertion  means  something  more  fundamental 
than  assent  to  this  or  that  theology,  or  membership 
of  this  or  that  church — holds  in  normal  human  life. 
Whatever  the  fluctuations  in  the  fortunes  of 
churches  may  be,  or,  again,  the  quickenings  and 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     183 

slackenings  in  the  energy  of  men's  religious  life  itself, 
philosophy  renders  to  religion  the  service  of  making 
the  need  of  it  and  the  justification  for  it  clear 
to  reflective  consciousness. 

4.  We  have  followed  the  negative  argument 
long  enough.  Let  us  now  turn  to  the  positive  side 
and  consider  the  procedure  of  philosophy  in  its 
defence  of  religion. 

We  said  above  that  philosophy  has  to  "  evaluate  " 
religion.  The  phrase  may  have  suggested  philosophy 
sitting  in  the  judgment-seat,  and  religion  coming 
before  it  to  assert  its  own  value  and  accept  philo- 
sophy's verdict  on  its  claim.  But,  whence  is  the 
supposed  philosophical  judge  to  take  his  own 
standard  for  measuring  the  justice  of  that  claim  ? 
Philosophy  has  nothing  to  philosophize  with  except 
what  human  experience  offers  to  it  as  material  for 
reflective  synthesis  or  synopsis.  There  is,  indeed, 
a  formal  principle  by  which  the  philosopher  is 
guided,  viz.,  the  principle  of  consistency  or 
coherence.  But  the  matter  to  be  moulded  in  this 
form  consists  of  all  the  wealth  which  experience 
presents  to  him  who  would  "  think  things  together." 
This  implies  at  once  that  the  existence  of  religion 
is  one  of  the  cardinal  data  for  a  philosophical 
synopsis.  Whatever  choice  philosophy  may  have 
in  the  way  in  which  it  will  fit  religion  into  its  edifice, 
it  has  no  choice  between  accepting  and  rejecting  it 


184    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

Philosophy  is  not  free  to  omit  religion  ;  it  simply 
cannot  leave  religion  out. 

But  more :  not  only  must  it  include  religion 
among  its  data,  but  it  must  do  so  substantially  on 
religion's  own  terms,  and  at  its  own  valuation. 
It  must  concede  the  central  place  of  religion.  Its 
synopsis  would  be  untrue  to  the  proportions  of  the 
data,  if  it  did  not  put  in  the  centre  the  things  which 
are  in  the  centre.  That  religion  is  thus  central  or 
focal  is  a  commonplace  among  all  students  of  it. 
Psychologically,  it  is  admitted  on  all  hands, 
it  is  not  "  departmental."  It  is  not  an  affair  of 
the  intellect  alone,  or  the  will  alone,  or  the  feelings 
alone,  though  any  one  of  these  three  may  be 
dominant  in  the  religion  of  a  given  individual  or  a 
given  age.  In  principle,  religion  involves  the 
whole  man  :  at  its  best,  it  is  itself  a  synthesis,  a 
unification,  a  harmonious  stabilization  of  all  sides 
of  his  nature.  And  for  this  reason,  again,  it  is,  in 
principle,  not  one  departmental  interest  or  activity 
among  others  :  at  its  best,  it  pervades  all  interests 
and  sweeps  them  into  its  orbit.  This  being  its 
nature,  it  is  best,  perhaps,  to  follow  those  writers 
who  speak  of  religion  as  an  "  attitude  "  rather  than 
as  an  "  experience."  For  "  experience  "  suggests 
too  much  that  religion  is  merely "  subjective," 
mere  inward  feeling,  mere  thought  without  an 
objective  basis.  "  Attitude,"  without  ceasing  to 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     185 

connote  the  subjective  side,  yet  suggests  also 
activity,  response,  and  thus  implies  the  objective 
side,  the  universe,  to  which  religion  is  the  response. 
Moreover,  "  attitude  "  brings  out,  too,  that  religion 
is  more  than  a  theory  :  it  is  a  way  of  life.  It 
includes,  indeed,  always  a  theory,  or  theology, 
more  or  less  reasoned  and  explicit,  but  it  is  first 
and  always  more  than  merely  intellectual  assent  to 
a  theory.  And,  again,  whilst,  no  doubt,  the  theory 
aims  at  being  true  as  tested  by  logical  canons,  and 
must  be  recast  if  it  fails  to  meet  that  test,  yet  the 
truth  of  religious  theory  is  not  really  separable 
from  the  success  of  the  religious  attitude.  Religion 
claims  to  "  work,"  to  be  known  by  its  fruits.  This 
"  pragmatic  "  character  of  religion,  too,  is  nowadays 
conceded  by  most  of  the  students  of  it.  Fruitful- 
ness  and  moral  effect  are  vouchers  of  truth.  Or, 
perhaps,  we  should  rather,  with  W.  E.  Hocking, 
use  the  pragmatic  principle  negatively  :  that  which 
does  not  work  is  not  true,  and  say  of  any  theory 
which  "  lowers  the  capacity  of  men  to  meet  the 
stress  of  existence,  or  diminishes  the  worth  to  them 
of  what  existence  they  have,"  that  it  is  somehow 
false,  and  that  we  have  no  peace  until  it  is  remedied. 
That  religion  works  in  the  way  here  suggested  by 
Hocking  cannot  well  be  doubted  by  anyone  who 
honestly  looks  at  the  facts.  Here  is  the  verdict 
of  the  most  recent  student  of  the  religious  conscious- 


186    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

ness,  Professor  J.  B.  Pratt : — "  When  one  compares 
the  deeply  religious  and  spiritual  person  with  the 
best  and  bravest  of  those  who  are  not  religious, 
one  sees,  it  must  be  confessed,  that  the  former 
possesses  something  which  the  others  lack.  It  is 
not  that  he  is  any  better  morally  than  his  non- 
religious  brother,  nor  any  more  appreciative  of 
beauty  and  love,  nor  any  braver.  It  is,  rather,  that 
he  has  a  confidence  in  the  universe  and  an  inner 
joy  which  the  other  does  not  know.  He  is,  perhaps, 
no  more  at  home  in  this  world  than  the  other 
(perhaps  he  is  not  so  much  at  home  here),  but  he 
seems  more  at  home  in  the  universe  as  a  whole. 
He  feels  himself  in  touch,  and  he  acts  as  if  he  were 
in  touch,  with  a  larger  environment.  He  either 
has  a  more  cosmic  sense  or  his  attitude  towards 
the  cosmos  is  one  of  larger  hope  and  greater  con- 
fidence. Besides  this,  or  as  a  result  of  this,  he  has 
an  inner  source  of  joy  and  strength  which  does  not 
seem  dependent  on  outer  circumstance,  and  which 
in  fact  seems  greatest  at  times  when  outer  sources 
of  strength  and  promise  fail.  He  is,  therefore,  able 
to  shed  a  kind  of  peace  around  him  which  no  argu- 
ment and  no  mere  animal  spirits  and  no  mere 
courage  can  produce." 

We  see  now  more  clearly  in  what  sense  philosophy 
defends  and  justifies  religion  and  accepts  it  at  its 
own  valuation.  But  we  may  throw  light  upon  the 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     187 

same  point  from  another  side.  If  philosophy,  it 
may  be  said,  defends  religion,  it  should  at  least 
define  what  it  is  that  it  defends.  Now  this  problem 
of  defining  religion  is  one  which  has  given  no  end 
of  trouble.  Pratt  refers  to  no  less  than  forty-eight 
definitions  from  as  many  different  writers,  and 
rounds  off  the  list  by  adding  two  fresh  c  les  of  his 
own.  The  reason  for  the  difficulty  is  very  obviously 
that  religion  is  so  multiform  in  type  and  degree, 
that  a  formula  which  would  adequately  reflect  its 
variations  would  be  intolerably  complex.  On  the 
other  hand,  any  compact  formula  will,  in  proportion 
to  its  compactness,  fit  part  of  the  facts  only,  and 
compel  us  to  reject  as  irreligious  whatever  it  does 
not  include.  And  there  is  a  deeper  difficulty 
which  has  induced  one  of  the  foremost  English 
writers  on  religion  at  the  present  day,  Professor 
C.  C.  J.  Webb,  to  declare  that  any  definition  of 
religion  is  impossible,  viz.,  the  difficulty  that  it  will 
always  be  either  circular  or  irrelevant :  the  defining 
phrase  will  either  surreptitiously  slip  in  the  term 
to  be  defined,  or  else  miss  out  precisely  what 
differentiates  religion  from  other  human  attitudes. 
But,  if  religion  is  thus  indefinable  and  unique,  a 
consequence  follows  which  has  not  always  been 
observed.  It  is  this,  that  the  philosopher  who  sets 
out  to  discuss  religion  must  himself  be  religious. 
For  else,  to  put  it  bluntly,  he  will  simply  not  know 


188    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

what  he  is  talking  about.  The  outsider's  point  of 
view  alone  is  here  clearly  inadequate.  Whether  a 
definition  of  i  sligion  be  possible  or  not,  no  definition 
can  enable  anyone  to  understand  what  religion  is 
who  is  not  acquainted  with  it  to  some  extent  by 
being  religious.  Unless  the  student  knows  what 
the  term  "  religion "  means  by  being  religious, 
there  is  no  other  attitude  in  which  he  can  stand  to 
religious  language,  belief,  and  cult,  than  the  external 
attitude  in  which  we  all  commonly  stand  to  religions 
other  than  our  own.  Let  a  Protestant,  brought 
up  in  ignorant  contempt  of  "  popish  idolatry," 
watch  a  Roman  Catholic  service — the  candles, 
bells,  beads,  incense,  genuflexions  and  other 
ministrations,  the  repetition  of  lengthy  formulae  in 
unintelligible  Latin,  the  appeals  to  saints,  etc.— 
and  as  he  stands  there,  detached,  aloof,  unsharing, 
he  may  find  it  utterly  unintelligible  that  the  worship- 
pers take  part  with  reverence,  and  gain  obvious 
peace  and  comfort.  A  fortiori,  the  mental  distance 
is  even  greater  when  a  European  watches  the 
ceremonies  of  savages,  involving,  it  may  be,  animal 
sacrifices,  grotesque  dances,  self-torture,  or  indecent 
rites.  If  it  is  hard  for  those  brought  up  in  one 
religion  to  understand  another,  it  is  doubly  hard  for 
those  who  are  irreligious  to  understand  those  who 
are  religious.  Religion,  then,  cannot  be  intelligently 
discussed  except  by  those  who  are  acquainted  with 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     189 

it   from   within,    though   this   acquaintance   must 
needs  be  with  some  particular  type  of  religion,  in 
conformity  with  the  student's  whole  intellectual 
outlook  and  social  heritage.     And  this  brings  us 
back  to  our  point :    if  being  religious  is  the  only 
basis  on  which  we  can  philosophize  about  religion 
with  genuine  insight,  and  if  being  religious  means 
living  in  a  definite  attitude  towards  the  universe — 
an  attitude  engaging  all  sides  of  our  nature,  per- 
vading all  our  activities,  and  including  a  core  of 
belief  or  theory  about  the  character  of  the  universe 
and  its  disposition  towards  us — then  we  can  under- 
stand  why   philosophy,    so   far   from   seeking   to 
destroy  religion  as  being  unreasonable,  has  sought 
to  defend  its  reasonableness  by  exhibiting  reflec- 
tively its  central  position  in  man's  life  as  a  "  life  of 
reason."     Whoever   knows   "  from  within "   what 
religion  is,  cannot  thereafter  either  build  his  philo- 
sophy without  it  or  treat  it  as  anything  but  central. 
Negatively,  this  appears  even  in  the  attitude  of 
pessimism  which  is  essentially  an  inverted  type  of 
religion,  the  cri  du  cceur  of  those  who  have  failed 
to  find,  or  to  maintain,  the  attitude  of  confidence 
and  trust  in  the  universe,  and  who  thence  proclaim 
either  that  human  existence  has  nothing  of  value 
to  justify  it,  or  else  that  our  values,  in  a  universe 
indifferent  to  them,  are  not  destined  to  endure. 
For  the  pessimist  this  negative  result  is  as  central 


190    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

in  his  whole  scheme  of  thinking  as  is  the  opposite 
estimate  for  any  philosophy  which  bases  itself  on 
religion  triumphant.  In  either  case,  as  Webb 
says,  it  is  "  with  Religion  that  the  interest  in 
Reality  as  a  whole,  which  is  the  characteristic 
interest  of  philosophy,  first  takes  shape  in  the 
human  mind." 

5.  In  the  technical  language  of  philosophy,  the 
position  which  we  have  now  reached  has  been 
acknowledged  and  expressed  in  one  of  two  ways. 
One  way  is  to  assert  that  religion  is  metaphysical, 
i.e.,  that  metaphysics,  as  the  explicit  effort  to  frame 
a  reflective  theory  of  the  universe  as  a  whole  by  the 
thinking  together  of  all  sides  of  human  experience, 
must  take  from  the  religious  experience,  or  attitude, 
its  most  important  clue  to  the  nature  of  the  whole. 
Religious  feeling  and  thought  must  be  accepted  as, 
in  principle,  not  fancy,  or  make-believe,  but  bona 
fide  discovery  or  revelation  of  the  real  character 
of  the  real  world.  The  other  way,  which  leads  to 
the  same  goal,  is  to  be  found  in  the  handling  by 
modern  philosophers  of  the  old  arguments  for  the 
existence  of  God.  The  lesson  which  we  have 
learnt  from  the  destructive  criticisms  of  the  tra- 
ditional arguments  by  Hume  and  Kant,  is  that 
these  arguments  failed  precisely  because  they  tried 
to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  God  without 
appealing  to  the  evidence  of  the  religious  attitude 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     191 

itself.  The  tactics  of  the  traditional  arguments 
were  undoubtedly  due  to  the  distinction  between 
revelation  and  reason.  Religion  being  regarded  as 
fundamentally  based  on  revelation,  i.e.,  on  the 
self-revelation  of  God,  the  problem  took  the  form 
of  reaching  the  same  assurance  of  God's  existence 
by  the  road  of  reasoning,  either  from  the  evidence 
of  design  in  Nature,  or  from  the  existence  of  the 
world  as  requiring  a  cause,  or  from  the  assumed 
perfection  of  the  Supreme  Being.  None  of  these 
three  arguments  was  free,  in  consequence,  to 
appeal  to  religion  itself,  for  that  would  have  been 
an  appeal  to  revelation,  narrowly  interpreted  as 
an  appeal  to  the  Holy  Scriptures  and  the  authori- 
tative teaching  of  the  Church.  By  contrast,  the 
argument  of  modern  philosophy  of  religion  does  not 
assume,  as  its  basis,  this  distinction  between 
revelation  and  reason  (or,  in  another  form  of  it, 
between  revealed  and  natural  religion).  Hence  it 
does  not  attempt  to  prove — if  "  proof  "  is  the 
proper  word — the  existence  of  God  without  an 
appeal  to  religious  experience.  And,  whilst  appeal- 
ing to  this  experience,  and,  indeed,  regarding  it  as 
the  only  really  relevant  evidence,  it  also  enlarges 
the  scope  of  it  far  beyond  "  revelation,"  so  as  to 
include,  in  effect,  all  that  is  valuable  in  the  old 
appeal  to  "  reason."  The  modern  argument  has 
learned  much  from  the  methods  of  Kant's 


192    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

"  postulates  of  the  moral  reason,"  for  a  postulate 
is  essentially  a  belief  held,  or  a  theory  affirmed,  as 
implicit  in  the  maintenance  of  an  "  attitude " 
towards  the  universe  in  the  sense  which  we  have 
above  given  to  the  term  "  attitude."  To  put  it 
in  a  nutshell :  we  know  God  through  religion,  and 
there  is  no  other  way  of  knowing  him.  It  is  not 
that  we  are  religious  because  we  have  become 
convinced  antecedently,  from  other  sources,  that 
there  is  a  God.  Nor  do  we  gain  our  conviction  by 
an  exercise  of  the  "  will  to  believe,"  if  that  means, 
Pascal-wise,  taking  a  gambler's  chance  on  the 
possibility  of  there  being  a  God.  If  there  is  a 
"  venture  of  faith  "  which  outruns  demonstration 
and  yet  is  not  sapped  by  doubt,  it  is  because  in 
religion  we  live  by  a  conviction  which  the  very 
habit  of  living  by  it  re-enforces  and  sustains,  and 
which  justifies  itself  by  a  stability  of  outlook  and 
response  unshaken  by  the  vicissitudes  of  human 
fortune,  and  by  a  strength  equal  to  every  call 
upon  it. 

The  result  of  this  re-orientation  of  the  philosophy 
of  religion,  in  respect  of  the  problem  of  God's 
existence,  is  far-reaching.  It  means,  as  Webb 
puts  it,  that  "  the  great  question  for  the  thinker 
about  religion  is  not  whether  God  exists,  but  rather 
what  God  is."  Or,  to  put  it  differently,  to  doubt 
God's  existence  is,  at  bottom,  nothing  but  to  doubt 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "    193 

whether  the  universe,  in  its  real  nature,  is  such  as 
to  justify  the  religious  attitude  towards  it ;  whether 
it  deserves  to  be  worshipped.     Even  more  strikingly 
the  new  technique  appears  in  Hocking's  attempt 
to  exhibit  what  it  is  in  our  experience  of  the  universe 
that  we  mean  by  "  God."     In  the  very  form  in 
which  he  thus  puts  the  problem,  it  is  taken  for 
granted    that    "  experience    is    essentially    meta- 
physical," that  it  consists  in  the  "  discovery  "  and 
"  recognition  "  of  a  real  object.     Proof  of  God's 
existence  is,   thus,   not  a  process   of  building  a 
precarious  speculative  bridge  from  the  world  we 
see  to  its  unseen  author,  but  a  making  plain  what, 
in  a  sense,  is  there  and  possessed  by  us  all  the  time, 
but  what,  for  all  its  presence,  we  may  fail  securely 
to  grasp  or  clearly  to  discern.     We  need  argument 
because  our  hold  on  reality  is  variable.     We  live, 
we  feel,  we  think,  now  on  the  surface  lightly,  now 
seriously  and  strenuously  in  the  depths.     This  is 
why  the  assurance  which  religion  as  a  living  attitude 
carries  with  it  and  demonstrates  in  deeds,  needs 
also  to  be  raised  to  the  level  of  reflective  certainty, 
at  least  by,  and  for,  those  minds  who,  having  once 
begun  to  think  things  together,  are  consumed  by  a 
cognitive  restlessness  which   only   the   success   of 
their   synoptic    endeavours   can    still.     Thus,    the 
argument  does  not  start  with  a  definition  of  God 
and  then  search  the  world  of  experience  for  an 
13 


194    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

object  which  conforms  to  the  definition :  it  starts 
with  the  world  of  experience  and,  pushing  through 
half-truths  and  partial  impressions  to  its  real 
nature,  finds  there  the  meaning  of  "  God." 

6.  But  we  have  anticipated  in  thus  focusing 
our  attention  upon  the  problem  of  the  existence  of 
God.  This  problem  is  symptomatic  of  the  revival 
of  theism,  which  is  the  most  recent,  as  it  is  also  the 
most  striking,  movement  in  contemporary  philo- 
sophy of  religion.  Among  its  literature,  W.  E. 
Hocking's  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience 
is  written  fresh  from  the  life,  as  it  were  ;  the  record 
of  the  philosophical  pilgrimage  of  a  deeply  religious 
mind.  C.  C.  J.  Webb's  Gifford  Lectures,  especially 
Vol.  I,  on  God  and  Personality,  develop  a  theistic 
philosophy  in  closest  contact  with  the  detailed 
structure  of  Christian  theology.  Professor  A.  S. 
Pringle-Pattison's  Gifford  Lectures  on  The  Idea  of 
God  in  the  Light  of  Recent  Philosophy  reach  a  theistic 
conclusion,  not  so  much  through  an  interpretation 
of  theological  thought,  as  through  a  criticism,  on 
the  one  hand,  of  naturalistic  and  agnostic  tendencies 
in  modern  philosophy,  and  of  pantheistic  tendencies 
on  the  other.  The  significance  of  this  movement 
will  be  the  more  readily  appreciated  when  we  recall 
that,  not  quite  thirty  years  ago,  F.  H.  Bradley,  in 
Appearance  and  Reality,  whilst  declaring  that 
nothing  could  be  more  certain  than  religion,  yet 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     195 

also  proclaimed  the  God  of  theology  to  be  "  riddled 
with  contradictions."  Nor  did  Bradley  hold  out 
any  hope  that  by  further,  and  better,  thinking  we 
might  remove  these  contradictions,  for  the  chief 
of  his  theses  was  that  all  thinking  is  from  its  very 
nature  bound  to  be  self -contradictory ;  bound  to 
pursue  a  consistency  which  it  must  ever  fail  to 
attain. 

The  effect  of  this  doctrine  might  well  have  been 
to  discourage  all  philosophical  effort,  had  not 
Bradley  qualified  it  by  saying  also  that  we  cannot 
help  thinking  and,  indeed,  that  we  can  think  satis- 
factorily enough  for  all  "  practical "  purposes. 
At  any  rate,  since  Bradley's  book  appeared,  philo- 
sophical activity  in  all  directions  has  been  singularly 
varied  and  vigorous,  and  not  least  so  on  the  subject 
of  religion.  There  are  at  least  three  distinct 
tendencies :  (i)  There  is  the  theistic  tendency, 
already  noted,  which  attempts  a  philosophical 
defence  of  belief  in  a  personal  God.  (2)  There  is  the 
tendency  to  emphasize,  not  so  much  God  and 
personality,  as  the  perfection,  or  value,  of  the 
universe.  Hoffding's  definition  of  religion  as  "  faith 
in  the  conservation  of  value  "  is  a  typical  expression 
of  this  view,  which  for  us  is  best  represented  by 
Bosanquet's  Gifford  Lectures  on  The  Principle  of 
Individuality  and  Value  and  The  Value  and  Destiny 
of  the  Individual.  (3)  And  there  is  the  curious 


196    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

doctrine  of  "  Deity "  which  S.  Alexander  has 
recently  put  forward,  as  part  of  his  "  realistic  " 
system,  in  Space,  Time  and  Deity,  and  which  presents 
familiar  motifs  in  a  highly  original  combination. 

Let  us  glance  at  each  of  these  three  tendencies, 
remembering  that  within  the  time  at  our  disposal 
we  can  do  no  more  than  pick  out  a  central  point 
or  two. 

(i)  The  strength  of  theism,  as  also  its  difficulties, 
lie  in  its  interpretation  of  religion  by  social  analogies 
and,  consequently,  its  emphasis  on  the  personality 
of  the  worshipper  and  the  personality  of  God. 
The  chief  reason  why  metaphysicians  of  our  second 
group  shrink  from  the  theistic  position  is  just  that 
they  feel  unable  either  to  rank  human  personality 
so  high,  or  to  conceive  God  so  anthropomorphical ly. 
For  God  as  a  person  must  needs  be  pictured  to  the 
imagination  as  a  man  writ  large,  and  as  we  ascribe 
to  him  such  human  attributes  as  love,  knowledge, 
will,  power,  we  are  ever  conscious  of  alternative 
dangers,  both  equally  fatal.  For,  on  the  one  hand, 
we  feel  driven  to  assert  that  all  these  attributes 
exist  in  God  in  a  perfection  utterly  beyond  anything 
we  know  in  man.  Yet,  the  more  we  stress  this 
transcendent  perfection,  the  more  do  our  terms 
threaten  to  become  meaningless.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  more  vividly  concrete  we  seek  to  make 
their  meaning,  the  more  do  we  shrink  God  to  the 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     197 

dimensions  of  the  human  patterns  with  which  we 
are  familiar.  However,  we  do  not  wish  now  to 
exploit  these  dialectics.  The  fact  stands  that,  in 
proportion  as  the  worshipper  feels  himself  responding 
to  a  power  which  responds  to  him,  his  religion  takes 
on  the  theistic  form,  even  though  it  acknowledges 
more  than  one  God,  or  a  devil  as  well  as  a  god. 
Almost  all  the  higher  religions  employ  the  language 
of  social  intercourse  at  its  most  intimate  to  render 
the  worshipper's  sense  of  his  closeness  to,  and  trust 
in,  God.  To  know  God,  and  to  be  known  by  Him  ; 
to  love  God,  and  to  be  loved  by  Him — is  not  the  best 
of  Christianity  summed  up  in  these  simple  and 
familiar  phrases  ?  God  as  father,  God  as  judge, 
God  as  King — always  a  social  relationship  supplies 
the  pattern  on  which  the  worshipper's  attitude  is 
moulded.  Webb  admits  that  the  concept  of  God 
as  a  person  is  of  very  recent  origin  even  in  Christian 
thought,  and  that  Christianity  is  the  only  one  of 
the  great  historical  religions  the  theology  of  which 
culminates  in  that  concept.  But  he  also  argues 
that  this  is  "  the  natural  culmination  of  a  tendency 
traceable  in  all  Religion,"  and  with  skill  and 
sympathy  he  sets  himself  to  show  that  the  chief 
concepts  of  the  Christian  religion — sin,  forgiveness, 
justice,  sacrifice,  union  with  God — gain  both  in 
intelligibility  and  in  moral  power  when  God  is 
conceived  as  a  person.  Thus,  e.g.,  "  to  regard  Sin 


198    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

as  an  offence  against  a  personal  authority,  and  still 
more  to  regard  it  as  an  affront  to  a  loving  Father, 
is  a  more  intelligible  and  a  more  ethically  significant 
way  of  thinking  about  it  than  it  is  to  conceive  it 
after  the  analogy  of  a  physical  defilement  or  an 

automatic  mechanism."     And  both  love  and  know- 
\ 

ledge,  when  applied  by  religion,  suggest  an  intimacy 
of  union  in  which  the  distinction  of  persons  adds 
richness  of  content  and  is  so  little  an  obstacle  to 
union,  that  we  may  well  come  near  to  Spinoza's 
language  about  our  love  towards  God  being  the 
very  love  with  which  God  loves  himself.  For 
"  God  in  us  "  is  as  essential  to  the  full  religious 
attitude  as  "  God  above,  or  beyond,  us." 

The  same  social  character  of  theism  is  developed 
in  a  very  different  and  strikingly  interesting  way  by 
Hocking.1  After  emphasizing  that  religion  in  its 
higher  forms  grows  into  a  sense  of  God  as  the 
"  intimate,  infallible  associate,"  the  "  companion  " 
whose  constant  presence  brings  peace  of  mind  and 
happiness,  he  describes  the  "  original  source  of  the 
knowledge  of  God  "  as  "  an  experience  of  not  being 
alone  in  knowing  the  world,  and  especially  the  world 
of  Nature."  This  clue  he  follows  up  into  an  analysis 

1  Perhaps  Hocking's  argument  owes  something  to  a  position 
which  Royce  outlined  in  his  early  work  on  The  Religious  Aspect 
of  Philosophy.  But,  if  so,  Hocking  has  re-thought  and  re- 
stated the  argument  in  a  thoroughly  original  way,  and  the  direct 
affiliation  to  Berkeley  which  it  had  in  Royce,  has  dropped  wholly 
into  the  background  in  Hocking. 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "     199 

of  our  knowledge  of  Nature  as  a  world  actually, 
or  potentially,  common  to  ourselves  and  others, 
and  of  our  knowledge  of  other  minds  as  minds  also 
knowing,  or  interested  in,  just  these  objects  which 
we  know  and  are  interested  in  ourselves.  And  over 
this  bridge  of  the  social  character  of  knowledge  he 
seeks  to  travel  to  the  conclusion,  that  in  knowing 
Nature  we  are  in  social  contact  with  the  great 
Other  Mind  which  communicates  itself  to  us  through 
Nature,  and  which  to  religion  reveals  itself  in  the 
character  of  God. 

(2)  The  second  type  of  philosophy  of  religion 
does  occasionally  express  itself  in  language  which, 
torn  from  its  context,  may  seem  to  identify  it  with 
straightforward  theism.  Thus  Bosanquet  ends  his 
chapter  on  "  The  Religious  Consciousness  "  with  the 
words  :  "  Religion  establishes  the  infinite  spirit 
because  it  is  continuous  with  and  present  in  the 
finite — in  love  and  in  the  will  for  perfection.  It 
does  not  need  to  appeal  to  facts  of  separate  being, 
or  to  endeavour  to  demonstrate  them.  It  is  an 
experience  of  God,  not  a  proof  of  him."  This  last 
sentence  illustrates  admirably  the  change  in  the 
point  of  view  of  modern  philosophy  of  religion  which 
we  had  pointed  out  above.  But  "  God "  for 
Bosanquet  in  this  passage  is  not  the  personal 
Spirit  of  the  theist,  but  rather  the  impersonal,  or 
super-personal,  Reality  in  its  character  of  perfection. 


200    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

The  theist's  God  is  characterized  by  Bosanquet, 
in  a  passage  immediately  preceding  the  one  just 
quoted,  as  "  an  appearance  of  reality,  as  distinct 
from  being  the  whole  and  ultimate  reality."  When 
we  translate  this  statement  out  of  the  technical 
language  of  philosophy  into  the  language  of  every- 
day life,  it  means  (a)  that  the  social  analogies  and 
metaphors  through  which  ordinary  religious  thought 
expresses  itself  cannot  be  taken  literally,  as  if  they 
were  either  plain  statements  of  fact  or  ultimate 
philosophical  -  truths.  And  (b)  it  means,  more 
especially,  that  the  theist's  concept  of  God,  as  the 
will  for  good  against  evil,  is  still  too  much  coloured 
by  this  antithesis  of  good  and  evil  to  be  adequate 
to  a  Reality  which,  as  a  whole,  is  perfect.  Thus 
there  is  a  subtle  change  in  this  reading  of  religion. 
This  comes  out  clearly  in  that  Bosanquet  does  not 
regard  religion  as  specially  connected  with  the 
supernatural,  or  even  the  divine  (soil.,  as  conceived 
by  theists).  It  is,  for  him,  the  attitude  to  whatever 
one  at  once  fears  and  approves,  i.e.,  worships. 
"  Whatever  makes  us  seem  to  ourselves  worthless 
in  our  mere  private  selves,  although  or  because 
attaching  ourselves  in  the  spirit  to  a  reality  of 
transcendent  value,  cannot  be  distinguished  from 
religion."  This  view  is  explicitly  intended  to 
provide  for  false  religions,  i.e.,  it  allows  that  this 
attitude  of  self -surrendering  attachment  and  worship 


may  be  directed  to  an  object  undeserving  of  such 
devotion.1  What  object,  then,  is  deserving  ?  The 
answer  gives  us  Bosanquet's  meaning  of  "  God," 
or  rather  what  he  would  mean  by  "  God  "  if  he 
did  not  on  the  whole  avoid  the  term  because  of 
its  theistic  associations.  His  own  strict  language 
is  studiously  impersonal :  he  means  by  "  God  " 
Reality  as  a  whole,  conceived  as  perfect,  and  as 
transcending  and  transforming  within  itself  the 
opposition  of  good  and  evil.  In  this  perfection 
man  participates,  and  religion  is  his  sense  of  this 
participation,  of  his  fragmentariness  made  whole, 
of  the  evil  in  him  overcome,  of  his  life,  for  all  its 
failures  and  blemishes,  filled  with  value.  "  Every 
satisfaction  and  achievement — every  self-transcen- 
dence in  which  we  become  united  with  something 
which  was  beyond  us — may  be  religiously  felt,  if 
it  is  taken  as  involving  recognition  of  a  higher 
perfection,  that  is,  as  coming  to  us  not  in  our  own 
strength,  but  as  a  pledge  of  our  absorption  in  the 
greater  world." 

Compared  with  the  concrete  imagery  of  current 
theology,  such  a  rendering  of  religion  will  inevitably 
seem  pale.  The  theist's  language  has  the  advantage 
there.  But  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  pallor  of 
the  language  reflects  not  thinness  of  experience, 

1  Patriotism,  for  example,  will  be  religious  by  this  formula,  and 
it  would  be  an  interesting  question,  whether,  or  under  what 
conditions,  it  is  a  "  false  "  religion. 


202    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

but  a  fullness  and  intensity  to  which  the  more 
f  amiliar  terms  of  religious  speech  seem  inadequate. 

(3)  Our  third  type  of  philosophy  of  religion — 
Alexander's — shares  the  modern  approach : 
"  Religion  is  not  the  sentiment  which  is  directed 
upon  God,  but  God  is  that  upon  which  the  religious 
sentiment  is  directed.  The  datum  of  experience 
is  that  sentiment,  and  what  God  is  is  known  only 
by  examining  its  deliverances. "  "  What  we  worship, 
that  is  God."  But  it  takes  a  highly  original  turn 
by  treating  "  deity  "  or  "  divine  quality  "  as  a 
term  more  fundamental  than  God.  "  God  "  is  the 
name  for  any  being  (there  may  be  more  than  one) 
which  possesses  "  deity."  Deity,  moreover,  is  a 
metaphysical  term  ;  in  other  words,  it  belongs  to 
philosophy  to  show,  by  an  examination  of  the  whole 
system  of  things,  that  what  religion  worships  as 
God  really  has  the  quality  which  alone  justifies  the 
religious  passion.  The  metaphysical  argument  by 
which  Alexander  tries  to  establish  the  locus,  so  to 
speak,  of  deity  in  the  scheme  of  things  may  be 
briefly  outlined  as  follows :  He  conceives  the 
universe  as  in  process  of  evolution,  creatively 
bringing  forth  qualities  which  are  not  only  new, 
but  form  a  hierarchy,  an  ascending  scale  of  perfec- 
tion. Not  to  go  back  to  the  beginnings  in 
"  space- time,"  which,  for  all  Alexander's  skill  in 
exposition,  are  very  obscure,  we  may  enumerate 


first  the  secondary  qualities,  then  life,  then  mind, 
as  to  date  the  latest  stages  in  this  evolution  towards 
greater  perfection.  "  Deity  "  is  the  next  level  of 
perfection,  in  the  birth-throes  of  which  the  world 
is  now  travailing.  It  follows  that  "  God,"  as  the 
possessor  of  the  quality  of  deity,  does  not  yet  exist. 
He  is  only  about  to  be.  "  God  is  the  whole  world 
as  possessing  the  quality  of  deity.  .  .  .  But  this 
possessor  of  deity  is  not  actual  but  ideal.  As  an 
actual  existent,  God  is  the  infinite  world  with  its 
nisus  towards  deity,  or,  to  adapt  a  phrase  of  Leibniz, 
as  big  or  in  travail  with  deity."  Religion  is  our 
sense  of  participating  in  this  creative  nisus  of  the 
world  towards  becoming  God.  In  us,  in  fact,  this 
nisus  is  at  its  intensest.  Mind  is,  so  to  speak, 
the  growing-point  towards  God.  There  lies  the 
solid  certainty  and  significance  of  religion. 

Fascinating  as  is  in  many  ways  this  essay  in 
theology,  and  concordant,  too,  in  its  emphasis  on 
the  reality  of  time,  on  creative  evolution,  on  progress 
towards  perfection,  with  marked  tendencies  of 
modern  thought,  yet  most  critics  have  been  puzzled 
whether  to  take  it  seriously.  And  rightly — for  it 
breaks,  in  effect,  with  every  great  historical  religion. 
It  satisfies  neither  the  theist  nor  the  absolutist. 
For,  the  one  holds  that  God  is  real  here  and  now, 
and  the  other  says  the  same  of  the  perfection  of 
the  universe.  In  this,  both  of  them  seem  truer  than 


204    MATTER,  LIFE,   MIND,  AND  GOD 

Alexander  to  the  deliverances  of  the  actual  religious 
consciousness,  which  is  fundamentally  an  attitude, 
not  towards  a  reality  about  to  be,  but  to- 
wards a  reality  which  endures  and  is,  in  fact, 
"  eternal." 

7.  Our  survey  of  contemporary  philosophy  of 
religion  would  be  incomplete  without  a  brief  mention 
of  the  problem  of  immortality. 

Traditionally,  immortality  stands  next  to  the 
existence  of  God  among  the  truths  which  religion  is 
held  to  guarantee,  and  with  the  defence  of  which 
its  own  existence  is  held  to  be  bound  up.  But  it 
must  be  recorded  that,  on  the  whole,  recent  philo- 
sophy does  not  assign  to  immortality  so  central 
or  fundamental  a  place.  In  fact,  nothing  is  more 
striking  than  the  hesitancy  and  almost  lukewarm- 
ness  with  which  the  subject  is  handled.  It  is  not 
uncommon  even  for  those  who,  like  McDougall, 
defend  the  belief  in  immortality,  to  disclaim  any 
personal  desire  for  it.  Even  Webb  makes  a  some- 
what wry  face  over  it  and  confesses  to  "  a  prejudice 
against  a  belief  which  jars  upon  and  distresses  my 
imagination  and  from  the  consideration  of  which 
my  mind  has  an  instinctive  tendency  to  turn  aside." 
Survival,  in  fact,  for  some  of  the  most  thoughtful 
modern  minds  has  ceased  to  be  a  thing  to  be  con- 
fidently expected  and  longed  for  :  it  has  become  a 
mere  possibility  not  infrequently  contemplated 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "    205 

with  aversion.  Apart  from  neo-scholastic  thinkers, 
no  philosopher  now  thinks  of  deducing  immortality 
a  priori  from  the  definition  of  the  soul  as  a  single, 
indivisible,  indestructible  spiritual  substance.  Few 
philosophers  share  McDougall's  view  that  belief  in 
survival  is  essential  to  morality.  The  attempts 
to  obtain  direct  evidence  of  survival  from  com- 
munications with  "  departed  spirits "  through 
mediums,  even  supposing  such  evidence  genuine, 
are  commonly  recognized  as  alien  in  spirit  to 
religion,  though  Sir  Oliver  Lodge  and  many  others 
think  otherwise.  The  advance  in  scientific  know- 
ledge of  the  bodily  basis  of  consciousness  has  greatly 
increased  for  us  the  difficulty  of  accepting  survival 
as  a  fact.  In  general,  a  philosopher  will  make  his 
assent  to  the  doctrine  depend  very  largely  on  the 
nature  of  the  supposed  life  after  death.  But  this 
question  takes  us  either  into  a  region  of  more  or 
less  mythological  speculation — reincarnation,  trans- 
migration of  souls,  resurrection  of  the  body,  and  so 
forth — or  else  brings  us  back  in  imaginative  form 
to  the  fundamental  problem,  What  kind  of  life  is 
truly  worth  living  ?  But  once  we  ask  what  the 
values  are  which  make  existence  supremely  desirable 
and  satisfying,  we  may  be  led  on  to  consider,  on  the 
one  hand,  whether  these  values  are  not  within  our 
reach  here  and  now,  in  "  this  life,"  and,  on  the 
other,  whether  what  we  care  about  fundamentally 


206    MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 

is  not  the  survival,  or  eternity,  of  these  values 
rather  than  the  survival  of  our  personal  selves. 
Some  such  shift  of  emphasis  is  noticeable  in  Webb's 
remark  that  "  the  only  form  of  the  hope  which  it 
is  profitable  to  indulge  is  that  which  is  directed, 
not  upon  our  own  eternal  life,  but  upon  God's ; 
and  only  upon  our  own  as  involved  in  his."  And 
Bosanquet,  accepting  the  consequences  of  his  whole 
position,  directly  declares  that  the  criticism  of  our 
desires  which  makes  clear  to  us  what  as  reasonable 
beings  we  really  want,  leads  us,  not  towards  the 
prolongation  after  death  of  our  individual  existences, 
but  towards  the  assurance  that  the  fundamental 
values  are  "  eternally  real  in  an  ultimate  being  and 
in  the  universe  of  appearances." 

Time  and  eternity,  the  transitory  and  the 
enduring,  that  which  passes  and  that  which  is 
stable — these  are  for  us  moderns,  as  they  were  for 
the  ancient  Greeks,  two  of  the  poles  round  which 
our  thought  revolves.  Whether  the  individual 
self  is  transitory  or  enduring,  that  is  the  problem 
of  immortality.  On  the  whole,  modern  philosophy 
seems  as  profoundly  impressed  with  the  transitori- 
ness  of  human  life  hi  the  succession  of  generations, 
as  with  the  presence  in  that  life  of  something  which 
is  untouched  by  time  or  death.  What  this  some- 
thing may  be  has  been  variously  defined,  from 
soul-substance  to  eternal  values.  Different  thinkers 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "    207 

will,  no  doubt,  continue  to  estimate  these 
alternatives  differently.  But  it  is  not  a  bad  view 
which  bids  us,  rather  than  fix  our  hopes  upon  the 
future  beyond  death,  to  remember  that  we  are 
mortal  and  to  seize  our  opportunity  here  and 
now  of  filling  our  lives  with  the  things  that  are 
eternal. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  literature  on  the  philosophy  and  psychology  of  religion 
is  so  extensive  as  to  make  it  more  than  ever  necessary  to  warn 
the  reader  that  the  following  list  is  only  a  selection,  though  it 
includes,  among  others,  most  of  the  books  from  which  the 
lecturer  is  conscious  of  having  learnt  to  appreciate  the  philo- 
sophical problems  which  religion  raises. 

1.  Alexander,  S.       Space,  Time  and  Deity.    (Macmillan  &  Co., 

1920.) 

2.  Bosanquet,  B.      The   Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual. 

(Macmillan  &  Co.,  1914.) 

3.  Bosanquet,  B.      What  Religion  is.     (Macmillan  &  Co.,  1920.) 

4.  Hocking,  W.  E.  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience. 

(Yale  University  Press,  1912.) 

5.  James,  William    Varieties  of  Religious  Experience.     (Long- 

mans, Green  &  Co.,  1902.) 

6.  James,  William  The  Will  to  Believe.     (Longmans,  Green  & 

Co.,  1903-) 

7.  James,  William  A  Pluralistic  Universe.     (Longmans,  Green 

&  Co.,  1909.) 

8.  Pringle-  The  Idea  of  God  in  the  Light  of  Recent  Philo~ 
Pattison,  A.  S.        sophy.     (Oxford  Univ.  Press,  1917.) 

9.  Webb,  C.  C.  J.     Problems  in  the  Relations  of  God  to  Man. 

(Nisbet  &  Co.,  1911.) 

10.  Webb,  C.  C.  J.     God    and   Personality.    (George    Allen    & 

Unwin,   1919.) 

11.  Webb,  C.  C.  J.     Divine  Personality  and  Human  Life.  (George 

Allen  &  Unwin,  1920.) 


208    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 


12.  Merz,  J.  T. 

13.  Merz.  J.  T. 

14.  Ward,  James 

15.  Sorley,  W.  R. 

1 6.  Royce,  J. 

17.  Royce,  J. 

1 8.  Balfour,  A.  J. 

19.  H6ffding,  H. 

20.  Galloway,  G. 

21.  Collingwood, 

R.  G. 

22.  Rashdall,  H. 

23.  Martineau,  J. 

24.  Radha- 
krishnan,  S. 

25.  Pratt,  J.  B. 

26.  Stratton. 
G.M. 

27.  VonHOgel, 
Baron  F. 


History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,  Vol.  IV.  (W.  Blackwood 
&  Sons,  1914.) 

Science  and  Religion.  (W.  Blackwood  & 
Sons,  1915.) 

The  Realm  of  Ends.  (Camb.  Univ.  Press, 
1911.) 

Moral  Values  and  the  Idea  of  God.  (Camb. 
Univ.  Press,  1916.) 

The  World  and  the  Individual,  2  Vols. 
(Macmillan  &  Co.,  1904.) 

The  Problem  of  Christianity,  2  Vols.  (Mac- 
millan &  Co.,  1913.) 

Theism  and  Humanism.  (Hodder  &  Stough- 
ton,  1915.) 

Philosophy  of  Religion,  tr.  B.  E.  Mayer. 
(Macmillan  &  Co.,  1906.) 

Philosophy   of  Religion.     (T.    &    T.    Clark, 

1914-) 

Religion    and    Philosophy.     (Macmillan     & 

Co.,  1916.) 
"  Personality,  Human  and  Divine,"  in  H. 

Sturt,  Personal  Idealism.     (Macmillan  & 

Co.,  1902.) 
A  Study  of  Religion.     (Oxford  Univ.  Press, 

2nd  Edit.,  1900.) 
The    Reign    of   Religion    in    Contemporary 

Philosophy.     (Macmillan  &  Co.,  1920.) 
The    Religious    Consciousness.     (Macmillan 

&  Co.,  1920.) 
The  Psychology  of  the  Religious  Life.   (George 

Allen  &  Unwin,  1917.) 
Essays  and  Addresses  on  the  Philosophy  of 

Religion.     (J.  M.  Dent  &  Co.,  1921.) 


The  views  of  Alexander  (No.  i),  Bosanquet  (Nos.  2,  3), 
Hocking  (No.  4),  James  (Nos.  6,  7),  Pringle-Pattison  (No.  8), 
Webb  (Nos.  9,  10,  n),  Ward  (No.  14),  Rashdall  (No.  22),  have 
been  touched  on  in  the  text.  But  I  would  draw  special  attention 
to  chs.  viii-x  in  the  second  volume  of  Bosanquet's  Gifford 
Lectures  (No.  2).  The  psychology  of  religion  was,  as  our 
American  friends  would  say,  "  put  on  the  map  "  by  James's 
Varieties  (No.  5).  Its  closing  chapter  (ch.  xx),  with  its  use  of 
F.  W.  H.  Myers's  concept  of  the  "  subliminal  "  to  explain  the 


RELIGION  &  THE  MEANING  OF  "  GOD  "    209 

contact  of  the  individual  mind  with  the  cosmic  consciousness, 
has  given  a  powerful  influence  to  the  tendency  to  regard  religion 
as  close  to  the  primitive  moving-forces  of  life,  to  the  &lan  vital, 
to  the  libido  of  the  Freudians  (of  which  it  is  in  varying  degrees 
the  sublimation),  to  the  instincts  many  of  which  it  synthesizes 
within  itself  (cf.  W.  McDougall,  Social  Psychology,  ch.  vii). 
Among  the  numerous  American  books  on  the  psychology  of 
religion,  those  by  Pratt  (No.  25)  and  Stratton  (No.  26)  are 
perhaps  the  best.  The  former  especially  is  to  be  recommended. 
Merz's  account  (No.  12)  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  during  the 
last  century  is  full  of  learning.  No.  1 3  brings  out  the  importance, 
for  the  development  of  a  theistic  religion,  of  the  fact  that  persons 
are  the  first  objects  to  be  discriminated  by  the  child.  No.  14 
contains  a  typical  exposition  of  the  grounds  for  a  "  spiritual 
pluralism,"  i.e.,  for  maintaining  the  ultimate  distinctness  (and 
therefore  finitude)  of  individual  minds,  human  or  divine.  C.  A. 
Richardson's  recent  Spiritual  Pluralism  (Camb.  Univ.  Press, 
1920)  is  another  good  statement  of  the  same  type  of  view, 
whilst  No.  24  is  a  lively  criticism  of  "  pluralistic  theism  "  in 
favour  of  "  monistic  idealism."  Sorley's  book  (No.  15)  is 
especially  valuable  for  making  conveniently  accessible  much  of 
the  work  which  has  been  done  of  recent  years  on  the  theory  of 
value.  In  No.  16,  Royce  expounds  his  own  version  of  the  type 
of  "  idealism,"  which  identifies  the  "  Absolute  "  of  philosophy 
with  the  "  God  "  of  religion,  and  he  argues  for  the  immortality 
of  individual  souls  as  each  embodying  an  eternal  purpose  of 
God's.  In  No.  17  he  finds  the  essence  of  religion  rather  in 
participation  in  the  life  of  the  "  beloved  community "  and, 
consequently,  emphasizes  in  Christianity  rather  the  Church 
than,  as  is  usual  in  Protestantism,  the  personality  of  Christ. 
Collingwood's  essay  (No.  21)  is  fresh  and  thoughtful,  and 
deserves  much  more  notice  than,  owing  to  its  appearance  in  the 
midst  of  the  war,  it  has  received.  Its  "  realistic  "  position, 
however,  no  longer  represents  its  author's  present  views.  In 
No.  1 8  Mr.  Balfour,  with  matchless  dialectic,  once  more  tears 
down  "  naturalism,"  in  order  to  erect  theism  in  its  place.  But 
the  critical  part  of  his  argument  far  outweighs  the  constructive. 
Martineau  (No.  23)  was  a  religious  genius  and  so  is  von  Hugel 
(No.  27),  and  what  they  have  to  say  on  religion  is  said  at  first 
hand,  and  will  always  remain  worth  reading.  Nos.  19  and  20 
are  both  competent  and  instructive  general  treatments  of  the 
problems  of  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

In  general,  the  reader  should  bear  in  mind  that  there  is  no 


210    MATTER,   LIFE,   MIND,   AND  GOD 

subject  on  which  it  is  more  important  that  he  should,  whilst 
studying  all  views,  use  his  own  judgment  in  selecting  that  view 
which  seems  to  him  best  to  interpret  his  own  religious  life.  But 
the  existence  of  other  views  should  help  to  remind  him  how  many 
are  the  forms  of  religion,  and  how  necessary  are  mutual  sympathy 
and  tolerance. 


INDEX 


ALEXANDER,  S.,  23,  155,  161  ; 
Space,  Time  and  Deity,  22, 
42,  163,  207,  208  ;  on 
"  Deity,"  196,  202-207 

Animism,    32,    167 

Aristotle,  on  the  "  soul,"  149  ft., 
155 

B  CON,  Francis,  on  knowledge 
as  power,  14  ;  on  barrenness 
of  final  causes,  120 

Balfour,  A.  J.,  175,  208,  209 

Behaviourism,  101,  138,  140, 
155.  See  also  MIND,  PSYCH- 
OLOGY, and  SOUL 

Bergson,  Henri,  Creative  Evo- 
lution, 22  and  note,  go  n.,  125 
163  ;  on  the  living  boay,  95 
elan  vital,  100,  115-6,  153 
against  "  fmalism,"  119,  126 
on  mind  as  "  overflowing  ' 
body,  1 66 

Berkeley,  G.,  on  "  matter," 
48,  49,  62,  63  n.,  75  ;  Prin- 
ciples of  Human  Knowledge, 
75  n.,  85 

Bifurcation,  fallacy  of,  see 
NATURE 

Biology,  philosophical  problems 
raised  by,  ch.  3,  passim  ; 
place  of  man  in  biological 
theory,  89  ff.  ;  mechanical  v. 
vitalistic  views,  91-96  ;  tele- 
ological  concepts  in,  117- 
124  ;  relation  to  physics  and 
psychology,  127  ff. 

Bosanquet,  B.,  42,  119  ;  on 
immanent  teleology  in 


Nature,  124,  125,  126 ;  on 
soul  and  body,  155  ;  on  mind 
as  a  "  world,"  162,  163  ; 
on  religion  and  God,  199- 
202  ;  on  immortality,  206  ; 
Gifford  Lectures,  195,  207, 
208 

Bose,   Sir  Jagadis  Chunder,  128 

Boyle,  Robert,  Disquisition 
about  the  Final  Causes  of 
Things,  126 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  175,  195  ; 
Appearance  and  Reality,  194 

Bridgewater  Treatises,  33,  119, 
124 

Broad,  C.  D.,  Mechanical 
Explanation  and  its  Alterna- 
tives, 103  n.,  105,  125,  126 

Buckle,  H.  T.,  History  of  Civili- 
zation, 20 

Buddhism,    169   n. 

Burnet,  J.,  148 

Butler,  Samuel,  118,  119,  125, 
126 

Bury,  J.  B.,  History  of  the  Idea 
of  Progress,  15 

CAMPBELL,  N.,  Physics  :  The 
Elements,  53  n.,  84  ;  on 
"  universal  assent  "  as  test 
of  what  is  real,  55,  59,  85 

Christianity,  169  ff.;    180  ff. 

Collingwood,  R.  G.,  208,  209 

Consciousness,  140  ff.,  151  ff., 
158  ff.  ;  as  "  cross-section  " 
of  universe,  160  ff.,  162. 
See  also  MIND,  and  PSYCH- 
OLOGY 


212       MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 


Comte,  Auguste,  19  ;  "  religion 
of  humanity,"  23  ;  law  of 
progress,  173 

Crawford,  W.  J.,  136,  163,  164 
Creativity,     modern     emphasis 
on,  22 

DARBISHIRE,    A.    D.,    Introduc- 
tion to  Biology,  90  «.,  125,  126 
Darwin,  Charles,  19,  99,  100 
Descartes,    R.,    as    founder    of 
modern  physics,  47  ;    one    of 
first   "  mechanists  "   in    biol- 
ogy,      101  ;       two-substance 
theory    of    body  and     soul, 

151 

Dewey,  John,  21,  22 
Driesch,    H.,     v.     Loeb,     93  ; 

on     "  entelechy,"     96,     100, 

112-114  ;   125, 126 
Durkheim,   E.,   180 

EDDINGTON,  A.  J.,  Space,  Time 
and  Gravitation,  84,  85 

Einfuhlung,  in 

Entelechy,  96,  100,  113 

Evil,  problem  of,  176-180.  See 
also  MELIORISM 

FREUD,  S.,  143,  160 

GALLOWAY,  G.,  208,  209 

Galton,  Francis,  20 

Gibbs,  Willard,  123 

God,  ch.  5  ;  hypothesis  of,  in 
Science,  33,  98-100 ;  proofs 
of  existence  of,  120,  190-204  ; 
and  mysticism,  178 ;  mean- 
ing of,  193  ff.  ;  as  personal, 
196-199 

HALDANE,  J.  S.,  on  biologist's 
point  of  view,  109,  no,  in, 
116;  Mechanism,  Life  and 
Personality,  125,  126 

Haldane,  Viscount,  The  Reign 
of  Relativity,  84,  85 

Hall,  G.  Stanley,  141 


Hegel,  F.,  on  "  actuelle  Seele," 

155 

Henderson,  L.  J.,  The  Fitness 
of  the  Environment,  121,  125, 
126  ;  The  Order  of  Nature, 
121,  124,  125  ;  on  organisms 
as  "  systems  "  and  on  "  pre- 
paration "  for  life,  121-124 

Hocking,  W.  E.,  on  "  prag- 
matic "  test  of  religion,  185  ; 
The  Meaning  of  God,  194,  207, 
208  ;  on  knowledge  of  God, 
198  ff. 

Horfding,  H.,  195,  208,  209 

Holt,  E.  B.,  151  ;  on  "  be- 
haviour," 155  ff.,  157,  162, 
164  ;  The  Freudian  Wish, 
1 60,  163 

Hugel,  Baron  F.  von,  208,  209 

Humanism,  21 

Hume,  D.,  Treatise  on  Human 
Nature,  85,  120  and  note; 
on  "  economy  "  of  Nature, 
122  ;  on  "  soul,"  152 

Huxley,  T.,  20,  108 

IMMORTALITY,  and  morality, 
167  ;  recent  theories  of,  204- 
207 

Instrumentalism,  21 

Introspection,  158 

JAMES,  William,  21,  176,  207, 
208 

Jennings,  H.  S.,  Contributions 
to  the  Study  of  the  Behaviour 
of  Lower  Organisms,  89 

KANT,     I.,     Critique     of    Pure 
Reason,    85,    120    and    note ; 
on    "  Rational    Psychology," 
152  ;    on  proofs  of  existence 
of  God,  120,  192  ff. 
"  Kluge  Hans,"  the,   136 
Knowledge,     2,     24,      37  ;     of 
religion,  188  ft. 

LAIRD,  J.,  A  Study  in  Realism, 
42,  161,  164 


INDEX 


213 


Lansing,  R.,  The  Peace  Nego- 
tiations, 132  n. 

Life,  ch.  3,  passim  ;  concept  of, 
93,  109.  See  also  BIOLOGY 

Locke,  John,  62 

Lodge,     Sir    Oliver,    Raymond, 

165.   205 

Loeb,  Jacques,  91  ;  v.  Driesch, 
93  ;  on  mechanistic  explana- 
tion in  biology,  106  ;  on  "trop- 
isms,"  128  ;  Organism  as  a 
Whole,  102,  125,  126 

Lorenz,  L.,  on  "  macroscopic  " 
v.  "  microscopic  "  pheno- 
mena, 103 

McDouoALL,  W.,  Body  and 
Mind,  153,  164  ;  on  belief  in 
immortality,  167,  204-5  •  on 
the  soul,  ibid.,  209 

Mach,  Ernst,  60  ;  Analysis 
of  Sensations,  76,  84,  85 

Martineau,  J.,  208,  209 

Marvin,  F.  £>.,  17  n.,  42 

Matter,  philosophical  criticism 
of,  ch.  2  ;  meanings  of,  48- 
65  ;  v.  God,  49  ;  v.  mind, 
62  ;  v.  the  unreal,  54  ;  as 
electromagnetic,  57  ;  as  ex- 
cluding sense-data,  59 ;  as 
cause  of  sensations,  60  ;  as 
a  false  theory  of  what,  and 
how,  we  perceive,  65-73  ; 
history  of  theory  of,  73-75 

Mechanism,  ch.  3  ;  as  a  protest 
against  theologizing  in 
science,  97-102  ;  mild  and 
rigid  forms  of,  103-8  ; 
Driesch' s  criticism  of,  112 

Meliorism,  22,  176.  See  also 
EVIL 

Merz,  J.  T.,  History  of  European 
Thought  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century,  42,  125,  126,  127 ; 
Fragment  on  Human  Mind, 
163  ;  Science  and  Religion, 
208  ;  introduced  term  "  syn- 
optic," 43. 

Metchnikoff,  E.,  20 


Mill,  John  Stuart,  19  ;  Essays 
on  Religion,  23  ;  criticism  of 
theism,  ibid.  ;  Examination 
of  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
Philosophy,  85,  175,  176 

Mind,  as  epiphenomenon,  87  ; 
in  biology,  ch.  3,  passim ; 
nature  and  function  of,  ch. 
4  ;  as  a  quality  or  power 
admitting  of  degrees,  131  ff.  ; 
as  both  creative  and  logical, 
134  ;  problem  of  relation 
to  body,  137,  143  ff.,  154  ; 
technical  language  of,  138  ff.  ; 
as  a  "  world,"  162 

Myers,  F.  W.  H.,  208 

NATURE,  as  object  of  science, 
ch.  2  ;  as  "  what  we  perceive 
by  the  senses,"  ibid.  ;  as 
"  closed  to  mind,"  25  ;  and 
moral  values,  26  ff.  ;  an- 
thropomorphic and  anthropo- 
centric  theories  of,  29  ff.  ; 
mechanical  theory  of,  ch. 
3  ;  philosophy  of,  ch.  2, 
passim  ;  "  bifurcation  "  of, 
72,  74,  107,  114 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac,  120  and  note 

ORGANIC,  used  differently  by 
biologist  and  chemist,  109 

PALEY,  W.,  Evidences,  120 

Plato,  i,  148,  149 

Pearson,    Karl,    60 ;     Grammar 

of  Science,  76,  84,  85 
Perry,  R.  B.,  16  n. 
Pessimism,  189 
Philosophy,  as  synoptic,  ch.  i  ; 

relation     to     science,     ibid.  ; 

relation    to    religion,    chs.    i 

and    5  ;     systems    of,    5    ff.  ; 

lack  of,  in  education,  36  ff.  ; 

as  "  defender  of  faith,"   172 

ff.,  183-190 
Physics,  as  an  empirical  science, 

5i 
Positivism,  173  ff. 


214        MATTER,  LIFE,  MIND,  AND  GOD 


Poynting,  J.  H.,  84,  85 

Pragmatism,  21,  22 

Pratt.  J.  B.,  178  «.,  186,  187  ; 

The   Religious   Consciousness, 

208,  209 
Pringle-Pattison,     A.     S.,     42  ; 

Idea  of  God,  194,  207,  208 
Psychical     Research,     56.     See 

also  SPIRITUALISM 
Psycho-Analysis,    21,     142    flf., 

1 60 
Psychology,    ch.    4  ;     35,    51  ; 

present-day  conflicts  in,  130, 

134-145  ;     animal,    136    ff.  ; 

"  without  a  soul,"  152  ;  value 

of  concept  of  behaviour  for, 

155 

RAMAKRISHNA,  178  and  note 

Rashdall,  H.,  177,  208,  209 

Realism,  43 

Religion,  chs.  i  and  5  ; 
"  religion  of  humanity,"  16, 
23>  175  ;  relation  to  philos- 
ophy, 170  ff.,  182  ;  not  to  be 
judged  by  non -religious  stand- 
ard, 171  ;  and  creed,  ibid.  ; 
attacked  by  Positivism,  173 
ff.  ;  defended  by  philosophy, 

183  ff.  ;     not   departmental, 

184  ;     as    "  attitude,"    ibid.  ; 
indefinable,    187  ;     and   God, 
192.     See  also  SCIENCE,  and 
PHILOSOPHY 

"  Rolf  "  (a  trained  dog),  136 
Radhakrishnan,  S.,  208 
Richardson,     C.     A.,     Spiritual 

Pluralism,  164,  209 
Royce,  Josiah,  198  n.  ;   208,  209 
Russell,  Bertrand,  17,  42,  84,  86 
Rutherford,  Sir  Ernest,  65 

SCHILLER,  F.  C.  S.,  21 

Science,  ch.  i  ;  method  of,  2  ff.  ; 
relation  to  "religion  of  human- 
ity," 1 6  ff.  ;  emancipation 
from  theology,  24  ff.,  33  ff.  ; 
as  power,  14  ff.  ;  as  theory, 
24  ff.  ;  as  dealing  with 


"  Nature,"  25  ff.  ;  as  abstract, 
26,  52 

Socrates,  148 

Soddy,  F.,  20,  42 

Sophocles,  A  ntigone,  2nd 
chorus,  13  ff. 

Sorley,  W.  R.,  42,  208,  209 

Soul,  history  of  concept  of,  145- 
153  ;  as  principle  of  life, 
146  ;  as  spirit  separable  from 
body,  147  ;  as  something  to 
be  "  saved,"  148  ;  Aristotle's 
theory  of,  149  ff.  ;  as  "  con- 
sciousness," 151  ff.  ;  as 
"  behaviour,"  153,  160  ff.  ; 
as  "  overflowing  "  body,  167  ; 
immortality  of,  167,  204-7 

Spinoza,  B.,  Ethics,  6  ;  on  tele- 
ology, 1 20  n. 

Spiritualism,  135 

Stratton,  G.  M.,  208,  209 

Subconsciousness,  see  CON- 
SCIOUSNESS 

Synoptic  vision  (of  philosophy), 
ch.  i,  passim;  45  ff. 

TANSLEY,  A.  G.,  The  New  Psych- 
ology, 164 

Teleology,  ch.  3  ;  23,  33,  89, 
112,  117-124 

Theism,  revival  of,  194-199 

Theology,  and  science,  24  ff.  ; 
theologizing  in  science,  33  ff.  ; 
and  philosophy,  171.  See 
also  RELIGION,  and  GOD 

Thomson,  J.  A.,  42,  no,  126; 
System  of  Animate  Nature 
39,  93.  98,  1 1 6,  125  ;  on  intel- 
lect and  feeling  in  study  of 
Nature,  39  ff. 

Tyler,  E.,  Primitive  Culture, 
167 

UNIVERSE,  36 

VARISCO,  B.,  The  Great  Prob- 
lems (quoted),  166 

Vitalism,  Vital  Force,  Vital 
Energy,  ch.  3,  passim 


INDEX 


215 


WALLAS,  Graham,  on  the 
"  Great  Society,"  18  ;  on 
social  psychology  21  n. 

Ward,  James,  118,  125,  126, 
177,  208 

Watson,  John  B.,  153,  158,  159  ; 
Psychology  from  the  Stand- 
point of  a  Behaviourist, 
164 

Webb,  C.  C.  J.,  on  definition  of 
religion,  187,  190  ;  on  exist- 
ence of  God,  192  ff.  ;  Gifford 
Lectures,  174,  207,  208 ;  on 


God  as  personal,  197  ;  on 
immortality,  204,  206 

Wheeler,  R.  M.,  92 

Whitehead,  A.  N.,  29,  31,  42, 
48,  5i,  52,  53.  56,  58.  60,  72, 
73.  75  I  on  different  kinds  of 
objects,  68,  81  ff.  ;  on  Nature 
as  a  "  passage  of  events," 
76-84  ;  on  life,  27  n.,  84,  109  ; 
affinity  to  Bergson's  views, 
8 1  ;  Concept  of  Nature,  25, 
47,  84  ;  Principles  of  Natural 
Knowledge,  27  n.,  47,  77,  84 


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